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SUMMARY 
The first essay of this dissertation aims to bridge two strands of literature on 
investments in the pulp and paper industry, the one that follows the assumption of 
continuous capital adjustments and the other which adheres to the notions of lumpy 
investments in capital-intensive industries. Following regional studies on capital 
investments, I use a first-differencing, limited probability and logit models to examine 
papermakers’ investment decisions against a number of supply factors. The first group of 
factors hypothesized to influence the choice of investment location includes such 
‘traditional’ factors of production as variable input costs – prices for materials, labor, and 
energy. In addition to the list of the ‘traditional’ cost variables, I examine the impact of 
regulatory stringency of local/state environmental and tax policies. To complement and 
expand the scope of the previous regional literature on the industry, I utilize data that 
span over 1984-2002 covering capital progression of all pulp and paper mills located in 
the U.S. 
The second essay of this dissertation examines the relationship between pollution 
abatement and voluntary prevention efforts at pulp and paper mills and regulatory 
stringency they face. Using facility level data on U.S. pulp and paper mills for 1989-
2002, I estimate the fixed effects negative binomial model to test the hypotheses of 
‘responsive regulation’ and whether regulators are driven by numerical pollution targets 
or budgetary constraints. I find that pollution abatement and voluntary pollution 
prevention have greater impact on regulatory stringency than government budgetary 
expenditures. Additionally, state political pressure, pollution prevention legislation, firm 
and mill characteristics are found to be significant predictors of regulatory behavior. 
x 
The third and final essay sets to analyze the relationship between pollution 
prevention (P2) policy instruments and adoption of P2 modifications. Using facility level 
data on U.S. pulp and paper mills for 1991-2002, I estimate the negative binomial model 
to test the hypotheses of whether P2 state legislation and policies on target setting, 
reporting requirement, mandatory planning, and grants have positive impact on P2 
adoptions: (1) when they are grouped together and (2) when combined in two categories 
– (a) management and logistical or (b) product and process modifications. In addition, I 
examine the effects of regulatory and political threats, P2 firm spillovers and prior mill 
experience with P2 modifications, firm and mill size, and type of mill product. I find that: 
(1) policy instruments have different effects on the two groups of P2 modifications, (2) 
mandatory planning and grants have perverse results, (3) regulatory and political threats, 
firm spillover and prior mill experience are strong predictors of P2 adoptions, and (4) 






This dissertation consists of three empirical analyses examining the interactive 
and evolving nature of government regulations and how the regulated industries respond 
to the changes in the regulatory climate. The three essays bring together a number of 
strands of literature in environmental economics and policy studies discussing how 
changes in environmental policy were shaped by industry concerns and which strategies 
firms chose in order to adjust to the changes in policy. This work, however, does not 
attempt to document the actual interactions between regulators and the industry in order 
to propose a theoretical framework of how these interactions affect the environmental 
policy. Instead, the thesis, first, briefly documents the changes in the nature of regulations 
using an example of one heavily regulated capital-intensive industry and then investigates 
industry response through three strands of literature, each focusing on different 
adjustment strategies or market responses to the regulations. 
The overall research question of the dissertation is how industries respond and 
adjust to changing regulations. The traditional reaction of the industry to government 
interventions is that regulations increase operating costs and when faced with increasing 
operating costs, decreasing productivity and profit margins, additional environmental 
compliance costs can drive businesses to bankruptcy or cause them to experience massive 
1 
operating net losses. As a result, firms are forced to downsize, move oversees, and 
employ other adjustment strategies to keep their operating costs down. 
I start my investigation in Essay 1 with the often-made proposition that when 
industries face heavy regulations and are required to invest large amount of capital in 
order to comply with these regulations, they will alter their capital investment patterns to 
accommodate increased costs. The literature suggests that firms adjust to high 
compliance costs by downsizing and using other restructuring strategies (Hammer and 
Champy 1993; Gray et al. 2011a, 2011b), that abatement capital investment crowds out 
productive investment (Gray and Shadbegian 1998), and finally firms shift the production 
to locations with less stringent environmental regulations (Bergman and Johansson 2002; 
Gray and Shadbegian 1998, 2002; Lundmark 2001, 2003; Lundmark and Nilsson 2001). 
The debate that the only recourse to strict regulations available to firms is to cut 
down their labor costs or to move to a different location altogether assumes that 
government-to-industry interaction is unidirectional. This, however, is not accurate and it 
became evident that industry concerns can be heard when in 1981 President Reagan 
issued an executive order to conduct cost-benefit analyses of government regulations 
(Koehler 2007). There has been increasing body of literature that the U.S. environmental 
policy changed from command-and-control or top-down and adopted a more 
accommodating flexible approach (to cite a few, OECD 1999; Brouhle et al. 2004, 2007; 
Lyon and Maxwell 2001; and Lyon 2013). 
Concurrently, theoretical works appeared discussing the more complex nature of 
interactions of government and firms (Hemphill 1993/1994; Cothran 1993; Maxwell, 
Lyon, et al. 2000; Maxwell and Decker 2006; Decker 2005, 2007; Heyes and Kapur 
2 
2009; Colson and Menapace, 2012; Arguedas 2013). This strand of literature argues that 
government and firms engage in complex, multi-stage games, where firms would adjust 
their pollution levels in order to preempt regulatory stringency. Regulatory threat, the 
authors argue, is also shaped by budgetary constraints and political and consumer 
pressures. In Essay 2 of this dissertation, I examine whether firms’ environmental 
performance has impact on the stringency of regulatory monitoring and enforcement they 
face. I disaggregate environmental performance by the required-to-report amounts of 
toxic substances released into the environment (toxics release inventory, TRI), and 
voluntary adoptions of pollution prevention (P2) modifications. Examining the impact of 
the TRI and P2 measures on the expected count of inspections and enforcements, allows 
for comparisons of which one is more effective as a signal of environmental stewardship. 
In addition and following the latest theoretical works on this subject (Hayes and Kapur 
2009) I examine the extent to which regulatory actions are constrained or driven by their 
budgets. 
Jaffe et al. (2002) and Koehler (2007) reviewed the literature on the dynamic 
relationship between: (i) environmental policy and firm environmental innovations and 
(ii) environmental policy and firms’ participation in voluntary environmental programs 
(VEPs). According to the authors, much of the theoretical and empirical literature 
concurs that in the last twenty years VEPs have become part of the mainstream business 
strategy helping corporations address and manage their public relations image. The 
authors also conclude that the question of how environmental policy instruments affect 
the adoption and diffusion of environmental technologies remains to be one of the key 
research questions. In Essay 3 of the dissertation, I examine the impact of environmental 
3 
policy directed at voluntary pollution prevention practices, other market pressures, and 
the effectiveness of individual policy instruments resulting in the number of pollution 
prevention activities undertaken at individual pulp and paper facilities. 
Answers to the proposed research questions in each of the three essays of this 
thesis help shed more light on the complex nature of evolving relationships between 
government regulations and regulated industries, as exemplified by the case study of the 
environmental regulations of the U.S. pulp and paper industry, one of the more capital-
intensive manufacturing industries. The first essay helps inform whether the industry’s 
expectations of prohibitively high environmental abatement costs translated into 
drastically different investment patterns. The second essay addresses more directly the 
pre-emptive nature of environmental efforts undertaken by producers in order to reduce 
regulatory stringency. And the third essay examines if more flexible government policies, 
which are designed to encourage pollution prevention, in fact have positive impact on 
pollution prevention adoption. 
 
1.2.Empirical Focus: U.S. Paper Industry 
Pulp and paper industry represents an interesting case study because it is one of 
the biggest and most capital-intensive traditional industries with the latest pulping and 
paper machines amounting up to $1.5 billion in capital costs.1 In addition, the technology 
of industrial paper-making has not changed dramatically since its invention, and only 
1 McNutt J. (2002), “The Paper Industry”, Presentation for the Sloan Workshop on 
Globalization, Center for Paper Business and Industry Studies (CPBIS), Georgia Institute 
of Technology (GaTech), and Institute of Paper Science and Technology (IPST), Atlanta, 
GA. 
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marginal process and product innovations characterize its technological progression. 
Theoretically, high capital expenditures associated with new mills and limited room for 
drastic technological advancements translate into high entry costs and inability to quickly 
re-engineer and/or relocate in response to such exogenous market shocks as government 
regulations. Hence, pulp and paper mills are expected to resist sudden changes. 
On the other hand, the paper industry is, in fact, subject to heavy regulation. First, 
the industry is one of the most natural-resource-intensive. Its primary raw material is 
wood fiber accounting for up to 40% of total materials costs for some paper products and 
the U.S. Department of Commerce recognizes the industry as the single largest industrial 
process water user among U.S. manufacturers.2 Furthermore, pulp and paper mills release 
pollutants into air, water and land, and have to comply with the regulations covering all 
three pollution media. Finally, the Cluster Rules of 1997, which integrated the regulations 
in all three media, were designed for bleached paper-grade kraft, soda, and paper-grade 
sulfite manufacturing processes, are specific to the pulp and paper industry only. The 
combination of its resistance to quick market adjustments due to its capital intensity, 
being one of the most regulated industries among heavy manufacturers, and having a set 
of regulations that are designed specifically for the industry, makes the U.S. papermaking 
sector an interesting case study of how traditional manufacturers respond to ever-
changing demands of environmentally-conscious society and its regulatory climates. 
 
2 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Office of Compliance Sector 





                                                          
 
1.3.Industry Overview 
Prior to the 2001-02 recession, the U.S. paper industry, National Industrial 
Classification System (NAICS) 322,3 was one of top 10 industries4 with the national 
value of shipments amounting to $171.4 billion in 2013 and real value-added of $51.6 
billion, or 6.38% of total real value-added in the nondurable goods sector5. Currently, the 
domestic paper production amounts to about one-fifth of global paper production.6 And 
as of June 2014, the sector employed 379,300 workers with the average weekly earnings 
of $1,056 with the total compensation of $29.5 billion in 2012. 
Historically, the industry has been one of the most capital-intensive industries 
with the latest and most modern pulping and paper machines, which are equipped with 
computer-based operating systems, totaling up to $1.5 billion in capital costs.7 According 
3 This report focuses interchangeably on the complete paper manufacturing sector, 
represented by the older standard industry classification (SIC) system as 26 or NAICS 
322, and its subsector consisting of pulp, paper and paperboard mills, denoted as SIC 
261, 262, and 263 or NAICS 3221. The rest of the paper manufacturing sector consists of 
paper converters and box producers and are given by SIC 265 and 267 or NAICS 3222. 
For more information on the two standard industry classification systems and their 
correspondence, see: http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/index.html and 
https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html.  
4 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Office of Compliance Sector 
Notebook Project (2002), Profile of the Pulp and Paper Industry, 2nd Edition, November 
2002, EPA/310-R-02-002: 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/publications/assistance/sectors/notebooks/pulp
pasn.pdf. As of 2010, the industry is not included in the list of the top ten U.S. 
manufacturers. 
5 For more information on the economic indicators related to the paper manufacturing, 
see CPBIS Report “Pulp and Paper Economic Indicators: A Comparative Analysis”, 
CPBIS-FR-2014-01, available at: http://www.cpbis.gatech.edu/research/projects-and-
final-reports.  
6 American Forest & Paper Association: http://www.afandpa.org/issues/jobs-and-
economic-impact.  
7 McNutt J. (2002), “The Paper Industry”, Presentation for the Sloan Workshop on 
Globalization, Center for Paper Business and Industry Studies (CPBIS), Georgia Institute 
6 
                                                          
 
to the Bureau of the Census, pulping, paper-, and board-making facilities, representing 
NAICS 3221, included 486 establishments in 2007 with the average number of 
employees per establishment of 258.2 people and most of the establishments in 1998, or 
67%, having 100 or more employees.8 In contrast, more than 75% of all converting 
facilities, captured in NAICS 3222, employ less than 100 people. When considering the 
whole paper manufacturing sector, pulp and paper facilities employ only 28% of the 
workers in the sector, while producing over 40% of the sector’s shipments.9 
 
1.4.Environmental Impact 
Paper manufacturing is also one of the most natural-resource-intensive industries. 
Its primary raw material is wood fiber with up to 40% of total materials costs attributed to 
pulpwood for paper board production and 20% for paper production.10 In addition, the 
U.S. Department of Commerce recognizes the industry as the single largest industrial 
process water user among U.S. manufacturers. And according to the EPA, in 2000, a 
of Technology (GaTech), and Institute of Paper Science and Technology (IPST), Atlanta, 
GA. 
8 The Bureau of the Census data tool “Industry Snapshot” available at: 
http://thedataIb.rm.census.gov/TheDataIb_HotReport2/econsnapshot/2012/snapshot.hrml
?NAICS=3221.  
9 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Office of Compliance Sector 




10 McCarthy and Urmanbetova (2009) document that material input composition differs 
widely by type of paper produced. For example, the single largest input in paperboard 
production is credited to pulpwood – it accounts for up to 40% of all inputs. Paper 
production, on the other hand, uses pulpwood, chemicals, and woodpulp in 
approximately equal shares of about 20% with the woodpulp portion having declined 
since the 1980s. 
7 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
typical pulp and paper mill used 4,000-12,000 gallons of water per ton of pulp 
produced.11 
The complex production process employed at pulp and paper mills accounts for 
substantial air and water emissions as well as solid waste disposals. The main chemical 
pulping process used in the U.S. – kraft/soda or sulfate pulping – accounted for up to 
83% of total U.S. pulp tonnage in 2000 and is considered one of the primary sources of 
multi-media pollution. Other major sources of pollution come from wood processing, 
chemical recovery, bleaching and papermaking.12  
 
Main Production Processes 
Table 1.1 lists the major operations and processes of pulping and paper-making 
facilities. Most air emissions come from kraft and sulfite chemical pulping, evaporation 
and recovery boiler procedures, recausticizing and calcining during kraft chemical 
recovery, pulp bleaching, papermaking and water treatment. Water effluents result from 
all stages of wood preparation except for chipping and conveying, all stages of chemical 
pulping and pulp bleaching, papermaking and wastewater treatment. Finally, waste and 
waste byproducts emerge from debarking, chipping and conveying, kraft and sulfite 
pulping, and evaporation and recausticizing during chemical recovery, and wastewater 
11 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Office of Compliance Sector 




12 American Forest & Paper Association: http://www.afandpa.org/issues/jobs-and-
economic-impact.  
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treatment. Table 1.2 summarizes environmental impacts from pulping and paper-making 
operations by pollution media. 
 
Table 1.1. Major Paper Manufacturing Processes 
Operation Major Processes 
Wood Preparation Debarking Chipping & Conveying 
Pulping 
Chemical Pulping Kraft Process Sulfite Process 
Semichemical Pulping Mechanical Pulping 
Stone Ground Wood (SGW) Refiner Mechanical Pulping 
(RMP) Thermo-Mechanical Pulping (TMP) 








Mechanical or Chemical Pulp Bleaching 
 
Papermaking 
Paper Refining & Screening 
Newspaper Forming, Pressing, Finishing Linerboard 
Forming, Pressing, Finishing Tissue Forming, Pressing, 
Finishing Drying 
Source: USDOE (2005). 
 
Table 1.2. Environmental Impacts of Main Pulp and Paper Manufacturing Processes 
Process Air Emissions Process Effluents Wastes, Residuals, or Byproducts 
 
Wood Preparation Processes 
Debarking No significant air emissions 




BOD(a), TSS(b), and 
color(c) 
Bark and fines that 




Table 2.1. Continued 
Process Air Emissions Process Effluents Wastes, Residuals, or Byproducts 
Deincing and/or 
Washing Prior to 
Debarking 
No significant air 
emissions 
 
Water Flow: 100-300 
gallons/ton of wood 
debarked, BOD5: 1-8 
lb/ton, TSS: 5-55 
lb/ton, Color: less 







No significant air 
emissions 
BOD: 15-20 lb/ton 











of wood debarked 
BOD: 1-10 lb/ton 










Fines that are 
burned as fuel in 
boilers. Gross 
heating value is 







per day pulp mill) 
Noncondensibles 
(TRS(d), VOC(e)) 





TRS. Spent liquor 
and byproduct spills 
containing BOD (a), 
COD(f), AOX(g), 
TSS(b), color(c) 
Water Flow: >30,000 
gallons/ton of pulp 
BOD: 23 lb/ton pulp 






Table 2.1. Continued 








TRS. Spent liquor 
and byproduct spills 
containing BOD, TSS 
Lignosulfonates, 
sugars, organic 
acids for use as 
binders in 





Pulping Not available 
White water from 
pulp refining and 
spent liquor and 
byproduct spills 






No significant air 
emissions 
White water from 
pulp refining, 
containing BOD, TSS 
Water Flow: 5k -7k 















Tall oil is 
recovered when 




TRS, SO2, CO, 
NOx 
Potential black liquor 











impurities, such as 
calcium and iron 
compounds 
Calcining 














Table 2.1. Continued 









dioxide and VOCs 
Chlorine dioxide: 
0.05-2.65 kg/air 







AOX(g), and EOX(i) 
and levels vary by 
bleaching process 
For three softwood 
kraft pulp bleaching 
sequences, effluent 
levels are below: 














urea or melamine 
formaldehyde 




sulfates in water 














Table 2.1. Continued 











BOD, TSS, COD, 
color, 
chlorophenolics, and 




Notes: (a) Biological oxygen demand (BOD) is the amount of oxygen required by 
aerobic microorganisms to decompose organic matter in a sample of water. BOD5 
measures the oxygen consumed in a 5-day testing period. (b) Total suspended solids 
(TSS) is a measure of the solids in water that can be trapped by a filter. (c) Color is 
measured in platinum-cobalt (Pt-Co) units. The acceptable limits of color values for 
the disposal of treated wastewater range from 50-100 units Pt-Co depending on the 
nature of the receiving body of water (river, sea, lake, etc.) (d) Total reduced sulfur 
(TRS) emissions include hydrogen sulfide, methyl mercaptan, dimethyl sulfide, and 
dimethyl disulfide. (e) Volatile organic compounds (VOC). (f) Chemical oxygen 
demand (COD) measures the amount of oxygen required to oxidize organic matter in 
the sample. COD differs from BOD in that it measures the oxygen need to digest all 
organic content, not just the portion which could be consumed by biological 
processes. (g) Adsorbable organically bound halogen (AOX) can include chlorinated 
organic compounds such as dioxins, furans, and chloroform. ECF bleaching and 
careful process control has reduced dioxin levels to undetectable levels. (h) Total 
organic carbon (TOC). (i) Extractable organic halogen (EOX). (k) Elemental chlorine 
free (ECF) bleaching process. (l) Totally chlorine-free (TCF) bleaching process. 




According to the 1997 EPA’s Office of Water report, each year the U.S. pulp and 
paper mills, SIC 261, 262, 263 or NAICS 3221, emit about 245,000 metric tons of toxic 
pollutants into the air. Table 1.3 lists common air pollutants emitted from the pulp and 
13 
paper facilities. The emissions include hazardous air pollutants (HAPS), volatile organic 
compounds (VOCs), and total reduced sulfur (TRS) compounds.13 
 
Table 1.3. Common Air Pollutants from Pulp and Paper Processes 
Source Type 
Kraft recovery furnace Fine particulates, nitrogen oxides 
Fly ash from hog fuel and coal-fired 
burners Coarse particulates 
Sulfite mill operations Sulfur oxides, ammonia 
Kraft pulping and recovery processes Reduced sulfur gases 
Chip digesters and liquor evaporation Volatile organic compounds 
Pulp drying (non-integrated mills) Volatile organic compounds 
All combustion processes Nitrogen oxides 
Source: EPA (2002).  
 
More recently, the EPA’s toxic release inventory (TRI) data depository reports 
7.9 million pounds of fugitive air and 166.2 million pounds of point air emissions, adding 
up to 174 million pounds of total air emissions, for pulp and paper facilities in 2000.14 
Total air releases for the total paper manufacturing sector, SIC 26 or NAICS 322, in 2000 
amounted to 201.5 million pounds decreasing to just under 130 million pounds in 2009 
and increasing again in 2013 to 143.3 million pounds. Figure 1.1 shows this substantial 
drop in air emissions for the paper manufacturing sector. 
13 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, The Pulp and Paper Industry, the Pulping 
Process, and Pollutant Releases to the Environment, (Office of Water 4303, 1997a), 
EPA-821-F-97-011, available at: 
http://water.epa.gov/scitech/wastetech/guide/pulppaper/upload/1997_11_14_guide_pulpp
aper_jd_fs2.pdf.  
14 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Office of Compliance Sector 









Figure 1.1. Paper Manufacturing TRI by Pollution Media  
(Millions of Pounds, Source: TRI 2015) 
 
Water Discharges 
As mentioned earlier, pulp and paper mills use large volumes of water and, as a 
result of their manufacturing processes, generate lots of wastewater, which can contain 
chlorinated and sulfur compounds, volatile organic and other chemicals. In response to 
the 1981 EPA finding confirming that dioxin was one of the most potent carcinogens, 
litigious concerns arose around paper mills’ discharge of chlorinated organic compounds 
such as dioxins and furans, often referred to as adsorbable organic halides (AOX). In mid 
1990s, after a pro-longed political battle and the EPA- and industry-commissioned report 
“104 Mill Study,” the EPA and pulp and paper industry announced a voluntary agreement 
to eliminate dioxin-tainted effluents and sludge disposals formalizing best management 






























































substitution of chlorine dioxide enabled a dramatic reduction in the effluent chlorinated 
compounds, which no longer present a serious environmental and health risk. 
Since 1990 and by 2004, according to the National Council for Air and Stream 
Improvement (NCASI), there had been a 90% decrease in the number of dioxin 
compounds released downstream from pulp and paper mills.15 Further, the Alliance for 
Environmental Technology (AET) reinforce that in 2004, only 8 waterbodies, 
representing less than 0.2% of total 3,221 U.S waterbodies subject to any type of 
advisory, have a dioxin advisory downstream of bleached chemical pulp mills (Figure 
1.2).16 As of 2000, the industry released 320 pounds of dioxin and dioxin-like compounds 
in total, with 162, 103, and 55 pounds released into land, water and air, respectively, and 
with the average facility release of only 4 pounds. Similarly, total water releases 
decreased from 41.6 million pounds in 1988 for the whole paper manufacturing sector to 
17.8 million pounds in 2013 (Figure 1.1).17 Finally, the effluents of 20.7 million pounds 
in 2000 for pulp and paper mills18 represented 96% of water effluents for the entire paper 
15 The full NCASI (2013a) report “Effects of Decreased Release of Chlorinated 
Compounds on Discharge to Water, Wastewater and Water Quality Impacts Associated 
with Pulp Bleaching,” see: http://www.paperenvironment.org/index.html. 
16 See the full AET (2005) report here: 
http://aet.org/reg_market_news/press_releases/2005/Eco051.html#Dioxin.  
17 TRI (2015). 
18 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Office of Compliance Sector 





                                                          
 
manufacturing sector.19 Figure 1.3 shows the dramatic decrease in chlorinated organic 




Figure 1.2. Dioxin Advisories Downstream Of Pulp Mills 




In addition to air and water emissions, the pulp and paper industry generates more than 
12 million tons per year of solid waste, which consists primarily of de-watered 
19 Authors’ calculations. 
20 NCASI (2013b), Environmental Footprint Comparison Tool, A Tool for 
Understanding Environmental Decisions Related to the Pulp and Paper Industry, 
National Council for Air and Stream Improvement: 
http://www.vtgreenhotels.org/articles/ChlorineInPaperIndustryEPA2013.pdf. 
17 




Figure 1.3. Effluent Adsorbable Organic Halides 
(Kg/Tonne Pulp, Source: NCASI 2013b) 
 
sludge masses. While traditionally most of the sludge masses were released in landfills, 
currently other methods of disposals include incineration and land application.21 In 2000, 
the total land releases amounted to 16.8 million pounds per year.22 Unlike air and water 
releases, however, landfill deposits have grown from 7.8 million pounds in 1988 to 15.2 
21 USDOE (2005), Energy and Environmental Profile of the U.S. Pulp and Paper Industry 
Columbia, Maryland, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and 
Renewable Energy, Industrial Technologies Program, Prepared by Energetics 
Incorporated; full report can be downloaded here: 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/11/f4/pulppaper_profile.pdf.  
22 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Office of Compliance Sector 





                                                          
 
million pounds in 2013. Finally, 1995 marks the year with the lowest landfill deposits of 
only 2.1 million pounds, peaking to 17.3 million pounds in 2008 (Figure 1.1).23 
 
1.5.Main Pieces of Legislation and History of Compliance 
Conventional End-of-pipe Regulations: Air, Water, and Solid Waste 
Table 1.4 provides the main federal regulations directed at the pulp and paper 
industry including the Clean Air Act (CAA), Clean Water Act (CWA), Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), and the 
Cluster Rules (CR). In addition to the federal requirements, states can impose additional 
emissions and effluent restrictions. Yet, the list of regulations is not the same for all the 
mills even in one state and depends on such factors as the age of main pulping and 
papermaking equipment used at the mill, production processes, product mixes, and mill 
location. 
Table 1.4. Federal Regulations Affecting Paper Manufacturing 
Regulation Industry-Specific Provisions 
Air Quality Standards Act 
(Clean Air Act) (1970) 
 
Establishes standards for specific hazardous 
chemicals; applies to dissolving kraft, bleached 
paper-grade kraft/soda, unbleached kraft, 
dissolving sulfite, paper-grade sulfite, and 
semichemical mills; may require companies 
applying for state permits to install best available 
pollution control technologies 
 
Occupational Safety & Health 
Act (OSHA) (1970) 
 
Defines “safe and healthful” working conditions 
for all workers; regulates safety of moving 




23 TRI 2015. 
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Table 1.4. Continued 
Regulation Industry-Specific Provisions 
Environmental Pesticide 
Control Act (1972) 
 
Regulates application of pesticides and their 
interstate and intrastate marketing to protect 
humans and the environment 
 
Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments (Clean Water 
Act) (1972) 
 
Limits amount of toxic pollutants in industrial 
discharges; protects surface waters, rivers, lakes; 
discharger obtains state permit; applies to 
dissolving kraft, bleached paper-grade kraft/soda, 
unbleached kraft, dissolving sulfite, paper- grade 
sulfite, and semichemical mills; and to 
mechanical pulp, nonwood chemical, secondary 
fiber deink and nondeink, fine and lightweight 
papers and tissue, filter, nonwoven, and 
paperboard from purchased pulp 
 
Endangered Species Act 
(1973), amended 1988 
 
Lists threatened and endangered species of plants 
and animals that must be conserved, including 
their habitats; prevents the forest products 
industry from logging various areas 
 
Clean Air Act Amendments 
(1973, 1974, 1989-1990) 
 
Regulates VOCs and other ozone precursors; 
provides National Emission Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants; addresses acid rain 
 
Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA) (1976) 
 
Defines solid waste to include hazardous waste; 
charges EPA with “cradle-to-grave” tracking of 
hazardous wastes; requires standards and 
regulations for handling and disposing of solid 
and hazardous wastes 
 
Toxic Substances Control Act 
(1976) 
 
Regulates land application of sludge generated 
by pulp and paper mills that use chlorine or 




Compensation, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA) 
(“Superfund”) (1976, 1980) 
 
Regulates processing wastes containing 
CERCLA-listed hazardous substances above 
specific levels; includes past releases 
 
Clean Water Act 
Amendments (1987, 1990) 
 
Addresses excessive levels of toxic pollutants, 




Table 1.4. Continued 
Regulation Industry-Specific Provisions 
Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to-Know 
(EPCRA) (1986) 
Created a national database , Toxic Release 
Inventory (TRI), identifying facilities, chemicals 
manufactured and used at those facilities, and the 
annual accidental and routine releases of these 
toxic substances 
 
Pollution Prevention Act 
(1990) 
Focused industry, government, and public 
attention on reducing the amount of pollution 
through cost-effective changes in production, 
operation, and raw materials use; expanded the 
TRI 
 
Great Lakes Initiative (1995) 
 
Applies to industrial discharges in 8 states 
bordering the shores of the Great Lakes; affects 
more than 40 pulp and paper mills; limits release 
of 22 long- lasting toxic bioaccumulative 
chemicals of concern (BCCs) 
 
Cluster Rules (1997) 
Issued under the Clean Air 
and Clean Water Acts 
Regulates air and water pollution from mills; 
provides National Emission Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) for 
bleached paper-grade kraft, soda mills, and 
paper-grade sulfite mills; sets air limitations 
based on maximum achievable control 
technology (MACT); requires 100% substitution 
of chlorine dioxide for chlorine; lists oxygen 
delignification as a way to meet targets; calls for 
elimination of dioxin 
Source: USDOE (2005), EPA (2015). 
 
The CAA and its amendments oversee emissions of hazardous air pollutants and 
such criteria pollutants as carbon monoxide, lead, ozone, nitrogen dioxide, sulfur 
dioxide, and particulate matter. Emissions of criteria pollutants are controlled by the 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). Under the NAAQS permit programs, 
mills that are located in counties that meet the air quality standards, or in attainment 
areas, are mandated to develop and implement best available control technology (BACT). 
21 
Mills in non-attainment areas are required to employ lowest achievable emission rate 
(LAER) technologies and process-specific new source performance standards (NSPS). 
The EPA has developed the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants 
(NESHAP) for two processes that are specific to the pulp and paper industry, pulping and 
chemical recovery, and that generate substances suspected to cause cancer and other 
dangerous health and environmental effects.24 
Regulations covering effluents from the pulp and paper sector are postulated by 
the Clean Water Act (CWA) and specifically by the National Pollution Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES). The NPDES regulations lay out instructions on how to 
control: (1) toxics such as adsorbable organic halides, chloroform, dioxin and furan, (2) 
conventional pollutants such as biological oxygen demand (BOD), total suspended solids 
(TSS), chemical oxygen demand (COD), fecal coliform, oil and grease, and pH; and (3) 
non-conventional pollutants which include all chemicals not listed under the first two 
categories.25 The full list of potential water pollutants from pulp and paper mills is 
included in Table 1.5. 
 
 
24 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Office of Compliance Sector 




25 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, The Pulp and Paper Industry, the Pulping 
Process, and Pollutant Releases to the Environment, (Office of Water 4303, 1997a), 




                                                          
 
Table 1.5. Potential Water Pollutants From Pulp and Paper Processes 
Source Effluent characteristics 
Water used in wood handling/debarking and 
chip washing Solids, BOD, color 
Chip digester and liquor evaporator 
condensate 
Concentrated BOD, reduced sulfur 
compounds 
"White waters" from pulp screening, 
thickening, and cleaning 
Large volume of water with suspended 
solids, can have significant BOD 
Bleach plant washer filtrates BOD, color, chlorinated organic compounds 
Paper machinewater flows Solids 
Fiber and liquor spills Solids, BOD, color 
Source: EPA (2002).  
 
Finally, solid wastes from pulp and paper mills are regulated by two main pieces 
of legislation – the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (TSCA). Both sets of regulations aim to control possible 
hazardous pollutants such as chlorinated organic compounds, which are byproducts of 
elemental chlorine bleaching process. However, substituting the traditional chlorine 
bleaching by elemental chlorine-free (ECF) and totally chlorine-free bleaching (TCF) 
technologies during late 1990s- early 2000s, has diminished the related health and 
environmental threats. On the other hand, as the 2002 EPA report points out, some of the 
solid waste may still have high content of pH and, as such, are defined as corrosive 
hazardous waste and have to meet the RCRA disposal guidelines.26 
 
26 The EPA indicates pH>12.5 as corrosive hazardous waste threshold. The U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Office of Compliance Sector Notebook Project 





                                                          
 
Flexible Regulations: the Cluster Rules and Pollution Prevention 
Regulations 
The late 1980s and early 1990s mark initially subtle, yet quickly growing, 
changes in the focus and character of environmental policies from rigid command-and-
control to more flexible and cognizant of economic and market contexts, under which the 
regulated industries were operating. According to Brouhle et al. (2004, p.4), “in 1999 
OECD identified 42 voluntary initiatives in the U.S. with an estimated 13,000 
participants. The U.S. EPA, the primary environmental regulatory agency in the U.S., 
administered 33 of these initiatives (OECD, 1999). Currently, the U.S. EPA’s Partners 
for the Environment website lists 40 voluntary initiatives (U.S. EPA, 2004a).At the 
federal level alone, we identify over 50 voluntary initiatives in the U.S.” The authors 
identify three types of VEPs: (1) public voluntary programs, (2) negotiated agreements, 
and (3) unilateral industry commitments. 
Within the framework of public voluntary programs, the regulatory authorities – 
whether federal or local – design a program and firms are invited and free to participate. 
The often-cited examples of the first group of VEPs are the 33/50, Energy StarTM and 
WasteWise. The second type of VEPs – negotiated agreements between regulators and 
firms – are more common to the EU than to the U.S. Lastly, the authors identify 
unilateral commitments or industry-led initiatives that are typically proposed by the 
industry groups with no or minimal involvement of government. The examples of this 
third type of VEPs are the Chicago Climate Exchange and Responsible Care® program 
(Brouhle et al. 2004). According to a more recent taxonomy of voluntary programs 
developed by Lyon and Maxwell (2001) and updated by Lyon (2013), policies geared 
24 
towards firms’ self-regulation fall under Public Voluntary Schemes (PVS) and Public 
Voluntary Programs (PVP). Reviewing the existing literature, the authors emphasize that 
the PVS’ and PVPs can be effective in complementing more traditional regulations and 
help raise public awareness of and stimulate public discourse over environmental 
initiatives. 
Increasing pressures from the industry to take into account prohibitively high 
abetment costs, having to comply to different statutes for each pollution media and the 
confusing nature of numerous abatement and reporting requirements when taken 
separately for each media and even more so when put together (as is the case with the 
pulp and paper industry), and the realization that the existing regulations did little in the 
area of using market mechanisms to incentivize industries to take environmental 
pollution issues to heart – all have contributed to the emergence of the industry- and/or 
market-smart environmental policies. From the many shortcomings of the existing 
pollution regulations, the intense debates gave rise to two prominent themes: (1) the role 
and potentially large impact of emerging voluntary action on the part of the business 
community, later termed corporate environmentalism, and (2) natural precedence and 
cost-effectiveness of pollution prevention vs. abatement efforts. 
With the understanding that the existing end-of-pipe technologies fell short of 
curbing pollution occurring at all stages of manufacturing, not just the end stage, and 
having more accurate methods to detect pollutant escape/release, the policy-makers 
developed and enacted the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990. In order to diminish any 
future contamination issues well before they caused environmental crises, the new 
legislation explicitly recognized the elusive nature of many difficult-to-control sources of 
25 
pollution and called industries to implement day-to-day preventative practices aimed at 
reducing pollution by minimizing waste, spills, and leaks during all stages of 
production.27 
In contrast to end-of-pipe pollution abatement measures, they are less costly in 
terms of capital, technological, and personnel investments. By definition, the pollution 
prevention programs are voluntary or quasi-regulatory programs that do not require a 
change in polluting behavior, but may require other types of actions, such as submitting 
reports under the TRI disclosure requirements.28,29 As such, the P2 legislation represents 
the newer form of environmental policies, which have evolved from top-down command 
27 The EPA (2015) defines pollution prevention as “reducing or eliminating waste at the 
source by modifying production, the use of less-toxic substances, better conservation 
techniques, and re-use of materials” (EPA, Pollution Prevention, Basic Information: 
http://www.epa.gov/p2/pubs/basic.htm). Additional information about the Pollution 
Prevention Act of 1990 can be found at: http://www2.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-
pollution-prevention-act, http://www.epa.gov/p2/pubs/p2policy/act1990.htm, and 
http://www.epa.gov/p2/pubs/basic.htm. 
28 P2 activities are voluntary to adopt, yet facilities are mandated to file reports of any 
pollution prevention modifications for chemicals reported under the TRI and to submit 
plans to implement new P2s for hazardous waste. 
29 In 1986, in response to the fatal chemical release accident in Bhopal, India and less 
severe yet similar accidents in the U.S., the EPA amended the Superfund legislation and 
added the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know (EPCRA) provisions, 
which required facilities that manufactured or used in manufacturing toxic chemicals to 
report the amounts of each of these chemicals released into the environment. For history 
of the TRI, see the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Office of Pollution 
Prevention and Toxics, Environmental Assistance Division (1997b), Toxics Release 
Inventory, the History of TRI, Fall 1997, EPA 749-R-97-001b: 
http://www.epa.gov/oppt/cie/archive/issue06j.pdf. Later, the Pollution Prevention Act of 
1990, required manufacturing facilities to report information on the amount of toxic 
materials leaving a facility in waste. Overall since 1986, the original list of 300 chemicals 
expanded to the current 594 individually-listed chemicals and 31 chemical categories, 
including four categories containing 68 specifically-listed chemicals. For more 
information on chemicals included in the TRI, see the EPA’s site on Toxics Release 
Inventory (TRI) Program, TRI-Listed Chemicals: http://www2.epa.gov/toxics-release-
inventory-tri-program/tri-listed-chemicals. 
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regulations, to market-based incentives, to voluntary pollution and waste prevention and 
reduction programs that are more broadly termed as voluntary environmental programs. 
Finally, to help the industry reduce the costs of compliance by not having to refer 
to different sets of regulations and because of the multi-media nature of pollution control 
and prevention, in 1997 the EPA issued an integrated set of regulations covering air and 
water emissions – the Cluster Rules. The new regulations cover guidelines for air 
emissions in 115 and water discharges at 96 mills, which manufacture mostly bleached 
papergrade kraft and soda, and papergrade sulfite products.30 Further, to promote 
voluntary action, the Cluster Rules give a choice for pulp and paper mills to participate in 
the Voluntary Advanced Technology Incentives Program (VATIP), which sets more 
rigorous wastewater regulations while letting mills have more flexible time schedules to 
achieve the pollution standards.31 Most of these requirements became effective as of 
April of 2001.32 
 
30 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Office of Compliance Sector 




31 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, The Pulp and Paper Industry, the Pulping 
Process, and Pollutant Releases to the Environment, (Office of Water 4303, 1997), EPA-
821-F-97-011, available at: 
http://water.epa.gov/scitech/wastetech/guide/pulppaper/upload/1997_11_14_guide_pulpp
aper_jd_fs2.pdf.  
32 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Retrospective Study of the Costs of EPA 
Regulations: A Report of Four Case Studies, (National Center for Environmental 
Economics, August 2014),  
 EPA 240-F-14-001, available at: http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-
0575.pdf/$file/EE-0575.pdf.  
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1.6.Costs of Command-and-control Policies: Case of Pulp and Paper Mills, 
Essay 1 
When the 2014 EPA report examined the estimated ex-ante and ex-post 
environmental compliance costs in the pulp and paper industry, they came to a surprising 
conclusion that the actual costs of compliance were significantly lower than the estimates 
made by both the government and industry groups. Tables 1.6 and 1.7 lay out ex-ante 
cost estimates of complying with the Cluster Rules and related regulations. MACT stands 
for maximum achievable control technology requirements that were included in the final 
version of the Cluster Rule. MACT I and MACT III cover regulations on emission 
control of toxic air and water pollutants released during pulping and bleaching stages of 
the papermaking process while MACT II, added in 2001, regulates chemical recovery 
combustion sources in the pulp and paper industry. In addition to MACT II and Cluster 
Rules regulations, estimates for implementing the best available technologies (BAT) 
and pretreatment standards for existing sources (PSES) are also provided. 
 
Table 1.6. EPA Ex Ante Compliance Cost Estimates (in thousands of 1995 dollars) 
 MACT I MACT II BAT/PSES 
Cluster 
Rules 





Capital 500,758 258,389 1,039,388 1,540,146 1,798,535 
Operations and 
Maintenance 74,718 5,202 158,413 233,131 238,334 
Post tax, 
annualized 81,767 23,139 171,619 253,386 276,525 
Source: EPA (2014, p.30) 
 
Taking 1995 as their baseline year, the EPA estimated the capital expenditures 
associated with the Cluster Rules (MACT I and III or air and water regulations) and 
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MACT II (solid waste) to amount to $2.8 billion with $238 million in annual operating 
and maintenance costs (Table 1.6). Interestingly, the estimates from some industry 
sources, such as American Forest and Paper Association (AF&PA), were virtually the 
same – $2.6 billion and $273 million for capital expenditures and annual operating costs, 
respectively. Other industry groups, in contrast, provided much higher estimates with the 
maximum of $4 billion in capital investment costs for both the Cluster Rules and MACT 
II (Table 1.7). 
 
Table 1.7. Non-EPA Ex Ante Cost Estimates of the Compliance Costs 
Source Capital Expenditures Operating Costs 
 
Cluster Rules + MACT II 
AF&PA $2.6 billion $273 million 
Pulp & Paper Project Report, April 1998 $3.2+ billion --- 
   
Cluster Rule 
Parthasarathy and Dowd (2000, p. 41) $2.625 billion* --- 
NCASI (2003, p. 5) $3 billion (1999-2005) --- 
Jensen (1999, p. 72) $2.675-2.916 billion --- 
   
MACT II 
Parthasarathy and Dowd (2000, p. 41)  $0.35 billion --- 
Garner (2001, p. 45) $0.90 billion --- 
NCASI (2003, p. 5) $1 billion or less --- 
Notes: * $1.375 billion for MACT I & III and $1.250 billion for BAT and best 
management practices (BMP); ** MACT I (April 2001 compliance); *** MACT I 
(HVLC pollutants, April 2006 compliance); Source: EPA (2014). 
 
Table 1.8 provides an examination of actual pollution abatement costs at pulp and 
paper mills during 1990-2002. First, the total compliance costs appear to have been over-
estimated by both the EPA and industry groups. If one followed the EPA and took 1995 
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as the baseline year for when the initial Cluster Rules expenditures were anticipated to 
take place, then from Table 1.8 it is clear that these costs had been substantially 
overestimated. The total capital costs of compliance in 1995 were 625 million of 1995 
dollars. Even if one were to take an average between 1995 and 1997, the year of the 
Cluster Rules enactment, the average total compliance costs for those years is 632 million 
of 1995 dollars. Another interesting finding is that the average rate of growth in total 
abatement costs during 2000-2010 was negative 3.3% and went down to negative 24.2% 
during 2000-2002. And although abatement costs constituted on average only about 15% 
of total capital expenditures during 2000-2002, the average annual rate of growth of this 
proportion was 6.7% during 2000-2010. Hence, despite the overall decreasing rate of 
annual average growth in abatement capital costs, the proportion they represent within 
the total capital costs has grown over 2000-2010. 
Finally, the EPA (2014) report stipulates that the early cost estimates did not 
account for substitution of mandatory abatement requirements by more flexible 
compliance procedures adopted by the regulators and mills, suggesting that these other, 
more flexible, pollution abatement strategies provided substantial cost-savings and are 
preferred by mills.33 
 
 
33 EPA (2014): ” Among the reasons for EPA’s overestimates of these capital costs are 
the mills’ use of the clean condensate alternative (CCA), flexible compliance options, 
extended compliance schedules, site specific rules, use of equivalent-by-permit, and 
equipment/mill shutdowns and consolidations. However, the lack of detail in the 
available data means we can only speculate on which reason(s) is primarily responsible 
for EPA’s overestimate,” p. 52. 
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Table 1.8. Pollution Abatement Capital Expenditures (millions of 1995 dollars) 
Year Air Water Solid Waste Total 
Percent of Total 
Capital 
Expenditures 
1990 553 669 272 1,494 12% 
1991 542 765 214 1,521 19% 
1992 416 533 201 1,150 18% 
1993 289 354 131 774 14% 
1994 252 289 188 729 14% 
1995 219 309 97 625 12% 
1996 244 343 133 720 13% 
1997 142 305 105 552 12% 
1998 119 288 172 579 13% 
1999 294 340 65 699 17% 
2000 633 364 74 1,071 23% 
Average Annual Growth 
Rate, 1990-2000 1.4% -5.9% -12.2% -3.3% 6.7% 
2001 170 287 72 529 12% 
2002 105 170 29 304 9% 





23.0% -36.5% -24.2% -13.4% 
Note: Current dollar value values are deflated to 1995 dollar values using the 
Engineering New-Record Construction Cost Index. Calculation for annual growth 
rates: [(Ie/Is)^(1/t) -1]*100, where Ie and Is is the ending and starting index, 
respectively, and t is the number of time periods between the starting and ending 
period. For air capital expenditures, for instance, the growth rate between 1990 and 
2000 is ([633/553)^(1/10)-1]*100 = 1.4%. Source: EPA (2014). 
 
 
Compliance Costs and Investment Decisions 
The descriptive analyses of costs of abatement compliance, substantially 
overestimated by both the EPA and industry groups, need empirical examinations of how 
compliance costs affect the existing mill cost structures, which in turn, influenced 
papermakers’ investment decisions. Geographically, mills differentiate themselves by the 
type of product they produce. Pulp mills locate in regions with high-yield natural and 
farmed tree harvests: all of the East coast, Northwest and North-central states. Pulping 
31 
operations using recycled pulp choose to locate near urban centers where there is access 
to waste paper. Paper mills, typically, co-locate with pulping facilities or with converting 
centers. Figure 1.4 maps out the location of all pulp, paper and board mills by their size – 





Figure 1.4. U.S. Pulp and Paper Mills in 2011                                                                    
(Thousand Short Tons, Source: CPBIS 2013) 
 
34 The map was built using CPBIS Mills Online data. For more information, see: 
http://www.cpbis.gatech.edu/data/mills-online-new.  
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The literature characterizes the investment decisions as either (a) continuous 
investments or stay-put decisions or as (b) radical investments in new or existing 
locations by increasing operating capacity in large chunks. Earlier research on new 
branch plant location decisions for all manufacturing industries in general failed to 
document if location characteristics had significant impact on the choice of new plant 
location (Carlton 1983, Bartik 1985).35 
Later studies, however, find that such local characteristics as state environmental 
regulations affect behavior of pollution-intensive industries (Gray and Shadbegian 1993, 
Henderson 1996, Levinson 1996, Gray 1997, List 2001, List et al. 2004, Gray and 
Shadbegian 2005a, Condliffe and Morgan 2008). Further, works that narrowly focused on 
the pulp and paper industry examined the investment decisions of existing plants 
(Bergman and Johansson 2002, Gray and Shadbegian 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2004, 
Lundmark 2001, Lundmark and Nilsson 2001, and Lundmark 2003). Without explicitly 
noting that a firm’s decision to invest into an existing production site is also a ‘stay put’ 
location decision, these studies recognize that local and regional factors play a role in 
firms’ investment planning. Principally, these studies find that wage rates and such 
agglomeration factors as the size of existing pulp and paper industry and consumer 
market are significant determinants of investment flows. 
Building upon these latter works, Essay 1 of the thesis estimates a first-
differenced, limited probability and logit models of a firm’s decision to invest in an 
35 More specifically, Carlton (1983) found that energy costs and existing concentrations 
of employment had strong impact on new plant openings; Bartik (1985) showed that 
differences in unionization across states had major effect on business location, while state 
taxes did not. 
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existing plant against a number of variables that reflect cost factors, regulatory 
environment, and specifically environmental compliance costs, measured by regulatory 
stringency. To complement and expand the scope of the previous regional literature on 
the industry, I utilize data over 1984-2002 covering capacity progression of all pulp and 
paper mills located in the U.S. 
The contribution of this essay lies in its focus on the differences between the two 
theoretical approaches to model capital investments – continuous vs. lumpy. More 
practical implications of this work will inform (1) policy-makers and industry analysts 
about the site/state characteristics and environmental requirements to which traditional 
manufacturing employers respond most sensitively, and (2) entrepreneurial firms, 
investment analysts and regional planners about those combinations of location-specific 
factors and regulatory stimuli that attract further investments under profit maximization. 
 
1.7.Responsive Regulation, Essay 2 
History of Monitoring and Enforcement at Mills 
Returning to the history of environmental monitoring and compliance, the number 
of inspections and enforcement actions across all media in paper manufacturing has been 
increasing since the mid-1970s to 2014. Figures 1.5 and 1.6 lay out the number of federal 
and state inspections and enforcements at pulp, paper and board mills and converting 
facilities between 1974 and 2014. The number of inspections at pulp, paper and board 
mills peaked in 1986 and 2006, rising to the annual of 1,309 and 1,769, respectively. The 





Figure 1.5. Number of Inspections at Paper Manufacturing Facilities 




Figure 1.6. Number of Enforcements at Paper Manufacturing Facilities 






















Converters Pulp, paper, board mill
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fifth, 16%, of total inspections on average and peaked in 1994 to 393 for all media 
combined. Table 1.9 breaks down national aggregates into regional and is consistent with 
the national-level analyses presented in Figures 1.5 and 1.6. At the regional level, the 
enforcement to inspection rate is 0.19 in NJ, NY, PR, and VI, 0.13 in AK, ID, OR, WA, 
and the average of 0.6 for the rest of the regions. 
The overall decreases in the number of monitoring and enforcement actions and 
very low enforcement to inspection ratios can be explained by a number of competing 
hypotheses. On the one hand, the proponents of the deterrence model can postulate that 
the regulatory enforcement has been such an effective mechanism in changing mill 
behavior that overtime there has been less need to oversee facility compliance behavior. 
Gray and Shimshack (2011) review empirical literature on the effectiveness of 
environmental monitoring and enforcement and find that most analyses measure firm 
deterrence, or how plants respond to enforcement activities. There are a number of 
studies on pulp and paper industry that find evidence of the effectiveness of enforcement 
on facility compliance (Nadeau 1997, Gray and Shadbegian 2005a, Shimshack and Ward 
2005, 2008). Shimshack and Ward (2005, 2008) find that an additional fine induced state-
wide compliance. More specifically, Shimshack and Ward (2008) document that fines at 
violating facilities induced facilities that were operating within the permitted level of 
discharges to discharge even less, or go beyond compliance. Gray and Shadbegian (2007) 
find that inspections at one plant tend to increase compliance at both the inspected and 
nearby facilities. 
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National 585 495 6383 5 332 503 85% 15% 0.08 
CT, MA, ME, 
RI, NH, VT 92 73 571 10 38 37 95% 5% 0.06 
NJ, NY, PR, 
VI 71 57 383 11 34 73 96% 4% 0.19 
DC, DE, MD, 
PA, VA, WV 57 47 899 4 26 77 77% 23% 0.09 
AL, FL, GA, 
KY, MS, NC, 
SC, TN 
105 96 2024 3 90 116 91% 9% 0.06 
IL, IN, MI, 
MN, OH, WI 144 120 721 12 48 44 70% 30% 0.06 
AR, LA, NM, 
OK, TX 45 40 944 3 32 56 70% 30% 0.06 
IA, KS, MO, 
NE 7 7 33 13 2 1 100% 0% 0.03 
CO, MT, ND, 
SD, UT, WY 2 2 3 40 0 0 0% 0% 0 




22 18 140 9 16 12 100% 0% 0.09 
AK, ID, OR, 
WA 37 32 537 4 40 72 94% 6% 0.13 
 Source: EPA (2002).
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On the other hand, the theorists of voluntary corporate self-regulation propose that paper-
manufacturers preemptively lowered their TRI levels and adopted P2 modifications in 
order to signal their environmental stewardship to the regulators in the hope of softening 
regulatory stringency they face (Maxwell and Decker 2006, and Decker 2007). 
 
Target-driven Regime and Pre-emptive Compliance 
Maxwell and Decker (2006) and Decker (2007) corroborate theoretically that 
profit-maximizing firms, under ‘responsive regulation,’ overinvest in environmental 
compliance; hence, regulatory fines are likely to be an over kill and must be lowered. 
Corroborating this theory, Arguedas (2013) documents how the EPA legislation offers 
firms lighter penalties if those self-report/police in a timely manner.36 
Two additional important aspects of environmental enforcement and compliance 
that require attention are (1) the multi-media nature of the pollution and (2) budget 
constraints faced by the regulators. Figures 1.7 and 1.8 present the number of inspections 
and enforcement by pollution media. The graphs for air, water, and land inspections 
picture drastically different scenarios. In Figure 1.7, inspections are initially dominated 
by water, yet gradually in the mid 1996s air inspections took precedence, rose to the 
record high of 1,368 in 2007, and slid down to 845 in 2014. Also, for both water and air, 
inspections far exceeded the number of enforcements (Figures 1.7, 1.8). 
Land inspections, on the other hand, trailed at 25 inspections per year during 
1974-2014, but were significantly lower than the annual average of 76 enforcement 
actions per year. In fact, among the three media, land pollution received the highest  
36 Arguedas (2013), p. 157. 
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Figure 1.7. Number of Inspections for Pulp, Paper and Board Mills by Pollution Media 




Figure 1.8. Number of Enforcements for Pulp, Paper and Board Mills by Pollution Media 
























number of enforcement actions during the entire period. Enforcement actions in all three 
media peaked in the mid-1990s and trailed afterwards down with the exception of water 
enforcement which rose again after 2005 (Figure 1.8). 
 
Budget-driven Regime: Role of Budgetary Constraints 
The decreases in the total number of monitoring and enforcement actions could 
result from decreasing federal and state budgets specifically allocated to compliance 
enforcement. Figure 1.9 documents the federal budget disbursements between 1994 and 
2010. The average real EPA operating enforcement budget amounted to $580 million, 
according to Gray and Shimshack (2011a). Yet, both the budget as well as the number of  
 
 
Note: The solid line represents budget allotments for Office of Enforcement and 
Compliance Assurance (OECA) activities, measured in millions of US dollars 
along the left-side y-axis. The dotted line represents staffing levels for OECA 
activities, measured in FTEs along the right-side y-axis. 
 
Figure 1.9. EPA Enforcement Budgets and Full-time Equivalents, 1994–2010 
(Source: Gray and Shimshack 2011a). 
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staff employed at the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, measured in 
full-time equivalents (FTE), decreased significantly overtime. More specifically, the  
budget decreased from just over $630 million in 1994 to just over $530 million in 2010, 
and FTE decreased from over 4,200 in 1994 to just under 3,400 in 2010.37 
To better understand the dynamics between the regulators and mills, in Essay 2 of 
the thesis I examine the behavior of regulators within the context of their motivations and 
constraints as well as within the voluntary mill compliance. In this essay, I analyze if and 
how the behavior of the mills affects regulators’ monitoring and enforcement responses. 
Specifically, I study whether there is a relationship between voluntary pollution 
abatement and prevention activities at mills and the regulatory stringency they face; 
additionally, I explore if the monitoring and enforcement actions are driven by target or 
budget motivations. Compliance with the environmental command-and-control policies 
has been examined previously, yet within separate pollution media. Given the significant 
differences in inspection and enforcements by media, it makes sense that the analyses be 
done for both monitoring and enforcement within each pollution media separately and 
together. 
 
1.8.Voluntary Pollution Prevention at Pulp and Paper Mills, Essay 3 
The progression of environmental policies from command-and-control regimes to 
voluntary corporate self-regulation became possible with the recognition on the part of 
the regulated industries that voluntary programs can help reduce long-term compliance 
costs, rebrand their public image, and enhance their long-term competitiveness. This 
37 Source: Gray et al. (2011a), p. 3-24. 
41 
 
                                                          
 
recognition is first marked by the establishment of the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and subsequent emergence of the 
ISO 14001 environmental management system (EMS) leading the way to the bigger 
movement towards programs aimed at voluntary environmental self-regulation (Koehler 
2007). The movement has been corroborated by numerous researchers who examined the 
nature and dynamics of corporate self-regulation, both theoretically and empirically 
(Maxwell et al. 2000, Decker 2005, Maxwell and Decker 2006, Decker 2007, Koehler 
2007, Khanna et al. 2009, Harrington 2012, Harrington 2013). 
To examine if the legislation aimed at voluntary compliance is effective in terms 
of encouraging facilities to adopt more VEPs, in Essay 3 I study pollution prevention 
(P2) legislation and its impact, among other factors, on the adoption of P2 modifications 
at pulp and paper mills. In contrast to command-and-control policies, P2 legislation is 
characterized as a soft policy that encourages information sharing, numerical targeting, 
and mandatory planning, all of which are designed to appeal to the wide scope of the P2 
activities. Since 1990, 36 states adopted P2programs, prescribing varying combinations 
of regulatory-, information-, and management-based policies (Harrington 2013). 
In addition to examining P2s as strategic self-regulatory tools, I propose a 
definition of P2 modifications as soft technologies or soft technology innovations. The 
typical taxonomy characterizes technology innovations as: (1) product and/or service 
innovations, (2) process innovations, including new practices or delivery, (3) 
organizational innovations such as changes in management structure, methods and 
information management, and (4) marketing innovations (Youtie et al. 2005, OECD 
1997). P2s are not new products, hardware technologies or machines and they are not 
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new management or marketing methods. Yet, the application of P2s spans across all 
stages of modern industrial systems, from inventory control and administrative book-
keeping to equipment maintenance, and production process and product modifications. 
Given that P2s are a set of every-day hands-on managerial and production practices, they 
can be classified as active experiential knowledge, or applied know-how. And, in spite of 
being spread out across all administrative and manufacturing operations, P2 activities fit 
into a narrow niche of technology innovations referred to as soft technologies. 
Figure 1.10 demonstrates all eight broader categories of new P2 activities adopted 
at paper manufacturing sector from 1991 to 2013: (1) operating practices, (2) inventory 
control, (3) spill and leak prevention, (4) raw-material modifications, (5) process 
modifications, (6) cleaning and degreasing modifications, (7) surface preparations and 




Figure 1.10. Number of New P2 Activities at Paper Manufacturing Facilities by P2 Type 









































































paper sector are raw-material modifications, operating practices, and process  
modifications. Operating and raw material modifications totaled up to over 100 new P2 
counts each until 1997 with the numbers sliding further down to under 50 in 2003, where 
they have fluctuated until 2011. In 2012 and 2013, there was a slight rise the counts of 
new P2 activities across all eight categories. 
In Essay 3, I analyze the effectiveness of P2 policy tools on the adoption of new 
P2 modifications in total and when grouped in two more general categories. The first one 
consists of: (1) operating practices, (2) inventory control, (3) spill and leak prevention, 
(4) raw-material modifications; and rest of the modifications form the second group: (5) 
process modifications, (6) cleaning and degreasing modifications, (7) surface 
preparations and finishing modifications, and (8) product modifications. For the purposes 
of this analysis, I loosely term the first group as management and logistical and second as 
process and product modifications. Figure 1.11 depicts the total number of new P2 
adoptions and when separated into two general groups. The first group of modifications 
outpaces the count of new P2 modifications within the second group. 
The contribution of the third analysis is to shed further light on the effectiveness 
of policy and policy tools that encourage the adoption of P2 activities as well as other 
determinants identified in the previous literature. I am interested in looking at whether the 
given policy instruments and financial assistance in the form of state P2 grants are 
effective: (1) for all P2 activities and (2) for specific P2 activity groups related to either 
(a) management and logistical modifications or (b) product and process. Because of their 
unique definition as soft technologies, or applied knowledge skills directed at reducing 
and preventing production-related pollution, P2s exhibit the characteristics of knowledge-
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Figure 1.11. Number of New P2 Activities at Paper Manufacturing Facilities by Group 
(Source: TRI 2015) 
 
Given this definition, policy instruments and financial assistance aimed at 
information sharing may be more effective at encouraging P2 adoptions. The effect, 
however, may not be the same across different groups of P2 activities, with information 
sharing having greater effect on P2 activities related to management and logistical 
practices than on product and process modifications. Hence, I focus on the impact of the 
different P2 policy tools and grants on: (1) all P2 adoptions and (2) adoptions across 













All P2 Modifications Group 1 Group 2
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1.9.The Three Essays, Summary 
The first essay in Chapter 2 of this dissertation bridges two strands of literature on 
investments in capital-intensive industries, the one that follows the assumption of 
continuous capital adjustments and the other which adheres to the notions of lumpy 
investments in capital-intensive industries. To follow regional studies on capital 
investments, I use a first-differencing, limited probability and logit models to examine 
papermakers’ investment decisions against a number of supply factors. The first group of 
factors hypothesized to influence the choice of investment location includes such 
‘traditional’ factors of production as variable input costs – prices for materials, wages, 
energy, and land prices. In addition, I examine the impact of regulatory stringency of 
local/state environmental and tax policies. 
The second essay in Chapter 3 of this dissertation examines the relationship 
between voluntary pollution abatement and prevention efforts at pulp and paper mills and 
regulatory stringency they face. Using facility level data on U.S. pulp and paper mills for 
1989-2002, I estimate the negative binomial model to test the hypotheses of responsive 
regulation and whether regulators are driven by numerical pollution targets or budgetary 
constraints. I find that voluntary pollution abatement has greater impact on regulatory 
stringency than government expenditures. Additionally, state political pressure, pollution 
prevention legislation, and firm and mill characteristics are found to be significant 
predictors of regulatory behavior. 
The third and final essay in Chapter 4 analyzes the relationship between P2 policy 
instruments and adoption of P2 modifications at individual plants. Using facility level 
data on U.S. pulp and paper mills for 1991-2002, I estimate the negative binomial model 
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to test the hypotheses of whether P2 state legislation and policies on target setting, 
reporting requirement, mandatory planning, and P2 state grants have positive impact on 
P2 adoptions. In addition, I examine the effects of regulatory and political threats, P2 
firm spillovers and prior mill experience with P2 modifications, firm and mill size, and 




ESSAY 1: ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR OF 
CAPITAL-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES 
Abstract 
This study extends the existing literature on location choice in two ways. First, in 
contrast to the traditional location choice literature, which focuses only on the location of 
new plants and on re-location of production, this paper examines capacity investments in 
the existing pulp and paper mills as implicit ‘stay-put’ location decisions. Second, it 
bridges two strands of literature on investments in capital-intensive industries, one that 
follows the assumption of continuous capital adjustments and the other, which adheres to 
the notions of lumpy investments. I use first-differencing for the continuous capital 
adjustments and limited probability and logit methodologies for lumpy investments to 
analyze papermakers’ ‘stay-put’ decisions against a number of supply-side factors. The 
first group of factors hypothesized to influence the investment decision includes variable 
input costs – prices for materials, labor, energy and land. The second group includes 
regulatory stringency of state environmental and tax policies. The findings suggest that 
short-term capacity changes are sensitive only to energy and land prices while larger 
inflows of investments respond to the fluctuations in the availability of recycled pulp and 
land prices. Finally, whether I am looking at a continuous flow of investments or its 
spikes, I find that state environmental stringency has a negative impact on investments, 
but it is statistically insignificant through all the models and higher taxes do not deter 




The main purpose of this study is to frame the discussion of choice of location in 
capital-intensive industries in terms of a ‘stay-put’ investment decisions. Earlier research 
on new branch plant location decisions for all manufacturing industries in general found 
limited support that location characteristics had significant impacts on the choice of new 
plant locations (Carlton 1983, Bartik, 1985).38 Later studies, however, find that such local 
characteristics as environmental regulations affect behavior of pollution-intensive 
industries (Gray and Shadbegian 1993, Henderson 1996, Levinson 1996, Gray 1997, List 
2001, List et al. 2004, Gray and Shadbegian 2005b, Condliffe and Morgan 2008). 
Further, works that narrowly focused on the pulp and paper industry examined the 
investment decisions of existing plants (Bergman and Johansson 2002, Gray and 
Shadbegian 1998, 2002, 2003, 2004, Lundmark 2001, Lundmark and Nilsson 2001, and 
Lundmark 2003). These studies recognize that local and regional factors play a role in a 
firm’s investment planning. Principally, these studies find that wage rates and such 
agglomeration factors as the size of existing pulp and paper capacity as well as the size of 
the consumer market are significant determinants of investment flows. 
Building on the theory of short-run profit maximization, I articulate two broad 
hypotheses: (1) increases in regulatory stringency will decrease capacity levels, and (2) 
decreases in variable input costs will increase capacity levels. I use first-differencing for 
38 More specifically, Carlton (1983) found that energy costs, existing concentrations of 
employment had strong impact on new plant openings; Bartik (1985) showed that 
differences in unionization across states had major effect on business location, while state 
taxes did not. 
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small capacity changes and linear probability and logit methodologies for large capacity 
changes to test the two main hypotheses. The findings from this work contribute to the 
previous literature in two main ways. First, I explicitly reframe the discussion of the 
choice of location as a ‘stay-put’ decision, arguing that building a greenfield at a new 
location for such capital-intensive industries as pulp and paper is prohibitively expensive 
and induces firms to invest in existing locations. Second, to bridge various strands in the 
previous literature, this paper empirically tests two alternative theoretical models of 
capital investment – continuous vs. lumpy capital outlays. More practical implications of 
this work will inform (1) policy-makers and industry analysts about the state and 
regulatory characteristics to which traditional manufacturing employers respond most 
sensitively, and (2) managers, investment analysts and regional planners about those 
combinations of location-specific factors and regulatory stimuli that attract further 
investments into capital-intensive industries under profit maximization. 
The findings in this paper suggest that the two models of capital adjustments 
inform different behavioral choices considered by papermakers. When facing increases in 
variable input costs, specifically energy and land prices, papermakers respond by 
decreasing levels of investments. In contrast, when considering larger inflows of 
investments, availability of recycled pulp and land prices become more important 
determinants in pulp and paper investments. Additionally, whether the ‘stay-put’ decision 
is viewed as a continuous flow of investments or its spikes, state environmental 
stringency has a negative impact on investments, yet it is statistically insignificant 
through all the models. Finally and contrary to the expectations, higher taxes do not deter 




The Pulp and Paper Industry in Economic Geography Literature 
Historically, the U.S. paper industry has located its operations in areas that 
economized on one or more major inputs (e.g. fiber, water). In one of the earliest studies 
of papermakers’ location choices Lindberg (1953) used a location theoretic framework to 
analyze transportation costs of a number of Swedish paper and pulp mills for 1830-1939 
and found that distances to raw materials matter less than distances for product delivery 
and/or export. Barr and Fairbairn (1975) conducted interviews with managers in a 
number of newly established mills in western Canada in the 1960s and concluded that 
corporate behavior, rather than government incentives, cost and demand conditions, 
determine success and viability of location choices made by paper companies. Hayter 
(1978) conducted interviews with corporate executives in the same geographical area and 
time period as Barr and Fairbairn (1975) and outlined the executives’ decision-making 
model of the choice of location that consisted of: (1) selecting a forest-rich region, (2) 
identifying a number of sites which provide the least of both input and output shipment 
costs, and (3) comparing and selecting the sites. The author concluded that at the regional 
level corporate decision-making is centered around raw material factors.39 Table 2.1 
summarized of key locational studies. 
 
39 Hayter (1978) outlines the following specific cost factors: timber accessibility, quality, 
species mix and tenurial conditions; cost of adequate power, supply of fresh water for 
processing, suitable waterways for effluent disposal and minimal effect of air pollution 
on residential areas, and availability of housing or provision for building new housing. 
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Table 2.1. Previous Literature 
Author 
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regulations; low compliance 
firms avoid states with 












availability, market size and 
agglomeration economies 
have the strongest impact on 
papermakers’ investment 
decisions; prices for raw 
materials exhibit ambiguous 
effects 
 
In her extensive survey of regional composition and movements of the U.S. 
papermakers during 1880-1940, Hunter (1955) points out that technological 
characteristics of papermaking process have played a principal role in directing 
papermakers’ locational choices. Prior to the advent of papermaking technology that 
relies primarily on woodpulp kraft process, paper companies tended to cluster in most 
populous and urban Northeastern states where straw, rags, wastepaper, and manila stock 
were readily available. Introduction of woodpulp technology shifted production towards 
areas plentiful with wood fiber resources. Hunter (1955), without explicitly saying it, 
documents the path dependent behavior of the mills during the ‘formative’ years of the 
industry or from around 1880 to 1940. According to her analysis, given the high capital 
costs, the industry had been more reluctant to rapidly relocate its operations in response 
to the introduction of woodpulp technology and fluctuating stocks of pulpwood which at 
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the time were affected by the booming lumber and housing markets. The two factors had 
put pressures on pulp and paper mills to relocate first from urban areas abundant with rag 
and waste input sources to more rural areas plentiful with forest stands to then even more 
rural areas rich with self-replenishing forest stands. The author depicts the slow process 
of managerial learning from experience, gradual but persistent growth in overcapacity, 
and continual acquiescence to produce paper products in less than optimal production 
sites, all of which are symptomatic to the situation that the U.S. pulp and paper mills face 
today. Hunter’s (1955) analysis of the industry between 1880 and 1940 suggested that 
such highly capital-intensive industries as pulp and paper are able to respond to locational 
pressures in no less than 40-50 years and that sunk costs constrain many of the choices 
available to such firms.40 
 
Location Choices and Paper Industry in Literature, Environmental Factors 
Few econometric studies exist on locational choices of papermakers. Gray and 
Shadbegian (1998) studied the impact of environmental regulations across different states 
on new plant location decisions of the U.S. papermaking companies over 1972-1990. The 
authors analyzed the location choices by specific types of pulping technologies installed 
at new mills as well as annual investment spending at existing mills. The authors 
concluded that mills choosing to locate in states with stricter environmental regulations 
40 The author documents the dramatically increased scale of production, vertical 
integration to internalize procurement costs, and higher responsiveness, reflected in 
firms’ restructuring and relocations, to market and geographic cost conditions among 
producers of more standardized paper-grades, namely newsprint and wrapping papers, 
which also demonstrated higher growth rates in consumption. 
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ended up installing cleaner technology. Additionally, the study found abatement and 
productive investments tended to be scheduled together and high abatement costs tended 
to be associated with lower productive capital expenditures.41 
In their subsequent work, Gray and Shadbegian (2002) focused on the impact of 
environmental regulations on the pulp and paper firms’ decision to re-allocate productive 
capacity across states. Using Census’ Longitudinal Research Database for 1967-2002 at 
five-year intervals the authors found that, controlling for other state characteristics, firms 
allocated smaller shares of production to states with stricter regulations. The results also 
differed by the firm level of environmental compliance – low compliance firms appeared 
to avoid states with higher regulatory stringency, while high compliance firms deemed 
unnecessary to do so. 
Lundmark (2001) studied the effect of wastepaper availability and its prices on 
location decisions of paper producers in 16 European countries over 1985-1995. The 
study tested the hypothesis that increases in the importance of wastepaper as a raw 
material for the industry may have contributed to a structural locational shift/movement 
of paper companies from forest-endowed areas to regions with high levels of aggregate 
paper consumption and effective paper recycling programs. The author found that local 
41 Gray and Shadbegian (1998) specifically note that high abatement costs over the 
studied period reflected that environmental investment ‘crowded out’ productive 
investment and that “…firms shifted investments towards plants facing less stringent 
abatement requirements,” p. 235. The authors also look at the impact of environmental 
policies on firm productivity, effects of productive vs. pollution abatement capital, choice 
of technology, co-relationship with plant vintage, firm structure and managerial expertise 
and spatial effects on plants’ environmental performance. 
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market size and agglomeration effects were significant location determinants of pulp and 
paper investments, while prices for raw materials were not. 
Lundmark and Nilsson (2001) analyzed the effects of recycling rates and 
investments in paper recovery infrastructure on location choices of newsprint capacity 
investments. Country-specific newsprint investment project counts were regressed 
against four cost factors – tonnage of wastepaper recovered, volume of standing forest, 
electricity price, and wage; two demand factors – per capita GDP and paper consumption; 
and income tax for 13 Western European countries over 1985-1995. The two raw 
material factors and energy input prices were found to be significant and with the 
expected signs indicating that Western European newsprint industry is resource-oriented 
while wages were found insignificant. Demand variables were also found to be 
insignificant. The findings suggest that more standardized grades (such as newsprint and 
wrapping papers) respond differently to changes in cost and market conditions. 
Bergman and Johansson (2002) studied the impact of regional cost factors on 
investment propensities of the pulp and paper companies in 15 European countries over 
1988-1997. The authors found that the most important determinants of European pulp 
and paper firms’ decisions to invest in pulp lines and paper machines were wage rates, 
installed production capacity, price of the final product and the USD/ECU exchange 
rate.42 
42 European Currency Unit. 
56 
 
                                                          
 
Lundmark (2003) looked at three continuous investment models for the pulp and 
paper industry in ten European countries over 1978-1995. His fixed and random effects 
models of continuous investment flows indicated that wages, wastepaper availability, 
market size and agglomeration economies have the strongest impact on papermakers’ 
investment decisions, while prices for raw materials exhibited ambiguous effects.43 The 
author concluded that the choice of country to invest was related to time-specific effects 
that stemmed possibly from market cyclicality, introduction of new technologies, and 
adjustments in competition patterns due to changes in regional and common polices. 
 
Location Choices and Paper Industry in Literature, Agglomeration and 
Innovative Activities 
Agglomeration forces attract productive investments towards already well-
established paper-producing regional markets even if technological advancements and/or 
requirements may call for geographic relocations (Hunter 1955, Lundmark 2001, 
Bergman and Johansson 2002). Firms tend to enter regional markets through either 
vertical integration (Ohanian 1994, Melendez 2002) or horizontal expansion via mergers 
and acquisitions (Pesendorfer 2003). Greater reliance on recycled raw materials and 
decreased usage of virgin pulp in the 1990s discouraged vertical integration with timber 
producers and encouraged gradual relocation towards large metropolitan areas with 
sufficient supply of waste paper (McNutt 2002). Expectations that biotechnology would 
43 More specifically, Lundmark (2003) found that wages, wastepaper recovery rate, GDP 
and agglomeration had the expected signs and high statistical significance, while energy 
and raw material prices exhibited statistically and substantively ambiguous results. 
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provide the industry with the next radical technological boost (Laestadius 1998, 2000) 
lead to the forecasts that industry clusters would shift even further towards large 
metropolitan areas with high research capacity. The main limitation of the enumerated 
location choice studies is the narrow focus on the establishment of new plants or 
greenfields and, in the case of the EU studies, the use of country-level aggregates. 
 
Pulp and Paper Industry in Industrial Organization Studies 
In addition to the above stream of the Economic Geography studies, there are a 
few Industrial Organization (IO) papers that have analyzed the industry’s regional capital 
investments and market restructuring. Ohanian (1994) used individual mill level data for 
years 1900 to 1940 to analyze regional patterns of vertical integration. Studying the 
period of industry relocation from the Northeast and Great Lakes to South and Pacific 
Coast, the author found that vertical integration of the U.S. pulp and paper industry is 
consistent with the transactions cost model of consolidation and positively associated 
with regional concentration, paper-mill capacity, and production of standardized grades 
of paper. Consistent with Hunter’s (1955) observations of slow reactions of industry to 
changing technology and cost incentives, Ohanian (1994) documented that the model of 
vertical integration fitted the cohorts of new entrants much better than the cohort of the 
established mills. Once mills were built, her analysis showed, they were unlikely to alter 
their integrated status despite changes in the regional market environment. The author 
also stated that major adjustments to industry trends occurred through entry and exit, not 
through changes in integrated status. 
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Extending Ohanian’s (1994) work to cover 1975-1995, Melendez (2002) 
expanded the definition of vertical integration to include pulp and paper mills that 
belonged to multi-plant firms and that were located within 350-400 miles away from each 
other. Melendez’s (2002) confirmed Ohanian’s (1994) findings that vertical integration 
was positively associated with mill size, measured in daily capacity, and production of 
newsprint, or standardized paper grades. In contrast to Ohanian’s (1994) results, 
Melendez (2002) found that the measures of regional concentration were negatively 
associated with vertical integration. At the same time, lagged concentration measures 
gave positive and significant results, signaling that vertical integration, as a response to 
increasing market concentration (or decreasing number of buyers and sellers in the 
market) during the studied period was not instantaneous.44 Melendez suggested that the 
difference in the effects of concentration between these and Ohanian’s (1994) findings 
stemmed from the difference in periods studied.45 
Documenting the effect of the horizontal merger wave on the welfare of paper and 
paperboard companies during 1972-1992, Pesendorfer (2003) found that increased 
capacity and larger number of merged firms generally reduced marginal costs while 
having little effect on consumer surplus and increasing producer surplus – findings that 
were consistent with competitive pricing environment and overall increased profits for 
44 Melendez (2002, p. 28) reported that the current period concentration measure was 
negative and significant while lagged concentration measure was found positive and 
strongly significant. Such results, the author pointed out, demonstrated that mills 
responded with a lag to market concentration in terms of making decisions about their 
integration status. 
45 According to the authors, 1900-1940 marked a period of gradual yet massive relocation 
of the industry to the Southern and Pacific regions of the country, while the years of 
1975-1995 did not observe extensive capital relocations. 
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merging firms.46 Additionally, the author documented that over 40% of the total capacity 
expansions for all years combined were achieved through horizontal acquisitions while 
only 7.29% are achieved through building new plants. Companies affected by mergers 
tended to be the largest within the industry – acquiring firms were among top 15% largest 
producers, while acquired firms among 25% top producers. Other findings included 
evidence of increased likelihood of merged companies to lose their market share and 
scrap excess capacity. 
Following the works of Lieberman (1987a, 1987b, 1987c), Christensen and Caves 
(1997) analyzed abandonment of previously announced capacity expansion projects in 11 
North-American pulp and paper industry segments for 1978-1991. In their analysis, the 
authors focused on the determinants of firms’ decisions to abandon projects that they 
have previously announced. Such determinants included attributes of the announced 
project and of the firm sponsoring it, the amount of resources already committed to it, 
and the fresh news arriving about the project’s expected payout. Having found that 
likelihood of abandonment increased if, during the same year, there were other competing 
projects announced, the authors suggested that there was some sort of continual auction 
within the market. According to the authors, the pulp and paper industry “comfortably 
fitted” into “a two-stage game, in which suppliers first chose their capacities and then 
competed in the short run within those capacity constraints.”47 The authors found 
empirical evidence that companies operating in more competitive paper market segments 
and with few or no financial commitment to the announced projects were more likely to 
46 According to the author, the merger wave followed 1984 revision of merger guidelines. 
47 Christensen and Caves (1997), p.48. 
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abandon those projects. Further, firms operating in less competitive paper grades were 
less likely to abandon previously announced capacity expansions and were more likely to 
complete when similar projects were announced by other/rivaling firms. 
To summarize, this brief literature review depicts an old highly capital-intensive 
industry which has been reluctant to carry out quick adjustments to changes in regional 
markets (Hunter 1955). Proximity to forest stands, rivers, and transportation links 
(Linberg,1953, Barr and Fairbairn 1974, Hayter 1978) appear to be prerequisites for the 
initial papermakers’ choices of location. However, once the producers are located in 
those areas, regional fluctuations in prices for raw materials have significant effects only 
for the producers of standardized paper grades (Lundmark and Nilsson 2001, Lundmark 
2003). Wages (Bergman and Johansson 2002) and environmental regulations (Gray and 
Shadbegian 1998, 2002) are found to be significant determinants of choice of the optimal 
location for continuous investments. Agglomeration forces attract productive investments 
towards already well-established paper-producing regional markets even if technological 
advancements and/or requirements may call for geographic relocations (Hunter 1955, 
Lundmark 2001, Bergman and Johansson 2002). Firms are expected to enter regional 
markets through either vertical integration (Ohanian 1994, Melendez 2002) or horizontal 
expansion via mergers and acquisitions (Pesendorfer 2003). Finally, firms’ strategic 
expansion and investment plans are announced and contested, as in auctions, in industry 





2.3.Methodology and Hypotheses 
Theoretical Motivation 
The early models of firm locational choices, developed by Carlton (1983) and 
Bartik (1985), rise from the theory of dual relationships between firms’ production, cost 
and profit functions. Under this framework, the profit maximization conjectures allow 
one to infer information on the optimal choice of variable and fixed inputs associated 
with chosen locations. McFadden (1971) proved one-to-one correspondence between 
given sets of concave production and respective convex profit functions.48 The dual 
relationship of the production and profit functions allows one to estimate parameters of 
an indirect restricted profit function without having to separately specify the 
corresponding production function. Under the assumptions of (i) a concave production 
function in variable inputs, (ii) profit maximizing and (ii) firms’ output and variable input 
price-taking, an indirect restricted profit function expresses the maximized profit of a 
firm as the function of prices of output and variable inputs and the quantities of the fixed 
factors of production for a given set of technologies and endowment of fixed factors of 
production. 
Consider a short run (restricted) production function with all the usual 
neoclassical properties:  
(1) ),...,,;,...,( 11 snsisismisis ZZKXXFQ = , 
48 Following McFadden (1971) and Lau (1971), Lau and Yotopoulos (1972, p.11) 
observe that “almost all continuous production functions in current use which are 
concave will give rise to a well-behaved profit function.” 
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where Qis is firm i's output in a state s, Xi‘s are quantities of a firm’s m variable inputs 
such as labor, materials, energy, isK is installed capital in state s, and the Z‘s are the 
levels of n conditional factors such as environmental regulations, transportation 
infrastructure, proximity to an urban area, regional market size, and other agglomeration 
factors associated with a given state s. Given the inputs, the associated short-run profit 
function for a firm i in a state s is: 
(2) 
isisismsmsnsismisiis KrXcZZXXFp −−= ∑),...,;,...,( 11p , 
where pis is short-run profit, pi is the unit price of firm output, and smc  is the unit price of 
the m variable input X, ris is the user cost of capital, and isK  is the quasi-fixed level of 
the firm’s capital or installed capacity in state s. Maximizing (2) with respect to X gives 
optimal quantities of variable inputs, denoted X*’s, as functions of output price, m 
variable inputs costs cis, installed capital isK and quantities of n fixed inputs Zsn: 
(3) mkKZcpfX kk ,...,1),,,,(
* == , 
where non-subscripted p, c, Z, and K  denote vectors. Substituting X
*’s back into (2) 
gives the following indirect profit function: 
(4) ∑ −−= )),...,;,...,(( *1**1* isisismsmsnssmsiis KrXcZZXXFpp , or 
(5) ),,...,;,,...,,( 11** isisnisisismisiisis KZZrccppp = . 
which is a function of installed capacity or the quasi-fixed factor of production. Of 
importance, the partial derivative of the indirect profit function with respect to the quasi-
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fixed factor gives the shadow value of a unit increase in installed capacity. And if the 
shadow value of installed capacity is greater than the cost of capital (i.e. the user cost of 
capital which, in general, includes interest, depreciation and obsolescence), then the firm 
has a profit incentive to increase capacity and invest in additional capacity. Without loss 
of generality, the profit function can be written as: 
(6) * *( )is isEp p= , 
where )( *isE p  is expected profit and isu  is a random term with mean 0. 
 
Empirical Methodology 
The first step of the empirical analysis is to carry out the first-differenced (FD) 









11 )ln(lnlnln β , 
where C is the state’s s operating capacity in year t measured in thousand short tons. 
Given installed capital, each firm in time t will invest in capacity in state s 
if the expected profit from the investment exceeds the expected profit without the 
investment, that is E(pis*|given investment) > E(pis*|without investment). Yet 
since I do not observe all of the determining factors, this occurs with some 
probability. In particular, Pr(invest in state s) = Pr(pis*|given investment > 
pis*|without investment)  
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= Pr(E(pis*|given investment) + uis,investment > E(pis*|without investment) + uis,no investment ), 
or: 
(8) )Pr()Pr()1Pr( 010101 ististististististist VVuuy −>−=>== pp , 
where istp  is profit 
*
istp  of firm i at time t in state s and the vector of observed 
characteristics of an investment choice istV  and chosen state s at time t. 
Further, to replicate the earlier studies on the location choice, I estimate the LPM 
and logit models of the following basic functional form: 
(9) ststst exI += β , 
where I equals 1 when there is an increase in annual capacity by more than 10 thousand 
short tons (10K) in a state s in year t and x is the set of state characteristics under 
consideration. The 10K-tons threshold captures both large investments, associated with 
the installment of new production lines, and small capital investments, such as those 
geared towards productive efficiency and environmental compliance.49 I estimate 
49 Berman and Johanson (2002) defined investment spikes as 50K and 100K tons 
increases for newly installed papermaking and pulping lines/facilities, respectively. 
Lundmark (2001) and Lundmark and Nilsson (2001), on the other hand, focused on all 
capacity increases while discarding investments that resulted in less than 10K tons 
capacity increases. For the purposes of this analysis, I have estimated models for 10K, 
50K, and 100K capacity increases and have chosen the 10K threshold of as the larger 




                                                          
 
equation (9) using the ordinary least squares (OLS) and logistic regressions with 2-year 
lags of the natural logarithm of x variables with and without state and year fixed effects.50 
To carry out the analyses, first, I expand the definition of the dependent variable 
and use the continuous measure of capacity changes to arrive at the first-differenced 
estimators as in equation (7). This allows me to utilize all of the information contained in 
the annual capacity data. Further, to compare the results of the current work with the 
previous findings, I redefine the dependent variable as in the previous literature – a 
binary variable with a non-negative value for mills that have been upgraded within the 




To test whether environmental regulatory stringency has deterring effect on 
capacity investments, I follow Gray and Shadbegian (1998, 2002) and include ‘non-
traditional’ costs associated with environmental regulations such as the degree of 
stringency of local/state environmental regulations. In addition, following the previous 
literature on the choice of location in the initial cross-industry studies (Carlton, 1983; 
Bartik, 1985) and in paper industry in particular (Lundmark and Nilsson, 2001; Bergman 
and Johansson, 2002; Lundmark, 2001, 2003), in the second group of factors 
50 In addition to state-level, I estimate mill-level FD for the continuous investments and 
LPM and logit models with and without fixed effects for lumpy investments. The mill-
level results are reported in Appendix A in Tables A.3 and A.4 and specific estimates are 
reviewed in the section on the overall results. 
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hypothesized to influence the choice of location for continuous and lumpy ‘stay put’ 
investment decision, I include the ‘traditional’ factors of production – variable input 
costs: availability of recycled pulp, labor and energy prices. Given that pulp and paper 
mills represent the input-oriented sectors of the paper manufacturing industry which 
produce intermediate goods (as opposed to final goods), I focus on the input cost 
structure.51 More specifically, the hypothesized investment and direct and indirect cost 
factor relationships are, all else constant: 
H1: An increase in the level of stringency of environmental state regulations will 
decrease the probability of continued investments in a given state, and 
H2: A decrease in the prices of variable inputs is expected to increase the probability 
of an investment at a given state. 
Consistent with the previous literature, we expect that variable operating costs 
will have negative impact on the firm/mill profitability and are likely to divert the 
investments away from the location with high input prices (Carlton 1983, Bartik 1985, 
Gray and Shadbegian 1998, 2002, Lundmark and Nilsson 2001, Bergman and Johansson 
2002, Lundmark 2001, 2003). Availability of recycled pulp will attract capital 
investments (Gray and Shadbegian 1998, 2002, Lundmark and Nilsson 2001, Bergman 
51 Material inputs for pulp and paper industry include virgin and recycled pulp and, 
according to McCarthy and Urmanbetova (2009), comprise about 20% of total short-run 
variable input costs. In order to proxy virgin pulp availability, I have examined a number 
of measures from the U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest Service inventory. 
Specifically, I tried the area of forest land, area of timberland, number of growing-stock 
trees on forest land, and number of live trees on forest land. However, the estimated 
coefficients for virgin pulp were statistically and substantively insignificant and were 
omitted from the final analyses. 
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and Johansson 2002, Lundmark 2001, 2003). Tax and environmental policies, on the 
other hand, impose indirect production costs and higher taxes and more frequent 
environmental monitoring and enforcement actions will divert the infusion of productive 
capital (Carlton 1983, Bartik 1985, Gray 1997, Gray and Shadbegian 1998, 2002). 
 
2.4.Data and Variables 
Dependent Variable: Lockwood-Post's Capacity 
To measure changes in capital investments, I use the data on productive mill 
capacity collected from the annual editions of Lockwood-Post's Directory of the Pulp, 
Paper, and Allied Trades (LW), which is a unique source on historical equipment and 
production processes registry on all U.S. pulp and paper mills since 1873. The annual 
editions of LW cover all the U.S. territories providing the list of all headquarters and 
mills for pulp and paper companies by state and city.52 For this chapter, annual editions 
for 1979-2002 were surveyed to collect data on all listed mills, annual capacity and 
product information, zip codes, availability of pulping facilities on the premises of the 
52 Specifically, each mill is listed with its site or local facility name, parent company and 
owner (if either are different from the site or local facility name), street address and zip 
code, mill phone number and indication of the neighboring transport link used by the mill 
(railroad or highway), and names and job titles of the management team, and the total 
number of the employees. In addition, more technical and in-depth details are provided 
on itemized equipment for the following production facilities: wood-handling and 
preparation, pulp mill, paper mill, steam and power generation, water treatment and 
effluent treatment. Each mill entry is closed with the list of products, their associated 




                                                          
 
mills (to ensure identification of vertically integrated mills), ownership information, and 
the timing of idling and dismantling of the mills.  
In this work, I equate the choice of location with the choice to invest additional 
capital in an existing/operating production site. Traditional economic geography studies 
examine the choice of location for new branch plants (greenfields), or plant entries 
(Carlton 1983, Bartik 1985). The rationale for such definition of the dependent variable is 
that firms choose to build new plants in areas that managers view as ‘geographic profit 
centers.’ In addition, works that study the effects of policy variables, such as 
environmental regulations (Gray and Shadbegian 1993, Henderson 1996, Levinson 1996, 
Gray 1997, List 2001, List et al. 2004, Gray and Shadbegian 2005b, Condliffe and 
Morgan 2008), argue that many of the environmental requirements are not imposed on 
older plants (‘grandfathering’ rules), hence environmental costs are not appropriately 
allocated among older establishments. 
A number of reviewed works focusing on the pulp and paper industry re-define 
the choice of location as the choice of optimal location for both continuous and new 
investments (Bergman and Johansson 2002, Gray and Shadbegian 1998, 2002, Lundmark 
2001, Lundmark and Nilsson 2001, Lundmark 2003).53 There is an intuitive reasoning for 
such definition of the location choice measure. Given the high capital intensity of the 
industry as well as the number of locational production requirements (closeness to forest 
stands, running water, and transportation networks), it is reasonable to suggest that 
53 Lieberman (1987a, 1987b, 1987c) studies the effect of both new plant entries as well as 
incremental capital adjustments made by incumbents on the market structure and barriers 
to entry for the chemical industries. 
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papermakers’ choices of manufacturing sites is limited by financial and resource 
prerequisites. Thus, the decision to upgrade existing equipment, whether to increase 
existing productive capacity, or expand into new product lines, or to comply with the 
environmental regulations, at any one given site is indicative of the managers’ perception 
that the selected site has superior production characteristics when compared to other 
sites.54 Hence, choosing to invest in an existing location becomes a decision to ‘stay put’ 
as opposed to try to relocate. And in a sense, the high capital investment is not only a 
barrier to greenfield by other firms, it is also a barrier to its own greenfield decisions. 
 
Explanatory Variables 
To test H1 on whether environmental stringency has impact on pulp and paper 
capital investments by increasing abatement, thereby total, costs, I supplement the plant-
level LW capacity estimates with the EPA's facility-level Enforcement and Compliance 
History Online (ECHO) records. The ECHO data base includes information on facility 
characteristics, its environmental permits and compliance history. The EPA data 
collections do not report any capacity or production- and/or technology-related 
information, but I match facility-level compliance with LW production data and obtain 
mill- and state-level measures of environmental stringency and noncompliance. 
Environmental stringency is measured by the total number of regulatory monitoring and 
enforcement actions in air and water pollution media, and mill noncompliance by the 
54 By similar logic, the decision not to invest into an existing plant may signal the 
managerial decision to divest the operation with a subsequent exit from the market. 
70 
 
                                                          
 
number of non-compliant quarters, respectively, and both variables are scaled by state 
capacity.55 Unlike other studies that use statewide and all-industry measures of 
environmental stringency, we match the mill level capacity with the EPA’s ECHO data to 
calculate the total number of inspections and enforcements specific to the mills in the 
sample.56 This allows me to use a direct measure of environmental regulatory stringency 
faced by the pulp and paper mills in the sample. Gray (1997) and Gray and Shadbegian 
(1998, 2002) found that air and water regulations, as measures of environmental 
stringency, had negative (yet statistically insignificant) impact on the choice of location 
and paper-making technology. 
The hypotheses under H2 include the following state price and other state control 
variables: real hourly wages, real electricity prices, availability of wood and waste, tax 
index for paper manufacturing and land prices. Previous studies found input costs – 
wages, energy, materials, and land prices – to negatively impact location and investment 
decisions in pulp and paper and other industries (Carlton 1983, Bartik 1985, Levinson 
1996, Gray 1997, Gray and Shadbegian 1998, 2002, Lundmark and Nilsson 2001, 
Bergman and Johansson 2002, Condliffe and Morgan 2008, Lundmark 2001, 2003, 
Bergman and Johansson 2002).57 As in these studies, I propose that increases in 
production input prices will increase variable costs, thereby making the location as less 
55 Air and water inspections and enforcements were collected from the Air Facility 
System (AFS) and National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), 
respectively. 
56 In addition to facility-specific air and water inspections, Gray (1997) and Gray and 
Shadbegian (2002) include Green Policies Index, state environmental spending, and 
manufacturing pollution abatement costs, adjusted for industry mix. 
57 Table A.1 in Appendix A lists signs and statistical significance of explanatory variables 
included in the previous works relevant to this work. 
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desirable for continued investments. In addition to the input price variables, Bartik 
(1985), Levinson (1996), Gray (1997), and Gray and Shadbegian (2002) found corporate 
and/or property taxes to have a negative impact on the plant location decision. Similar to 
the impact of input costs, increased tax rates are likely to deter further increases in 
investments into productive capacity. For measures of the above variables, I obtain wages 
from the BEA’s Annual Personal Income Employment, energy prices and availability of 
recycled pulp data from the Energy Information Administration (EIA), land prices from 
the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, and annual state tax index on production for paper and allied industries from 
the BEA’s Regional Economic Accounts.58 Tables 2.2 and 2.3 present descriptive 
statistics for all the variables involved in this analysis.59 
 
Table 2.2. Descriptive Statistics for Variables in the First-differencing Models 
Variable 
(Expected Sign) Definition Source Mean SD 
Dep.Var.: Δ Investment 
(N/A) 
State LW annual capacity in 
thousand short tons calculated 







Number of facility actions in 
state, ECHO, per million short 
tons of LW capacity 
EPA, 
ECHO 0.04 0.66 
  
58 The hourly wage was estimated by dividing the total annual paper manufacturing 
compensation by the sector employment and then by the total number of work hours in 
350 working days. All other variables included in the analysis did not require additional 
calculations, except for either converting into real 1990 dollars or to the base of 1990 in 
the case of the tax index. 
59 In addition, Tables A.2-A.3 in Appendix A present correlation matrices for the 
continuous and discrete investment models. 
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Table 2.2. Continued 
Variable 
(Expected Sign) Definition Source Mean SD 
Δ Environmental 
Noncompliance (-) 
Number of facility 
noncompliance quarters in 
state, NPDES system water, 
per million short tons of LW 
capacity 
EPA, 
ECHO 0.06 0.47 
Δ Wage (-) 
Paper and allied state hourly 
wage converted into real using 
regional 1990 CPI for urban 
workers in average US city 
BEA 0.01 0.14 
Δ Energy Price (-) 
Real price for electricity in the 
industrial sector in 1990 
dollars per million BTU 
EIA, 
SEDS -0.01 0.06 
Δ Recycled Pulp (+) 
Wood and waste consumed in 
the industrial sector at a cost in 
billion BTU 
EIA, 
SEDS 0.02 0.40 
Δ Taxes (-) 
Tax index on production and 
imports less subsidies for 
paper and allied, 1990 = 100 
BEA 0.06 0.07 
Δ Land Price (-) State farm real estate: average value per acre in 1990 dollars NASS 0.39 1.60 
Note: N = 684, all variables are in the log form and explanatory variables are lagged 
by two years. 
 
Table 2.3. Descriptive Statistics for the LPM and Logit Models 
Variable 
(Expected Sign) Definition Source Mean SD 
Dep. Var.: 
Investment (N/A) 








Number of facility actions in state, 
ECHO, per million short tons of 
LW capacity 
EPA, 
ECHO 2.33 1.01 
Environmental 
Noncompliance (-) 
Number of facility noncompliance 
quarters in state, NPDES system 
water, per million short tons of 
LW capacity 
EPA, 
ECHO 0.33 0.80 
Wage (-) 
Paper and allied state hourly wage 
converted into real using regional 
1990 CPI for urban workers in 
average US city 




Table 2.3. Continued 
Variable 
(Expected Sign) Definition Source Mean SD 
Energy Price (-) 
Real price for electricity in the 
industrial sector in 1990 dollars 
per million BTU 
EIA, 
SEDS -1.99 0.31 
Recycled Pulp, (+) 
Wood and waste consumed in the 
industrial sector at a cost in billion 
BTU 
EIA, 
SEDS 9.19 1.56 
Taxes, (-) 
Tax index on production and 
imports less subsidies for paper 
and allied, 1990 = 100 
BEA 3.62 1.83 
Land Price, (-) State farm real estate: average value per acre in 1990 dollars NASS 5.75 2.93 
Environmental 
Stringency, (-) 
Number of facility actions in state, 
ECHO, per million short tons of 
LW capacity 
EPA, 
ECHO 2.33 1.01 
Note: N = 720, all variables are in the log form and explanatory variables are 




Table 2.4 presents the state-level first-differencing results for the one-year change 
in capacity with environmental and input price variables. Model I includes both 
environmental variables – stringency and noncompliance. No input prices are significant 
except energy, which has the expected sign. Environmental stringency and 
noncompliance have expected signs, yet both are statistically insignificant. R-squared 
explains only 3% of the variation in the dependent variable. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses and the White (1980) test statistic fails to 
reject the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity. The calculated F-value rejects the null 
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of joint insignificance of all the variables at the 5%-level. The Durbin-Watson test 
statistic fails to reject the null hypothesis that errors are serially uncorrelated.60 
Table 2.4. First-differenced Models 
Dependent variable: ∆ state capacity Model I 
Intercept 0.0124*** 
 (0.003) ∆ Environmental Stringency -0.0040 
 (0.012) ∆ Environmental Noncompliance 0.0218 
 (0.022) ∆ Taxes 0.0869* 
 (0.050) ∆ Wage 0.0136 
 (0.023) ∆ Energy Prices -0.0819*** 
 (0.031) ∆ Recycled Pulp 0.0064 
 (0.005) ∆ Land Price -0.0020** 
 (0.001) Number of Observations 684 
R-Square 0.03 
Adj R-Sq 0.020 
Note: All variables are in the two-year lagged and log form. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors for the OLS 
estimates were obtained using White (1980) procedure and are 
reported in brackets. Significance levels are indicated as 
follows:* significant at the α = .10 level, ** significant at the α 
= .05 level, and *** significant at the α = .01 level. 
 
Changes in state environmental stringency, measured by the natural logarithm of 
facility actions reported in ECHO, have a statistically insignificant negative effect on the 
changes in the level of state capacity. The 10% increase in the number of facility actions 
60 Durbin-Watson statistic is 2.08, F-value is 2.93 and the White heteroskedasticity 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) value is 20.6 with p-value of 0.98. 
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decreases state capacity by 0.04%. Similarly, environmental noncompliance has positive 
yet substantively and statistically insignificant effect. Given these results, the first 
hypothesis (H1) of environmental stringency having a negative impact on the continuous 
capital adjustments can be rejected. 
With respect to the second hypothesis (H2) within the framework of the 
continuous capital adjustments, wages and state taxes have the ‘wrong’ sign -- both are 
expected to be negatively related to the changes in the state paper capacity, yet have a 
positive sign. In addition, taxes are statistically significant at 10% level. And in terms of 
marginal effects, all else constant, a 10% increase in taxes increases state annual capacity 
by 0.87%. 
In contrast to wages and taxes, energy, land prices and availability of recycled 
pulp have the expected sighs and energy and land prices are statistically significant at 1% 
and 5% levels, respectively. In terms of marginal effects, a 10% increase in state energy 
prices decreases state pulp and paper capacity by 0.82%, and a 10% increase in land 
prices decreases state pulp and paper capacity by 0.02%, all else the same. Finally, the 
availability of recycled pulp, approximated by changes in wood and waste consumption 
in the industrial sector, is positively related to the changes in the state paper capacity. A 
10% increase in the availability of recycled pulp increases paper capacity by 0.06%, but 
is statistically insignificant. 
 
LPM Results 
To replicate the results from some of the previous studies, I also ran the linear 
probability models (LPM) with and without the fixed effects (Table 2.5) as well as the 
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logit models with and without the fixed effects (Table 2.6). The dependent variable in 
these two sets of models is defined as 1 if there is at least a 10K-ton increase in state 
capacity and 0 if there are no, smaller than 10K tons or negative changes. Table 2.5 
presents the state-level LPM results for the same model reported in Table 2.4. Column I 
of Table 2.5 reports LPM estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, 
and Column II presents the same model but with state and year fixed effects (FE).61 
The LPM results differ substantially from the results of the first-differenced 
model. Environmental stringency and noncompliance are highly statistically significant in 
Model I with no FE and have negative impact on the probability of capacity investments, 
yet both variables become statistically insignificant when FE are included and 
environmental noncompliance changes its sign from negative to positive (Table 2.5, 
Model II). Further, wages have now the expected negative sign and are significant at the 
5% level in the FE model. Energy prices are still negatively related to the capacity 
investments in the estimation with the FE (Table 2.5, Model II), but are statistically 
insignificant, and they are positive and statistically insignificant in the model with no FE 
(Table 2.5, Model I). Availability of recycled pulp, measured by the industrial wood and 
waste consumption, is highly significant (at 1% level) in both models, but paradoxically 
changes sign from positive to negative when going from the LPM with no FE to the LPM 
with FE. Similarly, taxes are positively associated with the 10K tons increases in state 
capacity in the model with no FE and are statistically significant at 1% level, but change 
sign and become in significant in Model II (Table 2.5). Likewise, land prices change sign 
61 In the LPM and logit models, ‘FE’ refers to 2-way (year and state) fixed effects. 
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from positive to negative when FE are included, and in both cases they are statistically 
insignificant. 
 
Table 2.5. Linear Probability Models 
Dependent variable: 1 if at least 10K capacity increase 
 Model I  Model II 
Intercept 0.1161  2.7176*** 
 (0.229)  (0.747) 
Environmental Stringency -0.0467**  -0.0283 
 (0.018)  (0.028) 
Environmental Compliance -0.0760***  0.0332 
 (0.024)  (0.029) 
Taxes 0.0528***  -0.1075 
 (0.014)  (0.089) 
Wage -0.0384  -0.1525** 
 (0.069)  (0.074) 
Energy Prices 0.0075  -0.0498 
 (0.071)  (0.167) 
Recycled Pulp 0.0465***  -0.0789*** 
 (0.015)  (0.030) 
Land Price 0.0059  -0.0563 
 (0.007)  (0.072) 
Number of Observations 720 DFE 658 
R-Square 0.11 R-Square 0.36 
F Value 11.11 F Value 4.74 
Note: All variables are in the two-year lagged and log form. Significance 
levels are indicated as follows: * significant at the α = .10 level, ** 
significant at the α = .05 level, and *** significant at the α = .01 level. For 
the LPM results in Column I and II, Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors for the OLS estimates were obtained using White (1980) procedure 
and are reported in brackets. 
 
Finally, the fit statistics for both models suggest that they are only marginally 
better than the first-differenced model. R-squared explains 11% of variation in the 
dependent variable in Model I and 36% in Model II and F-values associated with all four 
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models fail to reject the null of joint insignificance of all the variables in the models at 
1% critical value (Table 2.5). 
 
Logit Results 
Logit results, reported in Tables 2.6 and 2.7, are similar to the LPM results in 
Table 2.5. As in the LPM results, parameter estimates for the environmental variables are 
negative and statistically significant for logit, yet, as is the case with the LPM, the 
statistical significance of the environmental variables dissipates when fixed effects are 
included. In general, both environmental stringency and noncompliance have negative 
impact on the probability of 10K capacity investments. Environmental stringency is 
statistically significant at 5% level, and environmental noncompliance is statistically 
significant at 1% level (Table 2.6, Model I). Specifically, for 1% increase in the number 
of regulatory actions at pulp and paper mills (environmental compliance), decreases the 
odds of 10 thousand tons capacity investments by a factor of 0.81 and 0.84 in logit 
models without and with FE, holding all else constant (Table 2.7, Models I and II). 
Similarly, under ceteris paribus, 1% increase in the number of noncompliant facility-
quarters (environmental noncompliance), decreases the odds of 10K ton capacity 
investments by a factor of 0.73 and 0.83 (Table 2.7, Models I and II). As in the LPM 
models, I find negative but statistically insignificant wage parameter estimates. Energy 
prices are positively associated with the probability of 10K capacity investments, but are 
statistically insignificant in the model with no FE (Table 2.6, Model I). 
Once the FE are included however, the energy prices become negative yet still 
statistically insignificant. Taxes are positive and statistically significant at 1% level  
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Table 2.6. Logit Models 
Dependent variable: 1 if at least 10K state capacity 
increase I II: State/Year FE 
Intercept -1.6898  
 (1.043)  
Environmental Stringency -0.2103** -0.1701 
 (0.090) (0.163) 
Environmental Noncompliance -0.3203*** -0.1814 
 (0.107) (0.134) 
Taxes 0.2303*** -0.4350 
 (0.066) (0.387) 
Wage -0.1728 -0.6445 
 (0.293) (0.427) 
Energy Prices 0.0725 -0.6324 
 (0.326) (0.919) 
Recycled Pulp 0.2143*** -0.4255*** 
 (0.074) (0.151) 
Land Price 0.0254 0.1237*** 
 (0.031) (0.048) 
N 720 720 
-2 Log L 915.3 671.3 
Pseudo R-squared 0.083 0.033 
Note: All variables are in the two-year lagged and log form. Significance levels are 
indicated as follows:* significant at the α = .10 level, ** significant at the α = .05 
level, and *** significant at the α = .01 level. 
 
Table 2.7. Odds Ratio Estimates of Logit Models 
Explanatory Variables I II: State/Year FE 
Environmental Stringency 0.810 0.844 
Environmental Noncompliance 0.726 0.834 
Taxes 1.259 0.647 
Wage 0.841 0.525 
Energy Prices 1.075 0.531 
Recycled Pulp 1.239 0.653 
Land Price 1.026 1.132 
 
(Table 2.6, Model I), but become negative and statistically insignificant in the model with 
the FE (Table 2.6, Model II). In 2-way FE logit, the availability of recycled pulp and land 
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prices are statistically significant at 1% level (Table 2.6, Model II), but both have the 
unexpected sign – availability of recycled pulp is expected to have impact on 10K 
capacity increases, while land prices negative. Finally, the goodness-of-fit measure 
McFadden’s (1974) Pseudo R-squared is low. 
 
2.6.Discussion 
Table 2.8 presents the signs and significance of all the estimated models. The 
difference in results and their inconclusive performance from the continuous first-
differencing to limited probability and logit models found in this study is not surprising, 
given the previous literature. Assuming that investments are made in a continuous flow of 
adjustments to achieve an optimal capital stock, these results suggest that the 
environmental regulatory variables – environmental stringency and noncompliance – are 
not as important as input price variables and among the number of the input costs, energy 
and land have statistical weight while others are statistically insignificant. In addition, 
taxes have a positive sign and are statistically significant at 10% level. 
Unlike most of the surveyed literature on the investments in pulp and paper 
industry, this study examines the direct impact of disciplinary actions conducted by the 
environmental regulatory agencies on the investment flows in the pulp and paper sector. 
Whether I am looking at a continuous flow of investments or its spikes, I find that state 
environmental stringency has a negative impact on investments, but it is statistically 
insignificant through all the models that take into account fixed effects. Firm 
environmental noncompliance renders even more inconclusive results changing from 
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positive in the continuous and LPM to negative in the logit model, but in all cases with 
FE, it is statistically insignificant. Using a less direct measure for regulatory stringency, 
specifically pro-environment Congressional voting, Gray and Shadbegian (2002) found a 
statistically strong negative impact on papermaking firms’ state production shares. 
Interacting pro-environment Congressional voting with firm compliance, Gray and 
Shadbegian (2002) conclude that the impact of stringency is concentrated on low-
compliance firms.62 It is possible that interacting my more direct measure of state 
environmental stringency with firm environmental compliance may change results for 
one or both of these variables, yet the statistically weak stand-alone effect of the 
environmental stringency suggests that papermakers’ investment decisions are not 
affected by direct disciplinary actions of environmental regulators. 
 
Table 2.8. Summary Results 
  Discrete 
 Continuous Without FE State/Year FE 
 FD LPM Logit LPM Logit 
Environmental Stringency - -** -** - - 
Environmental 
Noncompliance + -*** -*** + - 
Tax Rates +* +*** +*** - - 
Wage + - - -** - 
Energy Prices -*** + + - - 
Recycled Pulp + +*** +*** -*** -*** 
Land Price -** + + - +*** 
 
62 This suggests interacting environmental stringency and compliance for this study also 
to see if results change significantly. 
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Regarding the effects of taxes on pulp and paper investment flows, the continuous 
and LPM and logit model results without the FE suggest that taxes have a surprisingly 
positive effect and are statistically significant. However, in the discrete models with state 
and year FE, taxes have negative and statistically insignificant coefficients. On the 
surface, this finding is inconclusive and may render little value, however other studies 
also found inconclusive and unexpected results. Specifically, Carlton (1983) found mixed 
results, Gray (1997) found negative but only marginally significant results. On the 
contrary, Bartik (1985) and Gray and Shadbegian (2002) found corporate tax rates to be 
positive and statistically significant, and Levinson (1996) and Lundmark and Nilsson 
(2001) found positive but statistically weak relationship between taxes and investment 
projects. However, Gray (1997), Lundmark and Nilsson (2001) and Gray and Shadbegian 
(2002) focused on pulp and paper industry and their findings that pulp and paper 
investments are not deterred by higher taxes are confirmed by the results in this work. 
Overall, the parameter estimates of the policy variables – environmental stringency and 
noncompliance and taxes – reject the hypothesis H1 that more stringent policies deter 
pulp and paper continuous and lumpy investments. 
The performance of the input price variables in both the continuous and spike-like 
investment models confirms findings in some but not other studies. Wages appear to be 
one of the more robust variables in the literature. With the exception of Lundmark and 
Nilsson (2001), the rest of the studies have found wages to be negatively correlated with 
the investment and production shifting decisions of the European and U.S. papermakers. 
My findings suggest that wages have no significant effect on the continuous flow of 
investments, but a negative and statistically significant effect on the discrete increases in 
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capacity levels (in the case with the LPM 2-way FE model). This finding is consistent 
with Lundmark (2001, 2003),63 Bergman and Johansson (2002), and Gray and 
Shadbegian (2002) and suggests that more expensive labor negatively affects bigger 
investments in pulp and paper industry. 
Availability of recycled pulp, which has been analyzed only in the European 
studies, has an insignificant positive effect on the continuous investment adjustments and 
a strong negative effect on the discrete investment increases in the models that control for 
FE. The strong negative result contradicts the hypothesis that firms are attracted to states 
with large supplies of recycled paper. Another interpretation of the negative effect is that 
processing of secondary pulp is expensive and amount of wood and waste consumed – 
the measure that is used in this study to proxy for the availability of recycled pulp – is 
picking up the costs associated with wastepaper processing. In addition, Lundmark and 
Nilsson’s (2001) strong positive relationship of rate of recycling and newsprint 
investment projects suggests that producers of more standardized grades of paper, such as 
newsprint, are more interested in the availability of recycled pulp (vs. the consumer 
product paper producers such as tissue). Hence, in order to determine whether the 
availability of recycled paper is a determining factor for larger paper investments within 
specific paper product lines, one needs to differentiate specific pulping and/or 
papermaking technologies and final products. 
Further, I find that land prices are, as expected, negative and statistically 
significant for the continuous investments in pulp and paper industry. However, they 
63 Lundmark (2003) uses a continuous model. 
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change sign to positive in the discrete models and are highly statistically significant for 
the logit model with 2-way FE. Gray and Shadbegian (2002) arrived at a similar outcome 
— they found the effect of land prices to be positive but statistically inconclusive given 
that this variable’s statistical significance changed from insignificant to significant 
through different models.64 Finally, scholars specializing in the European paper markets 
omit land prices altogether, making the findings in this and Gray and Shadbegian’s 
(2002) works distinctive and mutually reinforcing. The unexpected positive and 
statistically significant result of land prices in the state discrete models suggests that this 
variable is picking up influences other than of a conventional cost variable. At the mill 
level however, land prices are negative and statistically significant for logit regressions 
with 2-way (i) state and year and (ii) mill and year effects (Appendix Table A.4). This 
suggests that analyses aggregated to the state level contain other omitted influences and 
disaggregated analyses are preferred. 
Finally, changes in energy prices have the strongest effect on the continuous flow 
of investments – the results are negative and statistically significant. The negative sign 
persists through the models, yet its statistical power dissipates when moving from the 
model of continuous capital adjustments to discrete inflows of investments. This result 
suggests that energy price is the most important cost variable for the continuous 
investment adjustments in the pulp and paper industry. Also, the performance of the 
energy variable from model to model is more consistent than the cumulative findings 
64 In addition to land prices, Gray and Shadbegian (2002) included state area as a scale 
control variable. However, when including state FE, land area was dropped from the 
analysis and the coefficient of land price was still positive and statistically insignificant. 
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from the previous literature: Lundmark and Nilsson (2001) and Gray and Shadbegian 
(2002) found energy prices to be negatively related to the number of newsprint 
investments and firm production shares, respectively, Lundmark (2001) and Shadbegian 
(1998) cite positive correlation, and Lundmark (2003) and Bergman and Johansson 
(2002) report inconclusive results. 
To summarize, the H1 hypotheses on the impact of regulatory climates on the 
choice of pulp and paper investments fail to be accepted for both continuous and lumpy 
models of investment. Input prices or hypotheses under H2, on the other hand, have 
mixed results in the two different models of investments. In the continuous or 
incremental investments adjustments, energy and land prices deter short-term capacity 
increases. Larger investments are sensitive to change in wages, availability of recycled 
pulp and land prices. While wages and recycled pulp reflect increases in respective costs, 
land prices give mixed and inconclusive results at the state level. 
 
Robustness Checks  
In addition to the state-level models, I also estimated a number of preliminary 
mill-level models. The results for these estimations are reporting in Appendix A, Tables 
A.4 and A.5. In the mill-level FD model, environmental noncompliance is found to be 
negative and statistically significant at 5% level. Energy and land prices, on the other 
hand, become statistically insignificant. Most importantly, with the exception of 
environmental stringency, all variables exhibit the expected signs (Table A.4). When 
examining hypotheses H1 and H2 at the mill level in the lumpy investments context, or in 
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logit estimations with 2-way state/year and mill/year effects, all variables also exhibit the 
expected signs with the exception of environmental stringency in the model with state 
and year FE, where it is positive and statistically significant at 5% level. Interestingly, the 
land variable is negative and statistically significant at 1% level in both state/year and 
mill/year models (Appendix, Table A.5). 
Additionally, to check for potential endogeneity of the environmental stringency 
and noncompliance I ran the endogeneity tests for all FD, LPM, and logit models at state 
and mill levels.65 Both state and mill FD models showed no endogeneity, while the tests 
within the LPM and logit estimation methods at the state and mill levels showed 
significant endogeneity – the statistical significance of the individual and joint 
endogeneity test parameters of environmental stringency and noncompliance strongly 
rejected the null of exogeneity.66 To address the issue of endogeneity in the next step of 
this research, I first plan to test the existing instrumental variables (IVs) for their validity 
using the overidentification test. Also, while controlling for endogeneity is 
straightforward within the linear panel models, it is more complicated in nonlinear panel 
65 To instrument for state environmental stringency and compliance, I used the 2-year 
lagged logarithms of the number of landfills in a state and total amount of waste 
generated. The logic behind these instruments is that dirtier states are likely to have more 
stringent monitoring and enforcement and the two variables will be correlated with the 
state’s environmental stringency, but not the error term of the unrestricted model. 
66 In order to run the endogeneity tests for the logit models at the mill level, I had to 
exclude non-compliance as it was correlated with the binary dependent variable and 
including the 2-way fixed effects in the logit regression resulted in model failing to 
converge. Once environmental compliance was excluded, however, I failed to reject the 
null of exogeneity of environmental stringency. 
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The main contribution of this work is to analyze and bridge two strands of 
literature on investments in the pulp and paper industry, the one that follows the 
assumption of continuous capital adjustments and the other which adheres to the notions 
of lumpy investments in capital-intensive industries. The current findings suggest that 
two models inform different behavioral choices considered by papermakers. When facing 
increases in variable costs, specifically energy prices, papermakers respond by decreasing 
levels of investments. However, in day-to-day capital adjustments, regulatory stringency, 
whether tax or environmental, availability of secondary pulp sources, wages and land 
prices have little or no effect. In contrast, when considering larger inflows of investments, 
wages, land prices, and availability of recycled pulp become more important 
determinants in pulp and paper investments. Finally, whether I am looking at a 
continuous flow of investments or its spikes, I find that state environmental stringency 
has a negative impact on investments, but it is statistically insignificant through all the 
models and higher taxes do not deter investments in the pulp and paper industry, contrary 
to my expectations. 
67 Preliminary examination indicates that the analyses may need to use the Correlated 
Random Effects (CRE) probit estimation methodology. 
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For future work, I plan to disaggregate the analyses to the mill level and include 
ten additional years of data extending the study period up to 2013. The preliminary mill-
level analyses demonstrate significantly more robust and consistent results across 
different models and estimations (Appendix Tables A.4 and A.5). Moreover, including 
political variables as in Gray and Shadbegian (1998, 2002) will inform on the extent to 
which political pressure has significant impact on the choice of investments in 
environmentally-sensitive segments of manufacturing such as pulp and paper mills. 
Similarly, given the previous literature we anticipate that differentiating investments by 
the type of the pulping and papermaking technology, type of final product, and 


















The main purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between voluntary 
pollution abatement and prevention efforts at pulp and paper mills and regulatory 
stringency they face. Using facility level data on U.S. pulp and paper mills for 1989-
2002, I estimate the fixed effects negative binomial model to test the hypotheses of 
responsive regulation and whether regulators are driven by numerical pollution targets or 
budgetary constraints. I find that voluntary pollution abatement has greater impact on 
regulatory stringency than government expenditures. Additionally, state political 
pressure, pollution prevention legislation, firm and mill characteristics are found to be 




Most previous literature on environmental regulation focuses on firms’ 
compliance. Since the late 1990s, there has been a growing body of work studying how 
firms’ environmental decisions and performance, in turn, affect the behavior of 
regulators. Building upon and expanding Decker (2005, 2007) and Maxwell and Decker 
(2006), I test the hypothesis of ‘responsive regulation’ first advanced by Hemphill (1993-
1994) and Cothran (1993).68 Maxwell, Lyon, et al. (2000) tested strategic self-regulation 
that preempted political action and their empirical results confirmed that increased threat 
of regulation, measured by membership in conservation groups, induced firms to reduce 
toxic releases. Building the first formal models of responsive regulation, Maxwell and 
Decker (2006) and Decker (2007) corroborated theoretically that profit-maximizing 
firms, under responsive regulation, overinvest in environmental compliance. They 
proposed a two-stage game with the outcome of firms voluntarily overinvesting in 
pollution abatement because of responsive regulation. 
Confirming theoretical propositions of responsive regulation, Arguedas (2013) 
points out that such regulatory behavior is documented not only in growing empirical 
literature, but also in the regulations themselves. For example, under the EPA’s Audit 
Policy, fines for non-compliance can be reduced up to from 75% to 100% if firms 
promptly disclose and correct violations.69 Building on the previous theoretical works, 
Heyes and Kapur (2009) addressed the type of regulatory missions and formally 
68 Decker (2005) identifies Hemphill (1993-1994) and Cothran (1993) as the first works 
using the term ‘responsive regulation,’ p. 180. 
69 Arguedas (2013) cites EPA (December 22, 1995), Incentives for Self-Policing: 
Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations – Final Policy Statement, 
60 Fed. Reg. 66, 706, p 157. 
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modelled two regulatory regimes/climates – target- and budget-driven. Under the target 
regime, firms’ compliance decisions are viewed as strategic substitutes and there are 
positive spillovers to enforcement and under the budget regime firms’ compliance 
decisions are modelled as strategic complements and result in negative enforcement 
spillovers. 
The main purpose of this study is to empirically test Heyes and Kapur’s (2009) 
hypothesis of ‘responsive regulation’ and gauge the extent to which the regulatory 
climate, in which pulp and paper mills operate, can be called a target- vs. budget-regime 
or both. This has not been done before. The analyses use firms’ pollution abatement and 
voluntary prevention efforts, measured by the EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) and 
pollution prevention (P2) facility-level data, and local and state budgetary expenditures 
on protective inspection and regulation from the Census’ Rex-Dac data base. I use the 
fixed effects negative binomial model to regress the number of EPA inspections and 
enforcements for 200 pulp and paper mills during 1984-2002, across all pollution media 
and separately for air, water, and land against the measures of TRI (by media), P2, local 
and state government expenditures. The EPA facility-level data were merged to the plant 
capacity data from the Forest Product Laboratory70 (FPL) and annual editions of 
Lockwood-Post's Directory of the Pulp, Paper, and Allied Trades71 (LW). In addition, I 
test the impact of state political pressure, P2 legislation, firm and mill characteristics and 
find them to be important factors in predicting regulators’ behavior. 
70 For the full description of the FPL data, see: 
http://www.fpl.fs.fed.us/documnts/fplrp/fplrp602.pdf.  









Gray and Shimshack (2011) reviewed empirical literature on effectiveness of 
environmental monitoring and enforcement. According to them, the existing empirical 
enforcement models measure firm deterrence, or how plants respond to enforcement 
activities. There are a number of studies on pulp and paper industry that find evidence for 
effectiveness of enforcement on facility compliance (Nadeau 1997, Gray and Shadbegian 
2007, Shimshack and Ward 2005, 2008). Shimshack and Ward (2005, 2008) found that 
an additional fine induced state-wide compliance. Shimshack and Ward (2008) found that 
fines at violating facilities induced facilities that were operating within the permitted 
level of discharges, were induced to discharge even less, or go beyond compliance. Gray 
and Shadbegian (2007) found that inspections at one plant tended to increase compliance 
at both the inspected and nearby facilities. 
Reviewing the empirical literature on effectiveness of environmental monitoring 
and enforcement, Gray and Shimshack (2011) point out that plant’s choice of its 
abatement effort is “a function of: (i) its perceived probability of a violation given its 
chosen abatement level; (ii) its perceived probability of detection by the regulator if it 
violates; (iii) its perceived probability of a penalty if a violation is detected; and (iv) its 
perception about the likely magnitude of the penalty if it is levied.”72 These appear 
strategic in nature and are included in the discussion of the hypotheses that I propose 
below. 
72 Gray and Shimshack (2011), p. 10. 
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More specifically on pulp and paper industry, Shadbegian and Gray (2003) found 
that air pollution emissions at 68 paper plants in 1985 were significantly lower in plants 
with a larger air pollution abatement capital stock, greater local regulatory stringency, 
and higher productive efficiency. Further, Gray and Shadbegian (2007) found that a 
typical regulatory measure, both inspection and enforcement mechanisms, induced a 10% 
increase in air pollution compliance among 116 paper mills over 1979-1990. 
 Shimshack and Ward (2005) found that in the sample of 217 pulp and paper mills 
over 1988-1996, an additional fine was associated with a two-thirds reduction in the 
statewide water pollution violation rate in the year following the fine. Shimshack and 
Ward (2008) extended the analysis to 251 pulp and paper mills over 1990-2004 and 
found a 7% decrease in statewide water pollution discharges in the year following a find 
being imposed at any plant in the state. They also showed that EPA enforcement actions 
increased overcompliance confirming the theoretical arguments of Maxwell and Decker 
(2006), and Decker (2007), and Arguedas (2013), all of which I review next. 
 
Voluntary Pollution Abatement Discussion 
Maxwell et al. (2000) tested strategic self-regulation that preempted political 
action and their empirical results confirmed that increased threat of regulation, measured 
by membership in conservation groups, induced firms to reduce toxic releases. Maxwell 
and Decker (2006) and Decker (2007) corroborated theoretically that profit-maximizing 
firms, under responsive regulation, overinvest in environmental compliance; hence 
regulatory fines are likely to be an over kill and must be lowered. They proposed a two-
stage game with an outcome of firms voluntarily overinvesting in pollution abatement 
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because of responsive regulation. Arguedas (2013) documents ‘responsive regulation’ 
within the EPA and Spanish environmental legislation.73 
Decker (2005) tested the responsiveness of regulation to voluntary environmental 
abatement and found mixed results. In two out of four frequently inspected industries, 
regulators conduct fewer inspections at the facilities that report lower per unit output of 
toxic release inventory. In pulp and paper industry, mills with larger share of state 
employment are inspected less frequently. Maxwell and Decker (2006) ran two 
regressions: one predicting the threat of regulation measured by green membership, and 
another using these estimated values for green membership in the regression of toxic 
releases (as a measure of voluntary abatement) against estimated green membership and 
other control variables. 
In 2013, Arguedas (2013) critiqued Maxwell and Decker (2006) and Decker 
(2007), arguing that self-reporting/policing efforts are already built-into the regulations, 
hence it is not necessary to model a hierarchical model of regulation with regulators 
worrying over their reputation costs. The simpler model of Arguedas (2013) arrives at the 
same outcome that fines should be reduced, but due to excessive administrative costs of 
regulations. Hence, according to the author, fines (enforcements) should be negatively 
related to the abatement investment efforts. 
To contrast, Heyes and Kapur (2009) addressed the type or nature of regulatory 
mission. They distinguished a target-driven vs. a budget-driven regulatory policy. Under 
the target-driven regulatory policy, firms’ compliance decisions are strategic substitutes 
and there are positive spillovers to enforcement – greater number of inspections will 
73 Arguedas (2013), p. 157. 
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reduce non-compliance. In contrast, the budget-driven regime is characterized by firms’ 
compliance decisions as being strategic complements, thus resulting in negative 




Hypothesis 1: Increases in voluntary pollution abatement, measured as the 
number of all P2 activities at mills, are expected to decrease the expected count of 
regulatory inspections and enforcements. 
Following Maxwell et al. (2000), Maxwell and Decker (2006), Decker (2005, 
2007), and Arguedas (2013), I hypothesize that when deciding whether to inspect and/or 
enforce, regulators take into account mills’ efforts to reduce pollution by implementing 
P2 activities. If a mill reports that it has implemented successfully a greater number of P2 
measures than in the previous period, the regulators may exercise greater leniency 
towards this mill as opposed to the mills that may have not implemented any P2 and are 
in need of greater regulatory pressure. To illustrate, Arguedas (2013) documents 
instances within the current environmental regulation when the regulations explicitly 
include provisions for “good behavior”. Specifically, she points out the EPA’s audit 
policy, which stipulates 75% and 100% fine reduction for gravity- and non-gravity-based 
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components, respectively, if firms quickly disclose and correct any discovered violations 
as a result of self-audit procedure.74 
 
Target-driven Regulatory Regime 
Hypothesis 2: Lower TRI levels will reduce the probability of inspections and/or 
enforcements, or increases in TRI will increase the expected count of inspections and/or 
enforcements. 
Similarly to P2 activities and as proposed by Maxwell et al. (2000), Maxwell and 
Decker (2006), Decker (2005, 2007), I expect mills’ lower TRI levels to signal to the 
regulators that mills are acting in good faith to decrease their emissions, thereby 
potentially decreasing regulatory scrupulousness. In contrast to the measure of P2 
activities, mills are encouraged not to exceed given levels of TRI for specific chemicals. 
In cases when a mill does not exceed permitted level of emissions, it can file a shortened 
Form A to the regulatory authorities, which does not require it to specify the actual 
number of emissions. These reports are credible as those employees who are responsible 
for filing the forms bear civil responsibility for potential misreporting or 
misrepresentation (Gray and Shimshack, 2011). 
Because of the numerical TRI goal that mills can strive to attain, I can follow 
Heyes and Kapur (2009) to hypothesize that TRI represents a target-driven regulatory 
regime. To do so, I assume that there are V number of polluters, with M being the 
maximum target of pollution. Each firm emits 1 unit of pollution, hence M is also the 
74 Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of 
Violations – Final Policy Statements, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (Dec. 22, 1995) cited in 
Arguedas (2013), p. 157. 
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number of firms allowed to pollute. Under these assumptions, Heyes and Kapur (2009) 
find that the probability that a firm will be caught is equal to (V−M)
V
 – or the greater 
number of firms that choose to violate, the greater the probability that the firms will be 
inspected (positive enforcement spillovers). Conversely, a smaller number of firms that 
choose to violate, the smaller the probability that the firms will be inspected. This result 
leads to the conclusion that firms’ compliance decisions are strategic substitutes and there 
are positive spillovers to enforcement – greater number of inspections will reduce non-
compliance. Hence, I can hypothesize that lower TRI levels will reduce the probability of 
inspections and/or enforcements. 
 
Budget-driven Regulatory Regime 
Hypothesis 3, 4: H3: Larger state budget will increase the expected count of 
inspections and enforcements. H4: Larger local budget will increase the probability of 
inspections and enforcements.75 
Continuing with the theoretical argument of Heyes and Kapur (2009), I 
hypothesize that regulators are driven by their budget constraints. Under this regime, 
environmental inspectors will continue to inspect and enforce until they run out of 
budget. Hence, one firm’s decision to violate decreases the probability of another firm’s 
violation being detected, thereby making firms’ compliance decisions strategic 
75 I estimated the models combining the state and local budget data and chose to keep the 
two separate for the following reasons: (i) for air and water, state and local budgets have 
opposite signs (in those cases when both are statistically significant with about the same 
magnitude in coefficients, combining the two into one renders the result insignificant), 
and (ii) when doing the formal test, the null that the two betas are equal is rejected. 
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complements and leading to negative compliance spillovers. Here, I expect that the 
bigger sizes of local and state budgets will increase the probability of inspections and 
enforcements. Given the data, I am able to separate the effects of state vs. local inspection 
and enforcement effort. I expect that both state and local budgets will have a positive 
relationship with the probability of inspection and enforcement, with local budget having 
potentially greater impact than the state budget. Finally, among the empirical works 
focused on pulp and paper industry, Gray and Shadbegian (1998) found that their time-
invariant measure of state government environmental spending was positively correlated 
with the plant birth rates, but was not significant.76 
 
Responsive Regulation: Budget vs. Target Regimes 
Hypothesis 5: Increases in budget are a function of decreases in pollution 
abatement efforts, measured in TRI and P2 activities, and will increase the expected 
count of inspections and enforcements. 
Building on the previous hypotheses, I also include the interaction terms between 
TRI, P2 on the one hand, and local and state budgetary expenditures, on the other. In the 
world of constrained budgetary realities, one can stipulate that state and local budgets are 
determined in light of the most recent pollution trends within the local communities. 
Mills that appear to have consistently fallen short in their pollution abatement efforts in 
previous years may attract additional scrutiny from the regulatory authorities who, in 
76 However, the authors also note that such result could be due to endogeneity of 




                                                          
 




Hypothesis 6: Increases in the number of members in environmental 
organizations will increase the expected of regulatory inspections/enforcements. 
Maxwell et al. (2000), Maxwell and Decker (2006), Khanna et al. (2009), 
Harrington (2012) hypothesize that membership in environmental conservation groups is 
an effective measure of political pressure that influences the stringency of regulatory 
oversight and enforcement. More recently, Matisoff and Edwards (2014) find state’s 
environmental group membership, namely Sierra Club membership, to be important 
determinants for state adoption of energy and climate-change policies. 
 
P2 Legislature 
Hypothesis 7: Legislated P2 programs for toxic waste reduction will lead to 
decrease in toxic releases and increase in firm compliance, thereby decreasing the 
expected count of inspections/enforcements. 
Khanna et al. (2009) and Harrington (2012, 2013) continued the empirical 
discourse by examining the role of regulatory threat on the voluntary pollution abatement 
efforts. The authors argue that legislated programs can promote abatement technology 
adoption and reduction in pollution through: (i) information-sharing and technical 
assistance and (ii) increased visibility of regulatory agencies and environmental 




Willingness to Pay 
Hypothesis 8: Increases in income per capita, measuring willingness to pay for 
higher environmental quality of life, are expected to increase the expected count of 
inspections/enforcements. 
To follow Maxwell et al. (2000), Decker (2005), and Harrington (2012, 2013), I 
include state income per capita to measure citizens’ willingness to pay for higher 
environmental quality of life, resulting in greater scrutiny of regulators. Maxwell et al. 
(2000) include income per capita and educational attainment with the expectation that 
both capture increased demand for pollution abatement. Decker (2005) included county 
median income measuring local affluence and hypothesizing that wealthier 
neighborhoods have higher demand for cleaner environment, hence exhibit political 
pressure for stricter environmental regulations. Similarly, Harrington (2012, 2013) used 




Hypothesis 9: Increases in firms’ market share/power are expected to decrease 
the probability of regulatory inspections and enforcements. 
Decker and Wohar (2006), Delmas and Toffel (2004, 2008), Khanna et al. (2009), 
and Minatti Ferreira (2014) suggested that oligopolies and market leaders have the ability 
to deter political actions, thereby decreasing regulatory monitoring. Additionally, Decker 
and Wohar (2006) suggested that firms that represent strategically important employers 





Hypotheses 10-12: H10: Increases in mill annual capacity will increase the 
expected count of regulatory inspections and enforcements. H11: Increases in the number 
of products produced at a mill will increase the expected count of regulatory inspections 
and enforcements. H12: Pulp and paper mills are expected to have higher expected count 
of inspections and enforcements than paperboard mills. 
Although larger corporations with significant market power can deter political 
action, Nadeau (1997) and Decker (2005) found that larger producers face greater 
number of inspections due to the scale of production and, therefore, releases. Similarly, 
greater number of final products produced increases the number of potential pollution, 
hence environmental scrutiny. Nadeau (1997) found that pulp mills are likely to get more 
inspections (mills involving kraft and bleaching technology are expected to get more 
inspections but less enforcement activities). Minatti Ferreira et al. (2014) also argued that 
mills with pulping technology face greater stringency. 
 
3.4.Empirical Model and Data 
The main goal for this study is to test whether there is a relationship between 
voluntary mill pollution abatement efforts and the level of regulatory scrutiny they face. 
If such relationship is found, it could suggest that when considering the level of 
monitoring and enforcement, regulators take into account mills’ actions, thereby 
confirming the propositions of responsive regulation. In addition, I am interested in 
examining the impact of two main motivators for regulators’ decision-making – 
environmental target of decreasing pollution and their budgetary constraints. 
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To assess such relationship, as the measure of regulatory scrutiny I choose two 
variables – the count of inspections and enforcements for each environmental media j, at 
mill i, at time t. The following two equations are the functional forms for inspections and 
enforcements: 
(1) +++++= −−−−− 1514131211 2 stststitjitjit SierraStateGovLocGovPTRIsInspection βββββ  
++++++ −−−−− 11019181716 2 itititstst NumGradesMillCapFirmMSPerCapIncAdoptYrP βββββ  
jittitsts ePaperMillPulpMill +++++ rδββ ,12,11 , and 
(2) +++++= −−−−− 1514131211 2 stststitjitjit SierraStateGovLocGovPTRItsEnforcemen βββββ  
++++++ −−−−− 11019181716 2 itititstst NumGradesMillCapFirmMSPerCapIncAdoptYrP βββββ  
jittitsts ePaperMillPulpMill +++++ rδββ ,12,11 . 
In addition to the time and mill vectors, the two dependent variables and TRI vary 
by three environmental media – air, water, land – and their total or j = 1, 2, 3, 4. 
Voluntary abatement technology adoption variable is the count of all P2 activities at the 
mill level. Other mill-level variables are firm’s market share, annual mill capacity in 
thousand short tons, number of grades manufactured at the mill, and whether the mill 
produces pulp, paper, or paperboard. State variables include annual local and state budget 
expenditures for protective inspection and regulation, the Sierra Club membership 
measuring the state environmental political activism and pressure, year of adoption of P2 
legislation, and income per capita gauging citizens’ willingness to pay for environmental 
quality of life. Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics for each of the variables.77 
 
77 For correlations, see Table B.1 in Appendix B. 
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Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variables Expected Sign Mean SD 
Air Inspections, Number N/A 1.29 2.14 
Air Enforcements, Number N/A 0.12 0.48 
Water Inspections, Number N/A 1.34 1.64 
Water Enforcements, Number N/A 0.23 1.04 
Land Inspections, Number N/A 0.28 0.71 
Land Enforcements, Number N/A 0.10 0.39 
All Inspections, Number N/A  2.90 3.02 
All Enforcements, Number N/A 0.45 1.24 
    Independent Variables    
Air TRI in pounds + 9.30 5.68 
Water TRI in pounds + 6.11 4.99 
Land TRI in pounds + 3.51 4.85 
Total TRI in pounds + 9.97 5.38 
Number of P2 - 0.10 0.33 
Local Government Expenditures on Protective 
Inspection and Regulation, Thousand 1990 Dollars + 10.24 1.16 
State Government Expenditures on Protective 
Inspection and Regulation, Thousand 1990 Dollars + 11.04 0.72 
Sierra Membership, Number of Members + 9.04 0.90 
State Per Capita Income, Thousand 1990 Dollars + 1.50 1.03 
Annual Mill Capacity, Thousand Short Tons + 4.52 2.11 
Firm Market Share - -4.14 2.02 
Number of Paper Grades Mill Produces + 0.27 0.41 
    Dummy Variables    
Year P2 Adopted, 1 if Adopted - 0.73 0.44 
Board Mill, Reference Category N/A 0.38 0.49 
Pulp Mill + 0.15 0.36 
Paper Mill + 0.59 0.49 
Note: N = 2,922. All continuous explanatory variables are in log form and lagged 
one year. 
 
EPA Facility-level Variables 
The count of inspections and enforcements at the mill level and for the three 
environmental media come from the EPA's Environmental Compliance History Online 
(ECHO). I use the Integrated Data for Enforcement Analysis (IDEA) system and Facility 
Registry System (FRS) to merge the facility-level data from the: (1) Air Facility System 
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(AFS), (2) Permit Compliance System (PCS), (3) Integrated Compliance Information 
System National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (ICIS-NPDES), and (4) 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Information (RCRAInfo) System.78 The data 
are further matched with the TRI facility records to calculate (i) total annual TRI by each 
media,79 and (ii) counts of facility-level of new P2 activities.80 
P2 measure is the sum of all new P2 activities at the mill level.81 They are every-
day procedural and operational measures taken at individual production facilities and 
aimed at reducing pollution by minimizing waste, spills, and leaks. In contrast to end-of-
pipe pollution abatement measures, they are less costly in terms of capital, technological, 
and personnel investments.82 P2s arose in response to the National Pollution Prevention 
Act of 1990 which called on industry to prevent pollution ‘whenever feasible’ and 
included 43 types of pollution prevention activities subdivided into eight broader 
categories: (i) operating practices, (ii) inventory control, (iii) spill and leak prevention, 
(iv) raw-material modifications, (v) process modifications, (vi) cleaning and degreasing 
78 For more information about ECHO and IDEA and data downloads, please refer to 
http://echo.epa.gov/ and http://echo.epa.gov/resources/echo-data/data-
downloads#downloads.  
79 Facility-level TRI data can be downloaded from http://www2.epa.gov/toxics-release-
inventory-tri-program/tri-data-and-tools.  
80 I used the TRI EZ search tool to download the list of facilities reporting P2 activities: 
http://www.epa.gov/enviro/facts/tri/ez.html.  
81 The TRI states that each facility is allowed to report no more than four P2 activities 
within one of the 43 categories. To investigate if there is an empirical issue associated 
with the maximum number of P2 activities allowed to be reported in one year, I follow 
Harrington (2012) and examine if the current sample for any facilities that reported the 
maximum allowable number of P2 activities for a number of consecutive years and did 
not find them. 
82 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines pollution prevention (P2) as 
“reducing or eliminating waste at the source by modifying production, the use of less-
toxic substances, better conservation techniques, and re-use of materials” (EPA, Pollution 
Prevention, Basic Information: http://www.epa.gov/p2/pubs/basic.htm). 
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modifications, (vii) surface preparations and finishing modifications, and (viii) product 
modifications. 
 
Mill-level Production Variables 
To supplement facility-level monitoring and technology abatement data, I use the 
mill-level data from the Forest Product Laboratory (FPL) and annual editions of 
Lockwood-Post's Directory of the Pulp, Paper, and Allied Trades (LW).83,84 The two, 
FPL and LW, contain detailed information on all of the U.S. pulp and paper mills from 
1970 to the present. The FPL comprised detailed information on the type of pulping 
processes and capacities for all the mills, their names and locations over 1970-2000. I 
used LW to verify the capacities, number of products, whether the mill was listed as 
vertically integrated, and extended the data to 2002. Additionally, using LW as well as 
other trade publications I added the name of the parent company and corporate owner/s in 
case the two were different, which helped identify a more accurate estimate of firm 
market share. 
The FPL and LW collectively contain data on more than 900 mills that have 
operated at any one point over 1970 to 2002. During 1988 and 2002 that number was 893 
mills. Both the FPL and LW collected data on the paper and pulp facilities that produced 
final products reported within the three primary paper SIC codes – 2611 for pulp, 2621 
for paper, and 2631 for paperboard mills. The EPA’s ECHO and TRI have records for 
83 For the full description of the FPL data, see: 
http://www.fpl.fs.fed.us/documnts/fplrp/fplrp602.pdf.  





                                                          
 
almost 520 pulp and paper facilities listed under SIC2611, SIC2621, and SIC2631for 
pulp, paper and paperboard facilities.85 Matching the EPA with mill data, I was able to 
find 201 one-to-one clean matches. The FPL and LW data provide firm-level market 
share, mill-level measure of capacity or its annual output, number of paper products 




State and local budget data come from the Census’ Rex-Dac data base, or more 
specifically, from the Data Base on Historical Finances of Federal, State and Local 
Governments: State Aggregates, Fiscal Year 1978-2008.86 The budget line item that 
captures state and local expenditures on government protective and inspection services 
comes from the Direct Expenditures and is called Protective Inspection and Regulation, 
NEC, and is defined as: “Regulation and inspection of private establishments for the 
protection of the public or to prevent hazardous conditions…” (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, 2006).87 The budget numbers are aggregated to the state level for both local and 
85 Corresponding NAICS codes for the three sectors are: NAICS322110 for pulp 
facilities, NAICS322121 for paper and NAICS322122 for newsprint facilities, and 
NAICS322130 for paperboard facilities. To arrive at the total values for paper facilities 
equivalent to SIC2621, one would need to combine NAICS322121 for paper and 
NAICS322122 for newsprint facilities. For more information on NAICS definition for 
paper manufacturing, see: http://www.bls.gov/iag/tgs/iag322.htm.  
86 The link (http://www2.census.gov/pub/outgoing/govs/special60/) to the data base was 
provided by the Census’s govs.cms.inquiry@census.gov upon request with the indication 
that the link will be available for a limited time only. 
87 The U.S. Census provides the full definition at: 
http://www2.census.gov/govs/pubs/classification/2006_classification_manual.pdf: 
“Definition: Regulation and inspection of private establishments for the protection of the 
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state expenditures on protective inspection and regulation.88 To measure the state 
environmental political clout I use the annual membership of the Sierra Club, the largest 
grassroots environmental organization in the U.S.89 The year of P2 legislation adoption 
across states comes from Harrington (2013).90 According to Harrington (2013), since 
1988 36 state have legislated P2 programs emphasizing the need to implement pollution 
source reduction technologies. Finally, state income per capita comes from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis’ (BEA) Regional Economic Accounts.91 
 
public or to prevent hazardous conditions NOT classified under another Census Bureau 
function, and the regulation of professional occupational licensing. Includes: Inspection 
of plans, permits, construction, or installations related to buildings, housing, plumbing, 
electrical systems, gas, air conditioning, boilers, elevators, electric power plant sites, 
nuclear facilities, weights and measures, etc.; regulation of financial institutions, taxicabs, 
public service corporations, insurance companies, private utilities (telephone, electric, 
etc.), and other corporations; licensing, examination, and regulation of professional 
occupations, including health-related ones like doctors, nurses, etc.; inspection and 
regulation or working conditions and occupational hazards; motor vehicle inspection and 
weighing unless handled by a police agency; regulation and enforcement of liquor laws 
and sale of alcoholic beverages unless handled by a police department. Excludes: 
Distinctive license revenue collection activities (report at Financial Administration, code 
*23); regulatory or inspection activities related to food establishments or to 
environmental health (report at Health, code *32); motor vehicle inspection, liquor law 
enforcement, and other regulatory type activities of police agencies (report at Police 
Protection, code *62); regulatory and inspection activities related to other major 
functions, such as fire inspections, health permits, water permits, and the like (report at 
function involved),” p.180. 
88 The budget expenditures are in thousand 1990 dollars converted to real using the 
regional consumer price index for urban consumers, which can be found at: 
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/.  
89 The membership data were obtained directly from the Sierra Club; more information 
about the organization can be found at: http://www.sierraclub.org/about.  
90 Specifically, Harrington (2013), p. 258. 
91 The data can be downloaded at: http://www.bea.gov/regional/index.htm. Per capital 
income is measured in thousands of 1990 converted to real similarly to the state budget 
expenditures, or using the regional consumer price index for urban consumers, which can 
be found at: http://www.bls.gov/cpi/.  
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3.5.Econometric Methodology 
The count data models are usually estimated using the Poisson regression method. 









iθθθ −= , 
where yi is the number of inspections or enforcements at mill i, and θi is the conditional 
mean and variance. The main property of the Poisson model is that the variance and mean 
of the dependent variable are equal. This is not the case in my data. The difference 
between the mean and the standard deviation in the number of inspections and 
enforcements reported in Table 3.1 informs that the Poisson model would be an 
inappropriate choice in this case.92 
According to Cameron and Trivedi (1998), the case when the variance of the 
count variable exceeds its mean, referred to as over-dispersion, is common due to the 
unobserved heterogeneity. Using the Poisson regression in such cases, however, may lead 
to biased and inefficient estimates. The negative binomial model, on the other hand, 
allows for the variable mean to be not perfectly observable and the unobservable 
heterogeneity is assumed to follow a gamma distribution. Hence, the density of the 
negative binomial model is given by: 
92 Building on the previous literature on inspections, Decker (2005) suggests using both 
the OLS and count regression analyses. I have ran both the OLS and negative-binomial 
models and found the results of the two estimation methods to be consistent with each 
other with the negative-binomial estimates having greater statistical significance. In 
addition, Decker (2005) has used the Poisson model for Chemicals and Iron and Steel 
industries, and negative binomial for Pulp and Paper and Petroleum Refining industries 
given the results of the over-dispersion tests for the four industries. 
109 
 















































where α and Г represent the dispersion parameter and gamma function, respectively. 
Applying the negative binomial model to the functional forms (1) and (2) provides a 
straightforward interpretation of the parameters, i.e. a 1 unit increase in independent 
variables leads to a β% change in θ. The expected inspections and enforcement 
frequencies are assumed to be in a log linear form. The use of panel data allows us to 
control for changes in unobserved time and state heterogeneity. In my models (1) and (2), 





I estimate eight model specifications for the count of inspections and eight models 
for the count of enforcements; the results are presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. Each media 
has two models (with and without the interaction terms), all independent non-dummy 
variables are in the log form and lagged one year. The TRI measure varies by the 
environmental media also. Table 3.4 gives marginal effects for the interactions terms in 
Models 5-8 in Table 3.2 and Models 12-16 in Table 3.3. Finally, Table 3.5 gives the 
overall picture of model performance by providing direction and significance of the 
estimated coefficients. 
The high significance of the over-dispersion variable through all sixteen models 
confirms the correct choice of negative binomial estimation method over the Poisson 
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regression. Most of the models have high log likelihood values and provide a reasonable 
basis for concluding that these models fit well. 
I start by looking at the basic inspection models for all media without the 
interaction terms (Table 3.2, Models 1 through 4). In Model 1, the two measures of 
voluntary abatement efforts, TRI and P2, are positive, with TRI statistically significant at 
1% level. Increases in annual TRI and P2 activities in the previous year increase the 
expected count of current period inspections. While the positive sign on TRI is expected, 
it is surprising for P2. In terms of marginal effects, 1% increase in last year’s all media 
TRI increases the estimated count of inspections across all media by 0.04%, all else 
constant. 
Going across the three media for the basic model (Table 3.2, Models 2 through 4), 
the TRI variable is positive and highly significant for both air and water, and is negative 
and statistically insignificant for land, and P2 variable is negative, confirming the 
expectation, for water and land yet statistically insignificant (Table 3.2, Models 3, 4). P2 
for the air model (Table 3.2, Model 2) is positive and statistically significant at 5% level 
– 1% increase in the number of P2 activities at the mill during the previous year increases 
the expected count of air inspections by 0.16%, all else constant. 
Local budget on protective inspection and regulation expenditure is positive for 
all media, water and land with a coefficient statistically significant at 10% level for the 
land model (Table 3.2, Model 4). In terms of the marginal effects, 1% increase in 
previous year’s local budget increases the expected number of land inspections 0.42%, 
ceteris paribus. Surprisingly, state budget on protective inspection and regulation, on the  
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Table 3.2. Negative-binomial: Determinants of Inspections 
 All Media Air Water Land All Media Air Water Land 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Intercept 3.0544* 10.6023*** -3.5676 -3.1829 5.6510*** 10.1378*** -1.6791 -3.3838 (1.702) (2.404) (2.288) (4.954) (1.282) (2.492) (2.303) (4.985) 
TRI, t-1 0.0400*** 0.0317*** 0.0769*** -0.0135 -0.2876*** -0.0835 -0.4229*** -0.3770** (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.041) (0.076) (0.076) (0.164) 
P2, t-1 0.0447 0.1611** -0.0908 -0.0835 2.1885*** 0.8592 3.0789** 0.7778 (0.048) (0.064) (0.062) (0.140) (0.698) (1.286) (1.244) (2.654) 
Loc Gov 
Exp, t-1 
0.0264 -0.1561 0.1357 0.4238* 0.1376* 0.0645 0.2526** 0.4085* 
(0.083) (0.120) (0.106) (0.235) (0.073) (0.138) (0.118) (0.240) 
State Gov 
Exp, t-1 
-0.2985*** -0.6370*** -0.1190 0.0264 -0.6204*** -0.8114*** -0.3819** 0.0067 
(0.113) (0.166) (0.144) (0.322) (0.094) (0.178) (0.151) (0.330) 
Sierra Club, 
t-1 
0.0133 -0.2181* 0.2586* -0.5198 -0.0081 -0.2120* 0.2426* -0.4618 
(0.091) (0.113) (0.142) (0.362) (0.061) (0.112) (0.138) (0.364) 
Year P2 
Adopted 
-0.0042 -0.1669* 0.1736** 0.0894 0.0346 -0.1563 0.1745** 0.0961 
(0.070) (0.097) (0.088) (0.200) (0.050) (0.097) (0.087) (0.200) 
 
State Per 

















(0.031) (0.044) (0.040) (0.091) (0.023) (0.044) (0.039) (0.091) 
Annual Mill 
Capacity, t-1 
0.0467*** 0.0436*** 0.0185 0.1112*** 0.0479*** 0.0456*** 0.0162 0.1095*** 
(0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.030) (0.008) (0.014) (0.013) (0.030) 
Firm Market 
Share, t-1 
0.0131 0.0388*** -0.0479*** 0.1447*** 0.0152** 0.0409*** -0.0469*** 0.1460*** 
(0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.025) (0.007) (0.013) (0.012) (0.025) 
# of Paper 
Grades, t-1 
0.0717 -0.0084 0.0837 0.2891** 0.0988*** 0.0033 0.1239** 0.2590** 
(0.047) (0.065) (0.061) (0.128) (0.033) (0.065) (0.062) (0.129) 
Pulp Mill -0.0821 0.0577 -0.1150* -0.5318*** -0.0540 0.0597 -0.0914 -0.5133*** 
 (0.050) (0.067) (0.065) (0.145) (0.036) (0.067) (0.065) (0.146) Paper Mill 0.1594*** 0.0883 0.1147** 0.7200*** 0.1501*** 0.0881 0.0950* 0.7145*** 
 (0.040) (0.055) (0.052) (0.112) (0.029) (0.055) (0.052) (0.113) P2 * Loc 
Gov Exp, t-1     
0.2141*** 0.2090** 0.1466 0.2774 




Table 3.2. Continued 
 All Media Air Water Land All Media Air Water Land 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 P2 * State 
Gov Exp, t-1     
-0.3924*** -0.2558 -0.4242** -0.3327 
    (0.095) (0.175) (0.167) (0.350) TRI * Loc 
Gov Exp, t-1     
-0.0189*** -0.0232*** -0.0178** 0.0008 
    (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.015) TRI * State 
Gov Exp, t-1     
0.0469*** 0.0320*** 0.0610*** 0.0323 
    (0.005) (0.010) (0.011) (0.023) Over-
dispersion  
0.2795*** 0.3665*** 0.2681*** 0.8942*** 0.0000*** 0.3575*** 0.2512*** 0.8776*** 
(0.018) (0.029) (0.028) (0.147) (.) (0.028) (0.027) (0.146) 
         
AIC 11,976.0 8,280.5 8,589.5 3,500.7 12,611.0 8,272.3 8,549.9 3,501.8 
LL -5,927.1 -4,079.2 -4,233.8 -1,691.4 -6,240.7 -4,071.2 -4,209.9 -1,687.9 
N 2,922 2,922 2,922 2,894 2,922 2,922 2,922 2,894 
Note: All variables, except for dummy variables, are in the log form; standard errors are reported in parentheses and ***, **, 




Table 3.3. Negative-binomial: Determinants of Enforcements 
 All Media Air Water Land All Media Air Water Land 
 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Intercept -6.2793 3.6891 -13.2885 -7.8529 -6.2927 8.0144 -12.0790 -9.8065 (4.711) (7.615) (9.983) (7.606) (4.956) (8.319) (10.103) (7.591) 
TRI, t-1 0.0631*** 0.1547*** 0.0738*** -0.0162 -0.2236 -0.3596 -0.2811 -0.3155 (0.013) (0.030) (0.022) (0.016) (0.166) (0.361) (0.291) (0.248) 
P2, t-1 0.1911 0.1416 0.2763 0.0604 5.9302** 4.8820 7.6805* 2.3936 (0.128) (0.200) (0.227) (0.212) (2.556) (4.237) (4.371) (3.863) 
Loc Gov 
Exp, t-1 
0.2695 0.2383 0.4417 0.8309** 0.4926* -0.0404 0.3902 0.6772* 
(0.237) (0.387) (0.448) (0.376) (0.294) (0.549) (0.503) (0.382) 
State Gov 
Exp, t-1 
0.0445 -0.8363 0.8251 -0.1943 -0.1969 -0.9817 0.7428 0.0259 
(0.318) (0.562) (0.557) (0.498) (0.357) (0.636) (0.589) (0.517) 
Sierra Club, 
t-1 
-0.0841 -0.1789 -0.6974 -0.5008 -0.0472 -0.1585 -0.6764 -0.3997 
(0.251) (0.308) (0.730) (0.547) (0.254) (0.305) (0.728) (0.546) 
Year P2 
Adopted 
-0.0924 0.3361 -0.1894 0.2558 -0.0875 0.3652 -0.1989 0.2731 
(0.192) (0.371) (0.315) (0.310) (0.191) (0.372) (0.315) (0.307) 
State Per Cap 
Inc, t-1 
-0.0743 -0.4097*** 0.1725 0.0655 -0.0569 -0.3928*** 0.1718 0.0947 
(0.089) (0.152) (0.156) (0.154) (0.089) (0.152) (0.156) (0.154) 
Annual Mill 
Capacity, t-1 
0.0969*** 0.1683*** 0.0173 0.1454*** 0.1003*** 0.1702*** 0.0218 0.1565*** 
(0.031) (0.059) (0.051) (0.052) (0.031) (0.059) (0.052) (0.052) 
Firm Market 
Share, t-1 
-0.0228 -0.0495 -0.0883* 0.1362*** -0.0197 -0.0464 -0.0861* 0.1456*** 
(0.029) (0.054) (0.050) (0.044) (0.029) (0.055) (0.050) (0.045) 
# of Paper 
Grades, t-1 
0.1585 0.1437 -0.0496 0.2299 0.1467 0.1279 -0.0334 0.1460 
(0.131) (0.227) (0.225) (0.198) (0.132) (0.229) (0.226) (0.198) 
Pulp Mill -0.0994 0.5915*** -0.3003 -0.4278** -0.1089 0.5786*** -0.3053 -0.4264** 
 (0.135) (0.214) (0.231) (0.214) (0.135) (0.214) (0.230) (0.214) Paper Mill -0.0861 -0.2162 -0.3795* 0.8337*** -0.0921 -0.2153 -0.3862* 0.8619*** 
 (0.118) (0.212) (0.202) (0.187) (0.118) (0.211) (0.202) (0.188) P2 * Loc 
Gov Exp, t-1     
0.5840*** 0.4198 0.7183* 0.5731* 




Table 3.3. Continued 
 All Media Air Water Land All Media Air Water Land 
 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 P2 * State 
Gov Exp, t-1     
-1.0606*** -0.8201 -1.3256** -0.7363 
    (0.365) (0.599) (0.663) (0.533) TRI * Loc 
Gov Exp, t-1     
-0.0225 0.0159 0.0039 0.0290 
    (0.015) (0.034) (0.031) (0.023) TRI * State 
Gov Exp, t-1     
0.0463** 0.0306 0.0280 0.0002 
    (0.022) (0.042) (0.043) (0.036) Over-
dispersion  
1.8812*** 2.3276*** 4.0696*** 1.3941*** 1.8402*** 2.2670*** 4.0064*** 1.2632*** 
(0.169) (0.445) (0.474) (0.344) (0.167) (0.441) (0.470) (0.328) 
         
AIC 4,424.9 1,824.5 2,326.0 1,728.0 4,421.3 1,828.7 2,328.8 1,727.2 
LL -2,152.5 -856.3 -1,108.0 -808.0 -2,146.6 -854.3 -1,105.4 -803.6 
N 2,908 2,771 2,771 2,810 2,908 2,771 2,771 2,810 
Note: All variables, except for dummy variables, are in the log form; standard errors are reported in parentheses and ***, 
**, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively. 
 
Table 3.4. Marginal Effects of Interaction Terms 
 Inspections Enforcements 
Interaction terms 
marginal effects 
All Media Air Water Land All Media Air Water Land 
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
TRI, t-1 0.07*** 0.03** 0.07 -0.01 0.06*** 0.14 0.07* -0.02* 
P2, t-1 0.05*** 0.18 -0.10** -0.06 0.20*** 0.13 0.40** 0.13 
Loc Gov Exp, t-1 -0.03*** -0.13*** 0.16** 0.44 0.33 0.15 0.49 0.84 





Table 3.5. Models Overview: Signs and Significance 
Inspections 
 
 All Media Air Water Land All Media Air Water Land 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 TRI, t-1 + *** + *** + *** -  - *** - - *** - ** 
P2, t-1 + + ** -  -  + *** + + ** + 
Local Gov Exp, t-1 + - + + * + * + + ** + * 
State Gov Exp, t-1 - *** - *** - + - *** - *** - ** + 
Sierra Membership, t-1 + - * + * - - - * + * - 
Year P2 Adopted - - * + ** + + - + ** + 
State Per Capita Inc, t-1 + + ** - + + *** + ** + + 
Annual Mill Capacity, t-1 + *** + *** + + *** + *** + *** + + *** 
Firm Market Share, t-1 + + *** - *** + *** + ** + *** - *** + *** 
Number of Paper Grades 
Produced, t-1 + - + + ** + *** + + ** + ** 
Pulp Mill - + - * - *** - + - - *** 
Paper Mill + *** + + ** + *** + *** + + * + *** 
P2 * Local Gov Exp,  
t-1     + *** + ** + + 
P2 * State Gov Exp, t-1     - *** - - ** - TRI * Local Gov Exp, t-1     - *** - *** - ** + TRI * State Gov Exp, t-1     + *** + *** + *** + Over-dispersion Parameter + *** + *** + *** + *** + *** + *** + *** + *** 
         Enforcements 
 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 TRI, t-1 + *** + *** + *** - - - - - 
P2, t-1 + + + + + ** + + * + 
Local Gov Expenditure, t-1 + + + + ** + * - + + * 
State Gov Expenditure, t-1 + - + - - - + + 




Table 3.5. Continued 
Enforcements 
 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Year P2 Adopted - + - + - + - + 
State Per Capita Inc, t-1 - - *** + + - - *** + + 
Annual Mill Capacity, t-1 + *** + *** + + *** + *** + *** + + *** 
Firm Market Share, t-1 - - - * + *** - - - * + *** 
Number of Paper Grades 
Produced, t-1 + + - + + + - + 
Pulp Mill - + *** - - ** - + *** - - ** 
Paper Mill - - - * + *** - - - * + *** 
P2 * Local Gov 
Expenditure, t-1     + *** + + * + * 
P2 * State Gov 
Expenditure,  
t-1     
- *** - - ** - 
TRI * Local Gov 
Expenditure, t-1     - + + + 
TRI * State Gov 
Expenditure, t-1     + ** + + + 
Over-dispersion Parameter *** + *** + *** + *** + *** + *** + *** + *** 
Note: ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively. 
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other hand, is negative and statistically significant for all media and air models (Table 
3.2, Models 1, 2) – 1% increase in last year’s budget on protective inspection and 
regulation decreases the expected count of all media and air inspections by 0.29% and 
0.64%, respectively. 
Moving to the other state-level variables, the Sierra Club membership and the 
year of P2 legislation adoption are statistically significant at 5-10% level for air and water 
models (Table 3.2, Models 2, 3). Both variables have the expected signs for the water 
model – increases in the number of people belonging to the Sierra Club and adopting P2 
legislation increase the expected count of water inspections. In contrast, the two have a 
negative sign and are statistically significant at 10% level. Per-capita income is positive 
in three models – all media, air and land – and is statistically significant at 5% for air 
inspections – 1% increase in last year’s state per-capita income increases the expected 
number of air inspections by 0.09%, all else the same. 
Mill’s annual capacity is positive, as expected, in all four models and highly 
significant (at 1% level) in all media, air and land models (Table 3.2, Models 1, 2, 4). 
Firm market share, on the other hand, gives statistically strong coefficients for air, water 
and land models, all at 1% level, but is positive in the air and land model (Table 3.2, 
Models 1, 4) and negative in the water model (Table 3.2, Model 3). Number of paper 
grades produced at a mill has statistical significance only in the land model (Table 3.2, 
Model 4) and is positively related to the expected count of mill inspections. Finally, 
whether the mill produces pulp or paper, as opposed to paperboard, makes a statistical 
difference only for the water and land inspections (Table 3.2, Model 3 and 4). To be more 
specific, producing pulp as a final product decreases the expectation of water discharged 
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being frequently inspected (Table 3.2, Model 3), while producing paper as a final 
product, increases the expected number of inspections across all media, and in water and 
land (Table 3.2, Model 1, 3, 4). 
The introduction of the interaction terms of TRI and P2 with the local and state 
budgets, reverses the signs on the TRI from positive to negative in all four models and P2 
from negative in the water and land models (Table 3.2, Model 3, 4) to positive (Table 3.2, 
Models 7, 8). Local and state budgets remained with the same signs, yet gained in 
statistical significance in all media and water models (Table 3.2, Models 1, 3 vs. 5, 7). 
The marginal effects of all media TRI at mean state and local government expenditures is 
0.07%, i.e. 1% increase in mills’ last year’s all media TRI at mean state and local 
government expenditures increases the estimated count of all media inspections by 0.07% 
(Table 3.4, Model 5), all else constant. 1% increase in last year’s P2 activities decreases 
this year’s inspections at a mill across all media by 0.05%, ceteris paribus (Table 3.4, 
Model 5). 1% increases in last year’s local and state government expenditures increase 
the expected count of mill inspections by -0.03% and -0.19%, respectively, ceteris 
paribus (Table 3.4, Model 5). 
The signs and significance levels of the rest of the variables are not substantially 
affected by the addition of the interaction terms. Holding all other variables constant for 
each of the variables discussed below: the Sierra Club membership has a statistically 
significant positive effect on expected count of water inspections but significant negative 
effect on air inspections. State adoptions of P2 legislation increases the incidence of 
inspections and are statistically significant for the water model (Table 3.2, Model 7). 
Higher income per capita is positively related to the expected number of inspections and 
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in case of all media and air inspections the effect is statistically significant at 1% and 
10% levels, respectively (Table 3.2, Model 5, 6). Increases in the size of mill capacity are 
statistically strong and positive predictors of the expected count of inspections for all 
media, air and land models (Table 3.2, Model 6, 8). Firm market share is statistically 
significant for all four models with the interacted effects and is positive for all media, air 
and land models (Table 3.2, Models 5, 6, 8) and negative for the water model (Table 3.2, 
Model 7). The number of paper products produced at a mill have positive signs and are 
statistically significant for all but the air inspections (Table 3.2, Model 6). Surprisingly, 
pulp mills have lower expected count of inspections than paperboard mills, yet this effect 
is statistically insignificant (except for the land model, Table 3.2, Models 5, 6, 7 vs. 
Model 8). And as expected, mills that produce paper, as opposed to paperboard products, 
are expected to be inspected more frequently at statistically significant levels, 1% and 
10% levels in all media, water and land models (Table 3.2, Models 5, 7, 8). 
 
Enforcements Models 
Looking at models results that predict the expected number of regulatory 
enforcements (Table 3.3), I notice in general the same pattern of signs yet much lower 
statistical significance than that for inspections. First, the TRI variable in the four basic 
models (Table 3.3, Models 9 through 12), is statistically highly significant for all media, 
air and water models and negative and statistically insignificant for the land model. The 
P2 variable is statistically insignificant across all models. Local spending on protection 
and inspection is positive across all four models and statistically significant at 5% and 
10% levels for the land models (Table 3.3, Models 12, 16, respectively). State budget, on 
the other hand, is positive for all media and water and negative for air and land models. 
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The Sierra Club membership and P2 coefficients are statistically insignificant for 
all four basic models. Per-capita income is negative for all media and air and statistically 
significant at 1% level for the air model – 1% increase in last year’s state per-capita 
income decreases the expected count of enforcements by 0.41%, ceteris paribus (Table 
3.3, Models 10, 14). Mill capacity is statistically significant for all media, air, and land 
enforcements, while firm market share keeps its statistical power only in the water and 
land enforcements model while being negative for water (Table 3.3, Models 11, 15) and 
positive for land models (Table 3.3, Models 12, 16). The number of paper grades 
produced is positive for all but water models, yet insignificant across all eight model 
specifications of enforcements. Finally, pulp mills face higher expected frequencies of air 
enforcements (Table 3.3, Models 10, 14) and lower land enforcements (Table 3.3, 
Models 12, 16), while paper mills have lower expected counts of water inspections 




In both sets of models, inspections and enforcements, it is clear that combining 
the three pollution source media together into one category obscures a number of 
prominent differences within the models results. When looking at the three media models 
separately, I find that, on the one hand, the parameter estimates for air and water are 
statistically more significant than for the land models, suggesting that the two media 
enjoy greater political and regulatory salience. On the other hand, the signs appear to be 
more consistent between the air and land models in opposition to the water models. 
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Pollution abatement measured by the TRI demonstrates expected and consistent 
performance through all the models, confirming Hypothesis 2. While anticipated to be 
negatively related to the expected number of inspections, as stated in Hypothesis 1, P2 is 
positive and significant. The result suggests that implementing P2 activities at mills does 
not necessarily signal to the regulators that the mill is in full compliance and, in effect, 
may suggest that the mill is a high polluter and/or that that P2 activities are not a 
sufficient measure of the voluntary abatement efforts at mills. In this light, the TRI is a 
stronger determinant of regulatory actions, both inspections and enforcements, while P2 
is a statistically significant factor for air and water enforcements. The results confirm the 
Hypothesis 1, but not Hypothesis 2, that regulators respond to the voluntary abatement 
performance of the mills in determining the level of scrutiny to levy on the mills. 
Additionally, the hypothesis that regulators are driven by numerical targets is strongly 
supported by the TRI coefficients.93 
State government expenditures, in contrast, surprise with negative coefficients 
through most of the models with the exception of the land models, where they are 
positively related to the number of inspections and enforcements (Hypotheses 3 and 4). 
This counter-intuitive result is further confirmed with the introduction of the interactive 
terms (Hypothesis 5) – given the average levels of TRI and P2, state government 
93 To test if TRI and P2 are endogenous due to the omitted quality of mill management, I 
ran preliminary endogeneity tests. The general results are reported in Appendix B under 
section B1. Preliminary Endogeneity Checks. In general, I fail to reject the null of 
exogeneity for the joint hypothesis for TRI and P2 in both inspections and enforcement 
models. When testing both variables individually, I fail to reject the null of no 
endogeneity for P2 in both inspections and enforcements, but not for TRI. This suggests 
that P2 activities present as a more robust measure of voluntary environmental 
stewardship, hence management, than the TRI. 
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expenditures are consistently negatively associated with the regulatory inspections 
(except for land, Table 3.2, Model 8 and water and land, Table 3.3, Models 15 and 16, 
respectively). Increases in local government expenditures, on the other hand, increase the 
expected count of water and land inspections, but decrease for air inspections, assuming 
average TRI and P2 (Models 3, 4 in Table 3.2 and Models 7 and 8 in Table 3.4). Further, 
examining the direction and statistical power of the interacted coefficients (Hypothesis 
5), it is noted that P2 interacted with the local budget has a positive and statistically 
strong effect, while when interacted with the state budget it is negative and statistically 
strong. Same can be said about the TRI measure interacted with the state and local budget 
– it is negative when interacted with the local government expenditure and positive when 
interacted with the state government expenditure. These two directly opposite results 
suggest that the two budgets may constrain regulatory scrutiny along different abatement 
efforts, as represented by TRI and P2 activities. 
Political activism, articulated in Hypothesis 6 and measured by the Sierra Club 
membership, has a statistically significant positive effect in the water models and a 
statistically significant negative effect in air models. The year of adoption of P2 
legislation (Hypothesis 7) follows the same pattern – negative for air, positive for water 
and both statistically significant. These inconsistent, yet significant results suggest that 
the Sierra Club membership and adoption of P2 legislation could be picking up some 
other influences which impact air and water regulations in the opposite ways. It is 
possible that the direct costs of air vs. water monitoring and enforcement differ due to the 
nature of emissions in the two media. One could hypothesize that water effluents are 
easier to monitor and enforce, hence are associated with lower enforcement costs, and 
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that water pollution resulting from pulping and papermaking facilities is politically more 
salient because the affected waterways are directly used as sources of drinking water.94 
On the other hand, air pollution monitoring and enforcement could be more costly 
because of the nature of ambient air pollution and because the associated health risks are 
more difficult to quantify due to the hard-to-measure actual pollutant exposure. Finally, 
air pollutant immediate exposure depends not only proximate location, but also on 
people’s age and associated activities, such as commuting patterns.95,96 
Income per capita (Hypothesis 8) is positive and statistically significant for the 
models across all pollution media and air inspections, but negative and highly statistically 
significant for air enforcements. The change in signs in the income measure from 
inspections to enforcements for the air models further points to the possibility of bias 
associated with the omitted costs related to enforcement efforts, which one would expect 
to be substantially higher than monitoring/inspection costs. 
94 Pulp and paper mills generate large volumes of wastewater, which can contain 
chlorinated and sulfur compounds, volatile organic and other chemicals. In response to 
the 1981 EPA finding confirming that dioxin was one of the most potent carcinogens, 
litigious concerns arose around paper mills’ discharge of chlorinated organic compounds 
such as dioxins and furans, often referred to as adsorbable organic halides (Powell 1997). 
95 Air pollution from pulp and paper mills is not as politically salient as water pollution 
due to lower concentrations and potentially less direct health risks associated with the air 
pollutants from pulping and papermaking processes. The largest part of air emissions 
from paper mills are water vapors that are the result of the paper drying process (UN 
1996). In the recent years, however, the air emissions from the mills that employ kraft 
manufacturing processes and generate a lot of their own energy have been attracting more 
media attention due to their greenhouse gas emissions (Schlossberg 2012). 
96 There is large literature analyzing the risks associated with pollution as well as unequal 
distribution of environmental regulation across different neighborhoods and population 
groups. More recently, a number of articles estimate the differences in risks associated 
with different air pollution concentrations and hot spots (Logue et al. 2011; Turaga et al. 
2011). 
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Bigger mills attract regulatory attention through all the media sources (Hypothesis 
10). Market leaders are inspected routinely more than followers within the air and land 
media and significantly less in water medium (Hypothesis 9). Additionally, the negative 
sign of the pulp dummy variable in the water and land models is perplexing given the 
expectation that pulp production process is chemically ‘dirtier’ and involves extensive 
water treatment (Hypothesis 12). On the other hand, this result is consistent with 
Levinson (1996) and Gray and Shadbegian (1998) who find that due to their age many 
pulp mills are unable to drastically reduce their emissions and discharges and enjoy 
grandfathering rules that allow them to stay in business. 
 
3.8.Conclusion 
The purpose of this analysis was to investigate the impact of (i) voluntary 
pollution abatement and prevention efforts at the U.S. pulp and paper mills and (ii) local 
and state protective and inspection government expenditures on the level of scrutiny 
levied by the regulators. More specifically, I tested the hypotheses of ‘responsive 
regulation,’ first advanced by Maxwell and Decker (2006) and Decker (2007), and further 
examined whether the regulation climate could be characterized, as suggested by Heyes 
and Kapur (2009), as being motivated by numerical pollution targets or size of regulators’ 
budgets. In addition, I have explored the role of political and consumer pressure, 
measured by the Sierra Club membership and state per capital income, and mill and firm 
heterogeneity on the number of regulatory inspections and enforcements. 
This paper contributes to the empirical body of literature on ‘responsive 
regulation’ by testing if regulatory actions are determined by environmental firm 
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performance and/or regulatory budget expenditures. While the pioneering works analyzed 
the effect of TRI on the count of regulatory inspections, I included regulatory inspections 
and enforcements and in addition to the TRI, I integrated the number of mill-level P2 
activities as the second measure of voluntary pollution abatement efforts. I also included 
two measures of government expenditures, at local and state levels. To contribute to the 
studies on the pulp and paper industry, which focus on either air or water pollution, I 
include all three pollution vectors – air, water, and land – as well as the combined 
category. The disaggregated results display better model performance than when the three 
media are combined together. Finally, P2 legislation also has not been examined in this 
context previously. 
Informing relevant policy implications, the main findings suggest that regulators 
are driven by numerical pollution targets and not budgetary constraints. Grass-roots 
environmental activism has greater impact for water inspections, while state residents’ 
willingness to pay affects the expected count of air inspections. Finally, bigger mills 
attract regulatory attention through all the media sources and market leaders are inspected 











The main purpose of this study is to analyze the relationship between pollution 
prevention (P2) policy instruments and adoption of P2 modifications. Using facility level 
data on U.S. pulp and paper mills for 1991-2002, I estimate the fixed effects negative 
binomial model to test the hypotheses of whether P2 state legislation and policies on 
target setting, reporting requirement, mandatory planning, and grants have positive 
impact on P2 adoptions: (1) when they are grouped together and (2) when combined in 
two categories: (a) management and logistical modifications or (b) product and process. 
In addition, I examine the effects of regulatory and political threats, P2 firm spillovers 
and prior mill experience with P2 modifications, firm and mill size, and type of mill 
product. I find that: (1) policy instruments have different effects on the two groups of P2 
modifications, (2) mandatory planning and grants have perverse results, (3) regulatory 
and political threats, firm spillover and prior mill experience are strong predictors of P2 
adoptions, and (4) there are substantial diseconomies of scale associated with P2 
modifications. To contribute to previous research, I examine the impact of each P2 policy 
instrument individually and include state P2 grants.  
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4.1.Introduction: What Are P2 Activities and Why Are They Interesting? 
Pollution prevention activities, or P2s, are every-day procedural and operational 
measures taken at individual production facilities and aimed at reducing pollution by 
minimizing waste, spills, and leaks. In contrast to end-of-pipe pollution abatement 
measures, they are less costly in terms of capital, technological, and personnel 
investments.97 P2s arose in response to the National Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 
which called on industry to prevent pollution ‘whenever feasible’ and included 43 types 
of pollution prevention activities subdivided into eight broader categories: (1) operating 
practices, (2) inventory control, (3) spill and leak prevention, (4) raw-material 
modifications, (5) process modifications, (6) cleaning and degreasing modifications, (7) 
surface preparations and finishing modifications, and (8) product modifications. Table 
4.1 reports the detailed list of P2 activity codes and descriptions. 
 
Table 4.1. P2 Codes and Activity Descriptions 
Operating Practices 
Improved maintenance scheduling recordkeeping or procedures 
Changed production schedule to minimize equipment and feedstock 
changeovers 
Introduced an in-line product quality monitoring or other process analysis 
system 
Other changes in operating practices 
  
97 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines pollution prevention (P2) as 
“reducing or eliminating waste at the source by modifying production, the use of less-
toxic substances, better conservation techniques, and re-use of materials” (EPA, Pollution 
Prevention, Basic Information: http://www.epa.gov/p2/pubs/basic.htm). 
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Table 4.1. Continued 
Inventory Control 
Instituted procedures to ensure that materials do not stay in inventory beyond 
Began to test outdated material - continue to use if still effective 
Eliminated shelf-life requirements for stable materials 
Instituted better labeling procedures 
Instituted clearinghouse to exchange materials that would otherwise be 
discarded 
Other changes in inventory control 
 
Spill and Leak Prevention 
Improved storage or stacking procedures 
Improved procedures for loading unloading and transfer operations 
Installed overflow alarms or automatic shutoff valves 
Installed vapor recovery systems 
Implemented inspection or monitoring program of potential spill or leak 
sources 
Other spill or leak prevention 
 
Raw-material Modifications 
Increased purity or raw materials 
Substituted raw materials 
Substituted a feedstock or reagent chemical with a different chemical 
Other raw material modifications 
 
Process Modifications 
Optimized reaction conditions or otherwise increased efficiency of synthesis 
Instituted recirculation within a process 
Modified equipment layout or piping 
Use of a different process catalyst 
Instituted better controls on operating bulk containers to minimize discarding 
Changed from small volume containers to bulk containers to minimize 
discarding 
Reduced or eliminated use of an organic solvent 
Used biotechnology in manufacturing process 
Other process modifications 
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Table 4.1. Continued 
Cleaning and Degreasing Modifications 
Modified stripping/cleaning equipment 
Changed to mechanical stripping/cleaning devices (from solvents or other 
Changed to aqueous cleaners (from solvents or other materials) 
Modified containment procedures for cleaning units 
Improved draining procedures 
Redesigned parts racks to reduce dragout 
Modified or installed rinse systems 
Improved rinse equipment design 
Improved rinse equipment operation 
Other cleaning and degreasing modifications 
 
Surface Preparation and Finishing Modifications 
Modified spray systems or equipment 
Substituted coating materials used 
Improved application techniques 
Changed from spray to other system 
Other surface preparation and finishing modifications 
 
Product Modifications 
Changed product specifications 
Modified design or composition of product 
Modified packaging 
Developed a new chemical product to replace previous chemical product 
Other product modifications 
Source: EPA (2015): http://www.epa.gov/p2/pubs/basic.htm). 
 
 
Encouraged by P2 Legislation 
Pollution prevention programs are, by definition, voluntary or quasi-regulatory 
programs that do not require a change in polluting behavior, but may require other types 
of actions, such as submitting reports under Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) disclosure 
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requirements.98 As such, the P2 policies represent the newer form of environmental 
policies, which have evolved from top-down command regulations, to market-based 
incentives, to voluntary pollution and waste prevention and reduction programs that are 
more broadly termed as voluntary environmental programs (VEPs). 
In contrast to command-and-control policies, P2 legislation is characterized as a 
soft policy that encourages information sharing, numerical targeting, and mandatory 
planning, all of which are designed to appeal to the wide scope of the P2 activities. Since 
1990, 36 states adopted P2 programs, prescribing varying combinations of regulatory-, 
information-, and management-based policies (Harrington 2013). Table 4.2 lists the 
history of state adoptions of P2 and complementary policies to P2 policies , specifically: 
(1) numerical goal of specific percentage reduction (adopted in 12 out of 36 states), (2) 
98 P2 activities are voluntary to adopt, yet facilities are mandated to file reports of any 
pollution prevention modifications for chemicals reported under the TRI and to submit 
plans to implement new P2s for hazardous waste. More specifically, paragraph 13106 of 
Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, entitled "Source reduction and recycling data 
collection," defines reporting requirement as: "Each owner or operator of a facility 
required to file an annual toxic chemical release form under section 11023 of this title for 
any toxic chemical shall include with each such annual filing a toxic chemical source 
reduction and recycling report for the proceeding (FOOTNOTE 1) calendar year. The 
toxic chemical source reduction and recycling report shall cover each toxic chemical 
required to be reported in the annual toxic chemical release form filed by the owner or 
operator under section 11023(c) of this title. This section shall take effect with the annual 
report filed under section 11023 of this title for the first full calendar year beginning after 
November 5, 1990. (FOOTNOTE 1) The copy of Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 can 
be found at: http://www.epa.gov/p2/pubs/p2policy/act1990.htm. In relation to mandatory 
planning, the report prepared by Research Triangle Institute for EPA, Office of Air 
Quality emphasizes that many states have introduced the requirement that specific 
industries prepare facility P2 plans. These plans, however, are not required to be 
implemented. The motivation for this rule is that when firms are forced to evaluate as 
many of P2 options as possible, they are a lot more likely to discover potential money-
saving and waste-reducing opportunities and will be more open to implementing them. 
The report can be downloaded from: 
http://www.epa.gov/airquality/permits/memoranda/permits.pdf. 
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required reporting of environmental performance measures (adopted in 18 states), and (3) 
management-based regulations that require facilities to develop P2 plans identifying 
problems, targets and solutions to their pollution concerns (adopted in 14 states). 
 
Table 4.2. History of P2 Program Legislation and Policy Instruments 













AK 1990       
AL     
AR 1993    
AZ 1991 √ (1993) √ √ 
CA 1989 √ (1993) √ √ (2007) 
CO 1992    
CT 1991    
DC     
DE 1990 √ (1992)   
FL 1991    
GA 1990  √ √ (1993) 
HI     
IA 1989 √ (1994)   
ID     
IL 1989  √ (1992)  
IN 1990    
KS     
KY 1988 √ (1997)   
LA 1992  √  
MA 1989 √ (1997) √ (1991) √ (1994) 
MD     
ME 1990 √ (1994) √ (2000) √ (2000) 
MI 1994    
MN 1990  √ (1992) √ (1991) 
MO 1990 √ (1998)   
MS 1990 √ √ √ 
MT 1995    
NC     
ND     
NE 1992    
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Table 4.2. Continued 













NH 1996    
NJ 1991 √ (1996) √ √ 
NM     
NV     
NY 1990 √ (2000) √ √ 
OH 1992  √  
OK 1994    
OR 1989  √ √ 
PA     
RI     
SC     
SD 1992  √  
TN 1991  √ √ 
TX 1991  √ √ 
UT     
VA 1994    
VT 1990  √ (1992) √ (1992) 
WA 1988 √ (1995) √ √ 
WI 1989    
WV 1998    
WY         
Source: Policy adoption years can be found in Ramirez Harrington, D. (2013). 
"Effectiveness of State Pollution Prevention Programs and Policies." Contemporary 
Economic Policy 31(2): p. 258. 
 
P2s as Soft Technologies 
It is not clear how P2 activities should be classified within the mainstream literature on 
technology innovation. The typical taxonomy characterizes technology innovations as: 
(1) product and/or service innovations, (2) process innovations, including new practices 
or delivery, (3) organizational innovations such as changes in management structure, 
methods and information management, and (4) marketing innovations (Youtie et al. 2006, 
OECD 1997). P2s are clearly not new products, hardware technologies or machines, and 
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they are not new management or marketing methods. However, the application of P2s 
spans across all stages of modern industrial systems, from inventory control and 
administrative book-keeping to equipment maintenance, and production process and 
product modifications. Given that P2s are a set of every-day hands-on managerial and 
production practices, they can be classified as active experiential knowledge, or applied 
know-how. And in spite of being spread out across all administrative and manufacturing 
operations, P2 activities fit into a narrow niche of technology innovations referred to as 
soft technologies. 
 
P2s Are Also Strategic Tools 
The progression of environmental policies from command-and-control regimes to 
voluntary corporate self-regulation became possible with the recognition on the part of 
the regulated industries that voluntary programs can help reduce long-term compliance 
costs, rebrand their public image, and enhance their long-term competitiveness. This 
recognition is first marked by the establishment of the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and subsequent emergence of the 
ISO 14001 environmental management system (EMS) leading the way to the bigger 
movement towards programs aimed at voluntary environmental self-regulation (Koehler 
2007). The movement has been corroborated by numerous researchers who examined the 
nature and dynamics of corporate self-regulation, both theoretically and empirically 
(Maxwell et al. 2000; Decker 2005; Maxwell and Decker 2006; Decker 2007; Koehler 




Contribution of This Paper 
The contribution of this study is to shed further light on the effectiveness of policy 
and policy tools that encourage the adoption of P2 activities as well as other determinants 
identified in the previous literature. P2 activities present an interesting subject of 
investigation because they are voluntary to adopt and because they are accompanied by 
narrowly-defined state legislation and by a number of policy tools encouraging adoption 
of as many P2 activities as possible across entire production systems.  I am interested in 
looking at whether the given policy instruments and financial assistance in the form of 
state P2 grants are effective: (1) for all P2 activities as well as (2) for specific P2 activity 
groups related to either (a) management and logistical modifications or (b) product and 
process. 
Because of their unique definition as soft technologies, or applied knowledge 
skills directed at reducing and preventing production-related pollution, P2s exhibit the 
characteristics of knowledge-based technology innovations and are influenced by prior 
experience and knowledge spillovers. Given this definition, policy instruments and 
financial assistance aimed at information sharing may be more effective at encouraging 
P2 adoptions. The effect, however, may not be the same across different groups of P2 
activities, with information sharing having greater effect on P2 activities related to 
management and logistical practices than on product and process modifications. Hence, 
this study focuses on the impact of the different P2 policy tools and grants on: (1) all P2 
adoptions and (2) adoptions across different P2 categories. 
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In the previous literature, Khanna et al. 2009 have focused only on the mandatory 
component of P2 policy combining them in one variable99. Harrington (2013) studied the 
effect of P2 legislation and three P2 policy tools – numerical goal, reporting requirement 
and mandatory planning – but, both Khanna et al. (2009) and Harrington (2013) focused 
on adoption of all P2 activities. In contrast, Harrington (2012) examined the impact of P2 
policy and other variables on P2 activities disaggregated into three groups, but included 
only one policy instrument – mandatory planning. All the three works presented cross-
industry examinations. The impact of awarded P2 grants has not yet been studied. 
 
4.2.Literature and Hypotheses 
Environmental Policy and Technology Innovations 
Jaffe et al. (2002) and Koehler (2007) reviewed the literature on the dynamic 
relationship between: (1) environmental policy and firm environmental innovations and 
(2) environmental policy and firms’ participation in voluntary environmental programs. 
Despite the fact that the two articles summarize the literature within two different 
methodological paradigms – environmental economics and policy program evaluation 
and analysis – both raise a number of the same unanswered research questions. The key 
question, at which the two authors arrive is, more broadly how environmental policy 
instruments affect the adoption and diffusion of environmental technologies.100 This 
99 The authors do not specify whether they used the year of adoption of P2 legislation or 
if they used specific policy instruments. 
100 Jaffe et al. (2002): “How do environmental policy instruments that implicitly or 
explicitly increase the economic incentive to reduce emissions affect the diffusion rate of 
those technologies?” p. 48. Similarly, Koehler (2007): “With the exception of theoretical 
work (Lyon & Maxwell, 2004), very little is known about the interplay between market 
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study examines the impact of environmental policy directed at voluntary pollution 
prevention practices and other market pressures, and the effectiveness of individual 
policy instruments resulting in the number of pollution prevention activities undertaken at 
pulp and paper mills. 
 
Corporate Environmentalism and Voluntary Pollution Abatement 
Building on Becker (1983), Stigler (1971), and Peltzman (1976), Maxwell et al. 
(2000) formalized firms’ strategic self-regulation that preempted political and 
government action. Following Becker’s (1983) proposition that regulation is a result of 
political pressure between consumers and producers, and assuming organization and 
policy influencing costs on the part of the lobbying parties, the authors built a three-stage 
game theoretic model, in which when faced with increased threat of political pressure and 
regulation, firms choose to preemptively decrease their pollution levels and over-comply. 
The authors tested the proposition of corporate self-regulation with empirical analyses 
confirming the hypothesis that increased threat of regulation, measured by membership in 
conservation groups, induced firms to reduce toxic releases. 
Khanna et al. (2009) and Harrington (2012, 2013) continued the empirical 
discourse by examining the role of regulatory and political threats on voluntary pollution 
abatement efforts. Specifically, Khanna et al. (2009) found that the threat of anticipated 
regulations is important in adoption of voluntary pollution prevention, or P2, programs. 
and regulatory pressures on adoption and action under a VEP. For example, if regulation 
is anticipated, does firm resistance increase or decrease after joining the associated VEP? 
Even less is known about the actual effectiveness of various program design elements 
intended to motivate participation and action,” p. 690. 
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Examining the role of previous inspections and penalties on the adoption of P2 programs, 
Harrington (2012, 2013) found mixed results. In the earlier article, the author found that 
the facilities that are exposed to greater threat of enforcement action find a limited scope 
for P2 in achieving environmental compliance objectives; in her later article Harrington 
(2013) found past inspections to be a credible threat to firms and a good predictor of the 
P2 adoptions. In addition, Harrington (2012) tested whether P2 legislation and other 
market factors had varying impact across different P2 groups, yet out of all P2 policy 
tools, she included only mandatory planning. Following Harrington (2012, 2013) and 
using the data on state P2 program legislation and policy instruments provided in 
Harrington (2013), the set of hypotheses is proposed in the following section. 
 
Hypotheses 
The main purpose of this study is to examine the extent to which (1) P2 
legislation and policy instruments, (2) threat of regulatory action and political pressure, 
and (3) previous experience with P2 technologies and external P2 spillovers – impact mill 
behavior in relation to its choice to adopt pollution prevention technologies and if the 
three groups of factors have different effects across different P2 categories. More 
broadly, I hypothesize that environmental policy instruments that are focused on practical 
day-to-day technology recommendations and that can be easily implemented at individual 
plants without extensive training and other resource expenditure can be as effective as 
mandated regulations in impacting a firm’s pollution abatement technology adoption.101 
101 For a more detailed discussion of the literature of relative effectiveness of regulatory 
command-and-control vs. market-based approaches, see Jaffe et al (2002). 
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P2 Legislation, Policy Instruments, and Grants 
Hypothesis 1: The following P2 policy instruments are hypothesized to have a 
positive effect on P2 adoptions: (1) year of state adoption of P2 legislation, (2) year of 
state adoption of the numerical goal for pollution reduction, (3) year of state adoption of 
the mandatory information disclosure policy as a reporting requirement, (4) year of state 
adoption of management-based policy as mandatory P2 activity planning, and (5) P2 
grant amounts. 
In addition to these hypotheses, I expect that (3.a) year of state adoption of the 
reporting requirement will have greater positive impact on the expected count of input 
and procedural P2 modifications, which are aimed at administrative operations such as 
inventory and raw materials management, than on product and process modifications. 
Similarly, I expect that (4.a) year of state adoption of mandatory planning may have 
different effects on the two groups of P2 modifications. Finally, I expect that (5.a) the 
annual P2 grants awarded to state and local government agencies, private businesses, 
nonprofits and universities and geared towards information- and expertise-sharing, or 
towards generating positive external information spillovers, will have a positive effect on 
the P2 adoptions among pulp and paper mills. 
According to Harrington (2013), state legislated environmental programs help 
mills adopt environmental technology and reduce pollution through: (1) information 
sharing, thus decreased transaction costs of technology adoption and (2) increased public 
visibility and credibility of the regulating agencies. Studies on the effectiveness of using 
numerical targets, such as numerical goal for pollution reduction, in environmental 
enforcement are inconclusive. On one hand, Jaffe and Stavins (1995) find that legislating 
state mandatory building codes did not improve building practices on energy efficiency. 
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On the other hand, Lanoie et al. (1998) found that more facility-specific, thus more 
stringent, emission level requirements can be effective in lowering effluent emissions at 
Ontario pulp and paper mills. 
The effectiveness of information disclosure mandates, that are similar to 
mandatory P2 reporting requirements, has been extensively documented in the empirical 
literature. Many studies discuss the impact of information disclosure policy under the 
TRI regulations on reducing emissions directly as well as indirectly by means of 
increasing pressure of grass-root organizations and stock market reactions (Khanna et al. 
1998, Khanna and Damon 1999, and Decker 2005). Similarly, Delmas et al. (2010) find 
that mandating disclosure of fuel mix in the electricity industry resulted in lowered use of 
fossil fuels and increases the use in clean fuels. 
A number of recent studies, as reviewed by Harrington (2013), document the 
effectiveness of management-based programs, comparable to management-based P2 
planning, at improving firms’ environmental performance (Khanna et al. 2009, Arimura 
et al. 2008, Khanna and Anton 2002, Dasgupta et al. 2000, Henriques and Sadorsky, 
1996). Anton et al. (2004) found that more comprehensive environmental management 
systems (EMS) lead to lower toxic emissions per unit output and decrease offsite 
transfers and onsite releases. Bannear (2007) found that in states with mandatory 
planning programs, referred to as management-based regulations or MBRs, facilities 
engaged in greater number of source-reduction activities and lowered their TRI. Further, 
Khanna et al. (2009) demonstrated that Total Quality Environmental Management 
promoted P2 adoptions. Finally, as suggested in Anton et al. (2004), financial assistance 
for state technical know-how programs is hypothesized to reduce the aforementioned 
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transaction costs associated with P2 program knowledge acquisition and technological 
adaptation of it to specific facilities and their production processes. 
 
Regulatory Threat and Political Pressure 
Hypothesis 2: Increases in annual TRI will increase the expected count of P2 
adoptions at pulp and paper mills. Increases in regulatory stringency, measured by the 
total number of inspections and enforcements, will increase the expected count of P2 
adoptions at pulp and paper mills. Increases in the number of members in environmental 
organizations will increase the expected count of P2 adoptions at pulp and paper mills. 
Finally, increases in income per capita, measuring willingness to pay for higher 
environmental quality, are expected to increase the expected count of P2 adoptions at 
pulp and paper mills. 
With higher levels of TRI, mills are expected to face higher threat of regulation 
and will have greater incentives to adopt P2 activities. Examining the role of previous 
inspections and penalties on the adoption of P2 programs, Harrington (2012, 2013) found 
mixed results. Harrington (2012) found that those facilities that are exposed to greater 
threat of enforcement action find a limited scope for P2 in achieving environmental 
compliance objectives. In her later article Harrington (2013) found past inspections to be 
a credible threat to firms and good predictors of P2 adoptions. In addition, Harrington 
(2012) corroborated the previous literature that regulatory pressure: (1) reduces facility 
pollution levels (Khanna and Damon 1999, Vidovic and Khanna 2007, and Brouhle et al. 
2009), (2) encourages participation in voluntary environmental programs (Brouhle and 
Harrington 2010, Brouhle at al. 2009, Sam et al. 2009, Innes and Sam 2008, Vidovic and 
Khanna 2007, King and Lenox 2000, Khanna and Damon 1999, Arora and Cason 1995), 
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and (3) promotes environmental technology innovations (Khanna et al. 2009, 
Brunnermeier and Cohen 2003, Gray and Shadbegian 1998, Jaffe and Palmer 1997). 
The game-theoretical works of Maxwell and Decker (2006) and Decker (2007) 
emphasized the importance of regulators’ reputation and credibility, or credible 
regulatory threats, in decision to comply or over-comply in order to signal their 
progressive environmental performance and, as a result, face reduced regulatory 
stringency. Khanna et al. (2009) found that the threat of anticipated regulations is 
important in adopting of voluntary pollution prevention programs, thereby supporting 
Maxwell’s et al. (2000) propositions of corporate self-regulation in which voluntary 
abatement is explained by increases in threat of state and/or government regulations. 
In relation to political pressure, Maxwell et al. (2000), Maxwell and Decker 
(2006), Khanna et al. (2009), Harrington (2012) demonstrate that membership in 
environmental conservation groups, or “green” membership, is an effective measure of 
political pressure that increases the threat of regulatory oversight and enforcement. 
Recently, Matisoff and Edwards (2014) show that a state’s environmental group 
membership, namely the Sierra Club membership, is an important determinant of state 
adoption of energy and climate-change policies. I hypothesize that political pressure will 
increase the expected count of mill-level P2 adoptions. 
Finally, to gauge how state political climate affects firms’ decisions to implement 
P2 activities and following the theoretical propositions of Maxwell et al. (2000), Decker 
(2005), and Harrington (2012, 2013), I hypothesize that environmental quality is a 
normal good and increases in income will increase the demand for higher quality of 
environment.  More specifically, Maxwell et al. (2000) include income per capita with 
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the expectation that it will capture increased demand for pollution abatement. Decker 
(2005) includes county median income to measure local affluence and positing that 
wealthier areas will demand higher quality environment and will exhibit political 
pressure for stricter environmental monitoring. Finally, Harrington (2012, 2013) 
employed median household income to approximate localized benefits from stricter 
environmental regulations. Following these works, I hypothesize that political attitudes 
are expected to influence environmental mill performance and the incidence of P2 
adoptions. 
 
Internal Mill Experience and Firm P2 Spillovers 
Hypothesis 3: Mills with greater previous experience with P2 technology 
adoptions face lower costs of such technology adoptions and are expected to have a 
greater number of new P2 counts. Similarly, cumulative experience with P2 technology 
adoptions at sister mills of the same parent firm are hypothesized to increase the expected 
count of mill’s new P2 adoptions. 
Jaffe et al. (2002) provide extensive review of theoretical and empirical literature 
examining the relationship of environmental policy and technological change. Increasing 
returns in the form of learning effects and reduction in the pollution abatement costs via 
learning-by-doing, according to Goulder and Mathai (2000), affect policy-induced 
innovation and resultant pollution abatement. Additionally, Jaffe (1986), Griliches 
(1992), and Jaffe (1998) discuss the importance of external information and knowledge 




Firm and Mill Characteristics 
Hypothesis 4: Changes in the number of mills per firm are expected to impact the 
expected count of P2 adoptions at pulp and paper mills. Increases in mill annual capacity 
will increase the expected count of P2 adoptions at pulp and paper mills. Finally, pulp 
and paper mills are expected to have higher expected count of P2 adoptions than 
paperboard mills. 
Decker and Wohar (2006), Delmas and Toffel (2008), Khanna et al. (2009), and 
Minatti Ferreira et al. (2014) proposed that large corporations and market leaders have 
greater ability to adjust to the changes in the regulatory climate, create legal and 
environmental stewardship departments, and institute environmental programs with 
permanent and well-trained technical personnel to oversee the environmental 
performance at their firms and decrease compliance and liability costs. On the other hand, 
size of firm could mean higher transactions costs associated with disseminating P2 
knowledge and experience. In light of these stipulations, I do not provide hypotheses on 
the direction of the effect of the size of the parent firm. 
In connection to Nadeau’s (1997) and Decker’s (2005) argument that larger 
production facilities face greater number of inspections due to the scale of production 
and, therefore, releases, I expect that larger mills will have a higher rate of P2 adoptions 
than smaller mills. Finally, Nadeau (1997) and Minatti Ferreira et al. (2014) found that 
mills involving kraft and bleaching technology, or those with pulping technologies, face 





4.3.Empirical Model and Data 
The empirical framework discussed in this section examines the relationship 
between the measure of voluntary pollution prevention technology adoption at mill level, 
state P2 program legislation and its policy instruments, regulatory threat and threat of 
political action, mill’s previous experience with P2 technology adoption, and spillovers 
of within-firm P2 experience. Following is the functional form of the empirical model of 
this study with the dependent variable as the counts of new P2 activities at mill i in state s 
at time t: 
(1) +++= −−− 131211 2222 ititstit reportingPNGoalPPP βββ
 17161514 22 −−−− ++++ ititstit sInspectionTRIGrantsPPlanningP ββββ  
++++ −−− 1101918 ststit PerCapIncSierratsEnforcemen βββ  
++++ −−− 113112111 22 ititit rmMillsPerFiPCumulativeSpilloverFirmP βββ  
14 1 15 16it st st i t itMillCap PulpMill PaperMill eβ β β δ r−+ + + + + + . 
Other state variables include annual state P2 grants, the Sierra Club membership 
approximating the state environmental political engagement, and income per capita 
measuring citizens’ ability to pay for environmental quality of life. Other mill-level 
variables are number of mills per firm, annual mill capacity in thousand short tons, and 
whether the mill produces pulp, paper or paperboard. Table 4.3 provides the descriptive 
statistics for all variables. 
 
EPA Data: P2 Activities, Cumulative P2, Spillovers, and Regulatory Threat 
The dependent variables – the new P2 counts and regulatory threat variables: (1) TRI, (2) 
ECHO inspections, and (3) ECHO enforcements – come from the EPA. The data for this 
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study consist of the sample of 9,441 pulp, paper, and paperboard facilities that have 
reported at least one P2 activity during 1988-2002 and have been downloaded using 
TRI.EZ search tool from the TRI database Envirofacts.102 The dependent variable is the 
sum of all new P2 activities reported at the mill level. The TRI stipulates that each 
facility is allowed to report no more than four P2 activities within one of the 43 
 
Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Expected Sign MEAN SD 
Number of New P2 Activities N/A 0.49 1.11 
Group 1 P2: Number of New Input and Procedural 
Modifications N/A 0.32 0.82 
Group 2 P2: Number of New Process, Equipment, 
and Product Modifications N/A 0.16 0.51 
Year P2 Adopted, 1 if Adopted + 0.76 0.43 
Year P2 Adopted, Numerical Goal, 1 if Adopted + 0.10 0.30 
Year P2 Adopted, Reporting Requirement, 1 if 
Adopted + 0.41 0.49 
Year P2 Adopted, Mandatory Planning, 1 if Adopted + 0.34 0.47 
P2 State Grant Budget, 1990 Dollars + 8.72 5.02 
Mill TRI, Pounds +/- 10.04 5.34 
Mill Inspections, Number + 0.79 0.73 
Mill Enforcements, Number + 0.11 0.36 
Sierra Membership, Number + 9.07 0.86 
State Per Capita Income, Thousand 1990 Dollars + 1.44 1.01 
Firm Spillover P2, Number of Firm P2 + 0.64 0.81 
Mill Cumulative P2, Number + 0.74 0.98 
Mill Cumulative Group 1 P2, Number + 0.51 0.82 
Mill Cumulative Group 2 P2, Number + 0.32 0.60 
Number of Mills per Firm, Number + 1.85 1.15 
Annual Mill Capacity, Thousand Short Tons +/- 4.56 2.09 
Board Mill, 1 if Board Mill, Reference Category N/A 0.38 0.48 
Pulp Mill, 1 if Pulp Mill + 0.15 0.36 
Paper Mill, 1 if Paper Mill + 0.59 0.49 
Note: N = 2,409. All variables, except for dummy, are in the log form and lagged 
one year. 
102 The TRI.EZ search tool is available at: http://www.epa.gov/enviro/facts/tri/ez.html. 
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categories (Table 4.1).103 To disaggregate all P2 activities into categories, I have grouped 
the total eight categories into two. The first one consists of: (1) operating practices, (2) 
inventory control, (3) spill and leak prevention, (4) raw-material modifications; and rest 
of them – 5 through 8 – form the second group: (5) process modifications, (6) cleaning 
and degreasing modifications, (7) surface preparations and finishing modifications, and 
(8) product modifications.104 Mill-level cumulative P2 activities and firm-level P2 
spillovers are calculated for both all P2s as well as two P2 groups.105 
The data are further matched with the TRI facility records to calculate (1) total 
annual TRI106 and (2) number of inspections and enforcements at facilities across all 
three media: air, water, and land. I use the Integrated Data for Enforcement Analysis 
(IDEA) system and Facility Registry System (FRS) to merge the facility-level data from 
103 To investigate if there is an empirical issue associated with the maximum number of 
P2 activities allowed to be reported in one year and following Harrington (2012), I 
examine the current sample for any facilities that reported the maximum allowable 
number of P2 activities for a number of consecutive years and did not find them. 
104 Running estimations for all eight original P2 categories is not feasible given the data, 
resulting in most of the models not converging. Harrington (2012) used three groups 
combined in the following way: first group: (1), (2), (3), and (6); second group: (4) and 
(7); and third group: (5) and (8). I have combined P2s into a number of varying 
groupings, including the one used in Harrington (2012), and ran into the same issue – one 
out of three models did not converge. Table 4.1 shows that the eight original P2 
categories are grouped according to the stage of production process and combining the 
consecutive P2 activities, as done in this study, may make better intuitive sense. 
105 It is important to note that P2 as a measure of cumulative voluntary abatement efforts 
can suffer from measurement error given that P2 activities that are no longer 
implemented at mills may not be reported as discontinued. The EPA Office of 
Information Analysis and Access (OIAA), Office of Environmental Information (OEI) 
confirmed that facilities are not required to report discontinued P2 activities. In the next 
step of research I plan to investigate if the measurement error associated with the 
cumulative P2 activities is nonrandom and biases the estimates. 
106 Facility-level TRI data can be downloaded from http://www2.epa.gov/toxics-release-
inventory-tri-program/tri-data-and-tools.  
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the: (1) Air Facility System (AFS), (2) Permit Compliance System (PCS), (3) Integrated 
Compliance Information System National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (ICIS-
NPDES), and (4) Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Information (RCRAInfo) 
System.107 The TRI and P2 data starts at 1988. 
 
Political Threat 
To measure the state environmental political clout I use the annual membership of 
the Sierra Club, the largest grassroots environmental organization in the U.S.108 Finally, 
state income per capita comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ (BEA) Regional 
Economic Accounts.109 
 
Variables Measuring P2 Policy Tools 
The year of P2 legislation adoption across states comes from Harrington 
(2013).110 According to Harrington (2013), since 1988, 36 state have legislated P2 
programs emphasizing the need to implement pollution source reduction technologies. 
The P2 legislation measure enters the model as a dummy variable taking the value of 0 
for all the years prior to the year of P2 adoption in a state, and 1 afterwards. A number of 
107 For more information about ECHO and IDEA and data downloads, please refer to 
http://echo.epa.gov/ and http://echo.epa.gov/resources/echo-data/data-
downloads#downloads.  
108 The membership data were obtained directly from the Sierra Club; more information 
about the organization can be found at: http://www.sierraclub.org/about.  
109 The data can be downloaded at: http://www.bea.gov/regional/index.htm. Per capital 
income is measured in thousands of 1990 converted to real using the regional consumer 
price index for urban consumers, which can be found at: http://www.bls.gov/cpi/.  
110 Specifically, Harrington (2013), p. 258. The author collected data from National 
Pollution Prevention Roundtable, http://www.p2.org/inforesources/nppr_leg.html, but the 
data are no longer available. 
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states have not adopted P2 legislation and have zero values for the P2 legislation variable 
across all years. Similarly, the three policy instruments – numerical goal, reporting 
requirement, and mandatory planning – are dummy variables with 0 for years prior to 
states’ adoption and 1 subsequently to adoption.111 In addition to P2 legislation and 
policy instruments variables, I include the amounts of P2 grants awarded to state and 
tribal technical assistance programs from 1988.112 
 
Mill-level Production Variables 
To supplement facility-level monitoring and technology abatement data, I use the 
mill-level data from the Forest Product Laboratory (FPL) and annual editions of 
Lockwood-Post's Directory of the Pulp, Paper, and Allied Trades (LW).113,114 The two, 
FPL and LW, contain detailed information on all of the U.S. pulp and paper mills from 
1970 to the present. The FPL comprised detailed information on the type of pulping 
processes and capacities for all the mills, their names and locations over 1970-2000. I 
used LW to verify the capacities, number of products, whether the mill was listed as 
111 In states where the year of adoption of a specific policy instrument is not known, I 
assume it was adopted during the same year as the P2 legislation for that state. 
112 The Pollution Prevention Incentives for States (PPIS) grant summaries were manually 
collected from: http://www.epa.gov/p2/pubs/archive/index.htm#p2grant and aggregated 
to the state level. For more information on the P2 Grants Program and its effectiveness, 
see: 
https://www.cfda.gov/index?s=program&mode=form&tab=step1&id=68f347ac81af1719
5e58709ef6e7ad59 and http://www.epa.gov/p2/pubs/rep1.pdf. The current grant dollars 
were converted to 1990 using the regional consumer price index for urban consumers, 
which can be found at: http://www.bls.gov/cpi/. 
113 For the full description of the FPL data, see: 
http://www.fpl.fs.fed.us/documnts/fplrp/fplrp602.pdf.  




                                                          
 
vertically integrated, and extended the data to 2002. Additionally, using LW as well as 
other trade publications I added the name of the parent company and corporate owner/s in 
case the two were different, which helped identify an accurate estimate of number of 
mills per firm. 
The FPL and LW collectively contain data on more than 900 mills that have 
operated at any one point over 1970 to 2002. During 1991 and 2002 that number was 717 
mills.115 Both the FPL and LW collected data on the paper and pulp facilities that 
produced final products reported within the three primary paper SIC codes – 2611 for 
pulp, 2621 for paper, and 2631 for paperboard mills. The EPA’s ECHO and TRI have 
records for almost 520 pulp and paper facilities listed under SIC2611, SIC2621, and 
SIC2631.116 Matching the EPA with mill capacity data, I was able to find and include in 
my final sample 200 one-to-one clean matches. The FPL and LW data provide firm-level 
number of plants, mill-level measure of capacity or its annual output, and whether the 
mill produces pulp, paper, or board as its final products. 
 
4.4.Econometric Methodology 
Traditionally, the count data models are estimated using the Poisson regression 
method. The density function of the Poisson distribution is written as follows: 
115 The total number of mills for 1991-2002 is 809, but only 717 of them had non-zero 
capacity. 
116 Corresponding NAICS codes for the three sectors are: NAICS322110 for pulp 
facilities, NAICS322121 for paper and NAICS322122 for newsprint facilities, and 
NAICS322130 for paperboard facilities. To arrive at the total values for paper facilities 
equivalent to SIC2621, one would need to combine NAICS322121 for paper and 
NAICS322122 for newsprint facilities. For more information on NAICS definition for 
paper manufacturing, see: http://www.bls.gov/iag/tgs/iag322.htm.  
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where yi is the number of P2 activities at mill i, and θi is the conditional mean and 
variance. The main assumption of the Poisson model is that the variance and mean of the 
dependent variable are equal. This is not the case in my data. Following the previous 
literature and Harrington (2013), and looking at the difference between the mean and the 
standard deviation in the number of P2 activities reported in Table 4.3 of descriptive 
statistics, I conclude that using the Poisson model is inappropriate and estimate the 
functional form in equation (1) using the negative binomial regression analysis. 
Cameron and Trivedi (1998) suggested that over-dispersion, or when the variance 
of the dependent variable exceeds its mean, is common in count regression models 
because of nonobserved heterogeneity. Hence, using the Poisson model in such cases 
leads to biased and inefficient parameter estimates. Instead, Camron and Trivedi (1991) 
propose using the negative binomial regression technique, which assumes the variable 
mean to be imperfectly unobserved and the unobservable heterogeneity to follow the 















































Here in equation (3), α denotes the dispersion parameter and Г represents the 
gamma function. Applying the negative binomial estimation to the functional form in (1) 
provides a straightforward interpretation of the parameters, i.e. a 1 unit increase in 
independent variables leads to a β% change in θ. The expected counts of new P2 
activities are assumed to be in a log linear form. The use of panel data allows one to 
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control for changes in unobserved time and state heterogeneity. In the current models, the 




Table 4.4 reports the results for the fixed effects negative binomial models. The 
models are grouped into three categories with the following dependent variables: (1) 
counts of all new P2 activities (Models 1-3), (2) counts of new input and procedural 
modifications (Models 4-6), and (3) counts of new process, equipment, and product 
modifications (Models 7-9). Each of the three groups includes three models adding 
consecutively, first, firm P2 spillover variable, and second, cumulative mill P2 activities. 
It is important to note that both P2 spillover and cumulative P2 variables are calculated 
for all three groupings: (1) all P2, (2) input and procedural, and (3) process, equipment, 
and product modifications. The high significance of the over-dispersion parameter 
through all nine models confirms the correct choice of negative binomial methodology 
over the Poisson regression. And most of the models have high log likelihood values and 
provide a reasonable basis for concluding that the models fit well. 
I start with the policy variables. The results for the first two variables – the year of 
state adoption of P2 legislation and the year of adoption of numerical goal – are 
inconclusive and statistically insignificant across all nine models. While this is expected 
117 The sample includes mills in Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, 
and Washington during 1991-2002. 
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for the numerical goal, in light of the previous literature, the results for the year of P2 
legislation adoption are surprising. In contrast, reporting requirement, mandatory 
planning and P2 grants are highly statistically significant for all new P2 adoptions, but 
they have different signs. Reporting requirement is positive confirming the hypothesized 
relationship, while mandatory planning and P2 grants are negative and raise interesting 
questions (Models 1-3). 
In terms of marginal effects, adoption of the reporting requirement in the previous 
year increases the estimated count of all P2 activities by 1.07%, all else constant (Model 
1). In contrast, ceteris paribus, adoption of mandatory planning and 1% increase in the 
amount of P2 grants in the previous year decrease the expected count of all P2 activities 
by 0.68% and 0.03%, respectively (Model 1). Further, in states where in addition to the 
general P2 legislation, all three P2 policy instruments are adopted, the marginal effects all 
of four policy instruments are 0.75%, 1.06%, and 0.37% for (1) all P2 adoptions, (2) 
input and procedural, and (3) process, equipment, and product modifications, respectively 
(Models 3, 6, and 9). Finally, the computed ratios of the conditional mean of P2 counts 
for the above magnitudes are: 2.12, 2.88, and 1.45, respectively, indicating that mills in 
states that have adopted all four P2 policies have as much as 2.12, 2.88, and 1.45 counts 
of (1) all P2 adoptions, (2) input and procedural, and (3) process, equipment, and product 
modifications, respectively. 
The results for two different P2 groups present an interesting picture – the three 
variables still show statistically strong results, but only for one group of P2 activities at a 
time. Specifically, reporting requirement is positive and statistically highly significant for 
the first group of P2 activities – input and procedural modifications (Models 4-6), and 
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statistically insignificant for the second group – process, equipment, and product 
modifications (Models 7-9). Going in the other direction, mandatory planning and P2 
grants are negative and statistically insignificant for input and procedural modifications 
(Models 4-6) and negative and highly statistically significant for process, equipment, and 
product adoptions (Models 7-9). Coefficients for the three variables are also higher for 
the two separate P2 groups than for all P2 activities pooled together. Specifically, 
adoption of the reporting requirement in the previous year increases the expected count of 
input and procedural modifications by 1.38% (Model 4) as opposed to 1.07% for all P2 
counts (Model 1), all else the same. Similarly, adoption of mandatory planning and 1% 
increase in P2 grants in the previous year decreases the estimated count of process, 
equipment and product modifications by 1.05% and 0.05% (Model 7), respectively, vs. 
0.68% and 0.02% for all P2 activities (Model 1), ceteris paribus. 
Moving on to regulatory and political threat variables, previous year’s TRI, 
inspections and enforcements are all positive, as expected, with TRI and enforcements 
being highly statistically significant across all nine models. Inspections are statistically 
significant at 5% significant level for process, equipment and product modifications 
(Model 7). In terms of the magnitude of the estimated coefficients for the regulatory 
threat variables, enforcements have the highest estimates – 1% increase of inspections in 
the previous year increases the expected count of process, equipment, and product 
modifications by 0.38%, all else constant (Model 8). 1% increase in mill’s TRI during the 
previous year increases the expected count of all P2 activities by 0.16%, ceteris paribus 
(Model 1) and the TRI coefficients are higher for the process, equipment and product 
(Models 7-9) than for input and procedural modifications (Models 4-6). 
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Political pressure, measured by the Sierra Club membership and per capita 
income, have positive and negative signs, respectively. While the positive sign for the 
Sierra Club membership is expected, the negative coefficient of per capita income is 
unanticipated. The Sierra membership is significant at 10% significance levels in two 
models (Models 1 and 4). Holding all else constant, 1% increase in last year’s Sierra 
membership in the state increases the expected count of all P2 and input and procedural 
modifications by 0.73% and 0.86%, respectively. State per capita income, measuring 
willingness to pay for higher environmental quality, is negative in all nine models, but 
statistically significant for all P2s and process, equipment, and product modifications. 
Ceteris paribus, 1% increase in last year’s state per capita income decreases the expected 
count of all P2 activities and process, equipment, and product modifications by 0.21% 
and 0.43%, respectively. 
Technology variables – firm P2 spillover and mill cumulative P2 activities – are 
positive and statistically significant at 1% level across the three groups. All else constant, 
1% increase in last year’s firms P2 activities increases the expected count of all P2 and 
input and process modifications by 0.84% (Models 2 and 5), and process, equipment, and 
product modifications by 0.77% (Model 8). Similarly, ceteris paribus, 1% increase in the 
mill cumulative P2 activities in last year increases the expected all P2, input and process, 
and process, equipment, and product activities by 0.80%, 0.95%, and 0.77%, respectively 
(Models 3, 6, and 9). 
Further, mill annual capacity and number of mills per firm have negative sign 
through all nine models, but are statistically significant for all P2 and input and  
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Table 4.4. Two-way Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Results 
Dep Var: # of New 
P2 Activities 
All P2s Group 1 Group 2 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Intercept -9.84** -8.56** -7.27** -11.12** -9.89** -10.31** -7.99 -7.05 -4.70 (3.969) (3.753) (3.515) (4.535) (4.311) (4.027) (5.458) (5.444) (5.306) 
Year P2 Adopted, s -0.053 0.158 0.314 -0.227 -0.016 0.230 0.358 0.416 0.412 (0.246) (0.229) (0.206) (0.283) (0.266) (0.238) (0.317) (0.307) (0.296) 
Numerical Goal, s 0.172 -0.008 0.019 0.148 -0.051 -0.071 0.263 0.129 0.225 (0.268) (0.255) (0.240) (0.299) (0.286) (0.269) (0.382) (0.374) (0.366) 
Reporting 
Requirement, s 
1.066*** 0.779** 0.852*** 1.380*** 1.105*** 1.185*** 0.667 0.545 0.577 
(0.333) (0.316) (0.285) (0.408) (0.387) (0.340) (0.426) (0.416) (0.398) 
Mandatory 
Planning, s 
-0.683** -0.509* -0.435* -0.534 -0.344 -0.285 -1.05*** -0.91** -0.89** 
(0.285) (0.271) (0.247) (0.340) (0.326) (0.291) (0.368) (0.362) (0.346) 
P2 State Grant 
Budget, s 
-0.026** -0.027** -0.03*** -0.014 -0.014 -0.019 -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.06*** 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) 
TRI, i 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.10*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.09*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.14*** (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 
Inspections, i 0.140* 0.090 0.071 0.110 0.058 0.110 0.206** 0.145 0.117 (0.073) (0.069) (0.064) (0.082) (0.078) (0.072) (0.095) (0.094) (0.092) 
Enforcements, i 0.285** 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.287* 0.318** 0.36*** 0.368** 0.376** 0.282* (0.129) (0.123) (0.113) (0.153) (0.147) (0.134) (0.157) (0.153) (0.148) 
Sierra Club, s 0.726* 0.575 0.295 0.860* 0.718 0.576 0.334 0.231 -0.065 (0.412) (0.389) (0.365) (0.472) (0.448) (0.417) (0.564) (0.563) (0.550) 
State Per Capita 
Income, s 
-0.21*** -0.190** -0.173** -0.098 -0.074 -0.016 -0.43*** -0.40*** -0.44*** 
(0.082) (0.078) (0.072) (0.093) (0.089) (0.082) (0.114) (0.110) (0.109) 
Firm Spillover P2, i  0.84*** 0.42***  0.84*** 0.41***  0.77*** 0.55*** 
 (0.067) (0.066)  (0.076) (0.073)  (0.092) (0.093) Mill Cumulative 
P2, i, j   
0.80***   0.95***   0.77*** 
  (0.055)   (0.065)   (0.099) Annual Mill 
Capacity, i 
-0.12*** -0.09*** -0.06*** -0.14*** -0.11*** -0.08*** -0.036 -0.023 -0.015 
(0.027) (0.025) (0.023) (0.029) (0.027) (0.025) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) 
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Table 4.4. Continued 
Dep Var: # of New 
P2 Activities 
All P2s Group 1 Group 2 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Number of Mills 
per Firm, i 
-0.097** -0.38*** -0.17*** -0.090* -0.37*** -0.18*** -0.102 -0.36*** -0.23*** 
(0.048) (0.051) (0.048) (0.054) (0.057) (0.054) (0.066) (0.072) (0.071) 
Pulp Mill, i 0.63*** 0.55*** 0.225* 0.72*** 0.64*** 0.252* 0.287* 0.257 0.269 (0.138) (0.129) (0.119) (0.154) (0.145) (0.135) (0.171) (0.167) (0.163) 
Paper Mill, i 0.67*** 0.45*** 0.260** 0.62*** 0.40*** 0.318** 0.72*** 0.49*** 0.363** (0.121) (0.117) (0.110) (0.138) (0.134) (0.127) (0.163) (0.163) (0.160) 
Over-dispersion  1.64*** 1.17*** 0.66*** 1.70*** 1.16*** 0.50*** 0.99*** 0.71*** 0.44*** (0.155) (0.126) (0.093) (0.200) (0.162) (0.106) (0.231) (0.194) (0.162) 
          
N 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 2,409 
LL -1,941.1 -1,864.6 -1,755.9 -1,524.6 -1,465.1 -1,351.5 -959.7 -923.7 -893.7 
AIC 3,998.3 3,847.2 3,631.8 3,165.2 3,048.1 2,823.1 2,035.4 1,965.5 1,907.5 
Note: All variables, except for dummy, are in the log form; all but product dummy variables are lagged one year; standard 
errors are reported in parentheses and ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively. 
Italicized i and s denote mill and state. Group j = 1 includes input and procedural modifications and group j = 2 includes 
process, equipment, and product modifications. To save space, state and year fixed effects are not reported; the reference 
group is Wisconsin board mills in 2002. 
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procedural modifications and less so for process, equipment, and product modifications. 
Specifically, 1% increase in last year’s mill capacity decreases the expected count of all 
P2 and input and procedural modifications by 0.11% and 0.14%, respectively, all else 
constant (Models 1 and 4). Similarly, 1% increase in the number of mills per firm during 
the previous year decreases the expected counts of all P2 and input and procedural 
activities by 0.38%, and process, equipment, and product modifications by 0.36%, all else 
the same. 
Finally, both pulp and paper mill dummy variables have the expected positive 
coefficients and are statistically highly significant at 1-5% significance levels in most 
models. The highest coefficient for the pulp mill is in the model with input and 
procedural modifications – operating a pulp mill increases the expected count of input 
and procedural P2 activities by 0.72%, holding all else constant (Model 4). And the 
highest coefficient for the paper mill is found in the model for process, equipment, and 
product modifications – operating a paper mill increases the expected count of process, 
equipment and product P2 activities by 0.72%, ceteris paribus. 
 
4.6.Discussion 
The current results for Hypothesis 1 confirm some of the findings in the previous 
research on the impact of policy instruments on voluntary participation in environmental 
programs. The results confirm that assigning numerical goals as environmental policy 
tools can produce ambiguous results. For all P2 modifications, conditional on the 
adoption of P2 legislation, the impact of adopting P2 numerical goal is inconclusive and 
statistically insignificant (Models 1-3). When disaggregated into different P2 activity 
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groups and conditional on adopting P2 legislation, the sign of the numerical goal is 
positive for the input and procedural and negative for process, equipment, and product 
modifications. In both cases, however, the coefficients are statistically insignificant. 
Harrington (2013) reports a negative, but statistically insignificant coefficient for the 
numerical target policy instrument on the adoption of all P2 activities. Similarly, Jaffe 
and Stavins (1995) found that building codes were not effective in increasing building 
energy efficiency. 
In contrast to the inconclusive results on the numerical goal, reporting 
requirement and mandatory planning have much more robust and statistically stronger 
results, yet the two go in different directions and exhibit even higher coefficients and 
statistical significance in models with disaggregated P2 modifications. Reporting 
requirement, conditional on adopting P2 legislation, has a strong positive impact on the 
adoptions of all and input and procedural P2 activities, in particular. This overall result is 
consistent with the findings in Harrington (2013) and earlier studies that find policies 
aimed at information disclosure directly and indirectly decrease emissions (Khanna et al. 
1998, Khanna and Damon 1999, and Decker 2005), and lowered the use of fossil fuels 
while increasing the use of cleaner fuels (Delmas et al. 2010). 
The stronger effect for the input and procedural modifications may be a reflection 
of either one or both of the following factors. First, the input and procedural 
modifications characterize the managerial side of the manufacturing process, or 
operations management and, as such, are more likely to be affected by information 
sharing policies. The second, and potentially more plausible, explanation is that the input 
and procedural modifications dominate other modifications in the pulp and paper 
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industry, in general, and in my sample, in particular. The 2002 EPA report on pollution 
prevention opportunities at the pulp and paper mills documents that most of the P2 
activities are completed mainly in three areas: (1) source reduction and material 
substitution, (2) water use and effluent releases, and (3) use of recycled materials,118 all 
of which fall into the category of input and procedural modifications. And in my sample, 
there are twice as many of input and procedural modifications than process, equipment, 
and product P2s (Table 4.3). 
Mandatory planning shows similarly strong statistical results but with a negative 
effect on P2 adoptions, conditional on adopting P2 legislation. This finding contradicts 
the earlier results of strong positive effect of mandatory planning on all P2 adoptions 
(Harrington, 2013) and on P2 adoptions differentiated by groups (Harrington, 2012). It is 
not clear why the mandatory P2 planning requirement has the negative effect on all P2 
adoptions and especially on process, equipment, and product modifications in my sample. 
It is possible that the non-binding nature of P2 plans, whereby companies are mandated 
to submit P2 plans but are not required to follow up on them, signals that many of the 
proposed P2 modifications are too costly for firms to implement. Another facet of the 
non-binding nature of P2 plans bearing import on policy implications is that they are not 
available to the public. The private nature, or lack of public disclosure, provides an 
additional incentive for facilities to delay the implementation of potential P2 
modifications. 
118 The report is available at: 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/publications/assistance/sectors/notebooks/pulp
pasn.pdf; for the discussion of P2 opportunities at pulp and paper mills, refer to pages 62-
67. 
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Given that the effect is stronger for process, equipment, and product 
modifications, the interpretation of delayed cost expenditures appears to be even more 
plausible in light of the above-mentioned EPA evaluation of pollution prevention 
opportunities at pulp and paper mills. According to the EPA, the nature of long 
equipment lifetimes of the paper-producing technologies precludes the industry from 
easily undertaking major process-changing pollution prevention measures, which are 
viewed as expensive and requiring long time periods of operational downtime. 
This result corroborates the concern documented in Lyon and Maxwell 
(2001) that some government reports criticize the public voluntary programs that 
do not institute monitoring and reporting requirements. 119 This, to quote the 
authors, “damages the credibility of the voluntary agreements since it does not 
allow for accountability, and makes ex post evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
agreements difficult” (Lyon and Maxwell, 2001, p. 2). 
The most controversial findings are those of P2 state grant budgets. As defined 
earlier, P2 grants are grants given to state and local governments, private businesses, 
nonprofits and universities to develop programs on establishing information networks and 
tools for implementing P2s.120 Naturally, one would expect the grants to generate positive 
119 More specifically, the European Environmental Agency (1997) report entitled 
“Environmental 
Agreements: Environmental Effectiveness,” which can be found here: 
http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/92-9167-052-9/page002.html.  
120 The Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA) defines P2 grants as “grants 
and cooperative agreements that provide pollution prevention technical assistance 
services and/or training to businesses” and “the P2 grant program supports P2 approaches 
and methodologies that focus on: institutionalizing P2 as an environmental management 
method, helping businesses establish prevention goals, providing on-site technical 
assistance or training to businesses, supporting outreach and research endeavors, and 
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externalities or spillover effects for and be positively related with the counts of P2 
adoptions. However, the direction and statistical significance of P2 state grants display 
the similar pattern as mandatory P2 planning, i.e. they have robust negative and 
statistically significant coefficients for the models with all P2 modifications and, even 
higher and statistically stronger estimates in models with process, equipment, and product 
modifications. However, it is much more difficult to understand the potential underlying 
reasons for this perverse result than in the case of mandatory planning. One possible 
explanation could be that P2 grants generate positive spillovers, but not for all industries. 
The pulp and paper industry, in particular, appears to experience the negative spillover 
effects of the P2 grants.121 However difficult to envision, this is the only plausible 
explanation I can conjecture given my data and results and suggest that more research 
needs to be done across other industries and possibly over a longer time span.122 
In contrast to the P2 policy instruments, the variables measuring regulatory and 
political pressure (Hypothesis 2) display expected direction and are, in general, well-
behaved. Confirming the propositions voluntary pre-emption (Maxwell et al. 2000, 
Maxwell and Decker 2006, Decker 2007) and corroborating earlier empirical results 
supporting data collection and analysis to curb environmental inefficiencies while 
increasing awareness of P2.” The discussion can be found at: 
https://www.cfda.gov/index?s=program&mode=form&tab=core&id=2598bcba855346b5
a45c84107499fbc3.  
121 The 1996 EPA Pollution Prevention Incentives for States (PPIS) Grant Program 
Assessment Study identifies the automotive (with auto body repair and vehicle 
maintenance) and printing industries as the top receivers of the number of grants each 
receiving 21% percent of total grants; the pulp and paper received 3% of total grants. The 
full text of the report can be downloaded from: http://www.epa.gov/p2/pubs/rep1.pdf.  
122 It is possible that the perverse results of both the year of adoption of mandatory 
planning and P2 grants is indicative of having omitted other important influences, such as 
P2 adoption costs, that have a strong negative impact on all P2 adoptions in general, but 
especially for process, equipment and product P2 modifications. 
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(Harrington 2012, Brouhle and Harrington 2010, Brouhle at al. 2009, Sam et al. 2009, 
Innes and Sam 2008, Vidovic and Khanna 2007, King and Lenox 2000, Khanna and 
Damon 1999, Arora and Cason 1995), I find that: (1) a higher level of pollution, 
measured by mill-level TRI amounts, and (2) higher level of regulatory scrutiny, 
measured by mill inspections and enforcements, are good predictors of mills’ efforts to 
adopt all P2 modifications and modifications categorized into two groups. More 
specifically, the effect of the TRI measure is robust across all nine models and 
enforcements appear to have more credibility as regulatory threats for adoption of P2 
modifications than inspections. 
Variables measuring political pressure present mixed results, however. The two 
variables, the Sierra Club membership and state income per capita, measure the two 
potentially different political forces – environmental group interests and increased 
pressure from groups with greater incomes who are willing to pay for and demand higher 
environmental quality. The Sierra Club membership has positive impact on the expected 
counts of P2 adoptions corroborating the previous literature (Maxwell et al. 2000, 
Maxwell and Decker 2006, Khanna et al. 2009, Harrington 2012, Matisoff and Edwards 
2014). In contrast, the negative sign of state per-capita is unexpected yet is consistent 
with some of the earlier findings. Specifically, Maxwell et al. (2000) found state per 
capita income also negative but insignificant; Decker (2005) found county median family 
income to be negative and statistically highly significant; finally, Harrington (2012, 
2013) found mixed results of county median household income. In light of these previous 
findings, the current result is less surprising and suggests it is picking up some other 
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influences.123 Finally, the coefficients of the Sierra Club and income differ in their 
statistical significance, with the Sierra Club showing a strong statistical result in only two 
out of nine models and income per capita having a high statistical significance in six out 
of nine models. The interesting nuance is that when looking at disaggregated P2 
modifications, one sees that the effect of the Sierra Club membership is driven by input 
and procedural modifications, while income per capita results are driven by process, 
equipment, and product modifications. 
The results on the impact of firm-level P2 spillovers and role of mill-level P2 
experience (Hypothesis 3), measured by cumulative P2 support arguments and evidence 
presented in the previous literature (Jaffe 1986, Griliches 1992, Jaffe 1998, Goulder and 
Mathai 2000, and Jaffe et al. 2002). The results unequivocally suggest that both firm 
spillovers and mills’ prior experience capture the effects of increasing returns in the form 
of learning effects and reduce pollution abatement costs via learning-by-doing. This is 
true for all P2 modifications and for the two groups separately with similarly large 
coefficients across all the six models. 
Finally, for Hypothesis 4, following the line of reasoning that market leaders and 
large firms are superior innovators and technology adopters (Schumpeter 1942, Scherer 
1967, Mansfield 1968) and where I am hoping to find positive firm and mill economies 
of scales for P2 technologies as in Khanna et al. (2009), I do not. Moreover, the findings 
exhibit substantive and statistically strong diseconomies of scale at both levels – firm and 
123 The cost of regulation could be one of the omitted variables influencing the results. It 
is suggested that costs of regulation for low income states may drive P2 adoptions as a 
strategy to substitute for other more costly monitoring and enforcement. Consequently, as 
income and state revenues rise, the need for P2 adoptions drops. 
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mill. The result is strong for all P2 and especially input and procedural modifications; 
firm effect is strong for process, equipment, and product innovations as well. The result 
confirms some of the earlier studies which supported the hypotheses that market 
concentration has, in fact, negative effect on innovations (Geroski 1990, Williamson 
1965) in part because once monopolistic rents are secured, firms have lower incentives to 
innovate. Yet, it is important to note, that this result could be different for end-of-pipe 
technologies, whereby there are increasing economies of scale with firm and/or mill size. 
This could also be different under different market conditions – more competitive 
markets could be forced to substitute pollution control for cheaper pollution prevention 
technologies, or forego all environmental improvements altogether if not regulated. 
 
4.7.Conclusion 
The main research question posed at the beginning of this paper was how 
environmental policy instruments affect the adoption and diffusion of environmental 
technologies. I examined this question looking at a narrow set of state P2 policy 
instruments that represent the wave of newer types of policies, namely voluntary 
environmental programs, and their impact on a narrow set of environmental technologies 
– P2 modifications. The P2 state programs prescribe varying combinations of regulatory-, 
information-, and management-based policies. In addition, the states receive P2 grants 
that are designed to help develop programs on establishing information networks and 
tools for implementing P2s. 
My results confirm some of the findings in the previous research on the impact of 
policy instruments on voluntary participation in environmental programs and 
environmental technology innovations. For instance, like others, I find that assigning 
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numerical goals as environmental policy tools can produce ambiguous results. Similarly, 
reporting requirement, regulatory and political threats as well as firm P2 spillover and 
prior P2 experience are all strong predictors of the increases in P2 adoptions at pulp and 
paper facilities. 
Mandatory planning and P2 grants, however, produced quite surprising, if not 
perverse, results and, while I was able to explore and offer a couple of plausible 
explanations for the unexpected effect of the mandatory planning policy instrument, I 
could not uncover why P2 grants had a robust negative effect on P2 modifications. I also 
found substantive diseconomies of P2 modifications associated with the firm and mill 
size, confirming most of the previous empirical literature that did not find much support 
for economies of scale for innovative activities. Another interesting finding is that the 
effects of most of the policy instruments and other factors differ by groups of P2 
modifications. These differences stem from the nature of the paper-making technology 
and P2 modifications associated with different stages of production, which then affects 
their cost and feasibility of implementation. 
The perverse results of the impact of P2 mandatory planning and P2 grants inform 
an important policy challenge and opportunity. To explain the effect of the P2 mandatory 
planning, I suggest that both nonbinding and private characteristics of P2 mandatory 
plans create an incentive for delaying more costly modifications. It would be wise, on the 
part of policy-makers, to consider potential ways to modify the policy in order to reverse 
this incentive. 
The explanation for the negative effect of state P2 grants does not appear as 
easily, however. After considerable research within the data as well as P2 grant program 
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descriptions, I conclude that, even though pulp and paper mills get little attention from 
the federal and state government in comparison to other sectors, this should not justify 
the negative spillovers that I find in my sample. Consequently, policy-makers must look 
into the planning and all stages of implementation of the P2 grant programs. It would not 
hurt to improve the data and other information tools available on the EPA site related to 
P2 grants. 
Another important policy implication derived from my results is that policy 
instruments affect different P2 modifications in different ways. For P2 modifications that 
heavily rely on improved management tools (like more improved maintenance, 
scheduling, or record-keeping), information-sharing policies, such as reporting 
requirement, have strong positive policy impact. This would not be true, as my results 
confirm, for P2 modifications related to process or product modifications. 
Future research would benefit from amassing more facility level data to look 
deeper at all eight categories of P2 modifications. Examining all policy instruments and 
P2 grants for each P2 category might shed more light on the effectiveness of the policies. 
It would be insightful to investigate the effects of P2 grants on a different set of industries 
or all manufacturing, data permitting. Additionally, case study analyses would 
complement the empirical models, completing the picture of what kind of decision-
making goes into planning and implementing P2 modifications as well as the type of 





5.1.Review of Findings 
This dissertation provides a broad view of and contributes to the current 
theoretical and empirical discourse on the effectiveness of the environmental policies and 
regulations. Chapter 1 documents the history of environmental regulations that apply to 
one of the larger manufacturing polluters in the U.S. – pulp and paper industry. The 
industry presents a good case for the analysis of the gradual progression in the character 
of policies – from the rigid command-and-control regulations of the Clean Air and Clean 
Water Acts in the early 1970s to the more flexible and accommodating Cluster Rules and 
voluntary, or quasi-voluntary, pollution prevention programs under the Pollution 
Prevention Act during the early-to-mid 1990s. While the Clean Air, Clean Water, and the 
Pollution Prevention Acts, along with other regulations reviewed in Chapter 1, apply to a 
wide set of industrial producers, the Cluster Rules was designed specifically for the pulp 
and paper mills making it a good case for a variety of empirical analyses. 
 
Essay1: Environmental Compliance and Investment Behavior of Capital-
intensive Industries 
The first essay in Chapter 2 examines the impact of the regulatory stringency on 
the industry investment decisions. The previous literature found that increases in 
environmental stringency, realized through higher pollution abatement and compliance 
costs, had impact on the papermakers’ choice of technology and timing (Gray and 
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Shadbegian 1998) and caused firms to shift production from more environmentally 
stringent to less stringent states (Gray and Shadbegian 2002). This essay contributes to 
the previous work by testing the hypotheses of non-zero impact of environmental 
stringency, as a proxy of compliance costs, within both the continuous and discrete 
choice regression analyses, thereby bridging the two literatures that view industrial 
investments as continuous capital adjustments or as lumpy outlays. The environmental 
stringency is measured by the total number of monitoring and enforcement actions 
undertaken by the regulators and as such, presents as a suitable measure of command-
and-control policy climate. In addition to the environmental regulatory stringency, I study 
the effect of other cost factors – prices for materials, labor, energy, land, and corporate 
taxes. 
The findings from this inquiry suggest that the two models inform different 
behavioral choices considered by papermakers. Confirming the results in Gray and 
Shadbegian (1998, 2002) and whether I am looking at a continuous flow of investments 
or its spikes, I find that state environmental stringency has a negative impact on 
investments, but it is statistically insignificant through all models. When facing increases 
in variable costs, specifically energy prices, papermakers respond by decreasing levels of 
investments, thereby confirming the findings of Lundmark and Nilsson (2001) and Gray 
and Shadbegian (2002). However, in day-to-day capital adjustments, regulatory 
stringency, availability of virgin or secondary pulp sources, wages and land prices have 
little or no effect. In contrast, when considering larger inflows of investments and 
reinforcing the findings in Bergman and Johansson (2002), Gray and Shadbegian (1998, 
2002), Lundmark (2001, 2003) and Lundmark and Nilsson (2001), my results suggest 
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that papermakers’ view wages, land prices, and availability of recycled pulp as important 
inputs when planning larger investments. 
 
Essay 2: Responsive Regulation: Target- vs. Budget-Driven Regulation 
The statistically weak impact of monitoring and enforcement actions on capital 
investments found in Essay 1 suggests, first, that inspections and enforcements measure 
other than command-and-control regulatory policy. Second, the results also suggest that 
pulp and paper mills may be employing a number of successful market adjustment 
strategies, cumulatively termed in the literature as corporate environmentalism, in order 
to lessen future regulatory scrutiny and, hence, decrease resultant compliance costs. To 
investigate if mills’ compliance behavior had significant impact on regulatory stringency 
they face, Essay 2 and Chapter 3 examines the hypotheses of ‘responsive regulation.’ 
Maxwell and Decker (2006) and Decker (2007) first advanced the theory of ‘responsive 
regulation’ and proposed that regulators acted in response to the compliance behavior of 
the regulated industries. As such, regulatory policies get characterized as more flexible, 
or responsive, while mills ensure compliance in order to preempt future regulatory 
stringency. Further, building on these theoretical propositions, I extend the empirical 
analysis to investigate if the environmental regulation regime could be characterized, as 
suggested by Heyes and Kapur (2009), as being motivated by numerical pollution targets 
or the size of regulators’ budgets. In short, I evaluate the impact of (1) voluntary 
pollution abatement and prevention efforts at the U.S. pulp and paper mills and (2) local 
and state protective and inspection government expenditures on the level of scrutiny 
levied by the regulators. In addition, I explore the role of political and consumer pressure, 
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measured by the Sierra Club membership and state per capita income, as well as mill and 
firm heterogeneity on the number of regulatory inspections and enforcements. 
The paper contributes to the positive theory and empirical body of work on 
‘responsive regulation’ by testing if regulatory actions are determined by environmental 
firm performance and/or regulatory budget expenditures. While the pioneering works 
analyzed the effect of TRI on the count of regulatory inspections (Maxwell et al. 2000), 
in addition to inspections I include the number of enforcements, and in addition to the 
TRI, I use the number of mill-level P2 activities as the second measure of voluntary 
pollution abatement efforts. I also included two measures of government spending on 
inspection and protection, at local and state levels. To contribute to the studies on the 
pulp and paper industry, which focus on either air or water pollution (Nadeau 1997, Gray 
and Shadbegian 2007, Shimshack and Ward 2005, 2008), I include all three pollution 
vectors – air, water, and land – as well as the combined category. The disaggregated 
results display better model performance than when the three media are combined 
together. Finally, neither P2 activities, nor state and local budgets had been examined in 
this context previously. 
 
Essay 3: Policy Instruments and P2 Adoptions 
In the Essay 2 I find that regulators take into account mills’ compliance behavior 
measured by the TRI for each specific pollution media and the total number of new P2 
activities. Both indicators had positive, and in most models, statistically significant 
results. While the positive relationship of the TRI coefficients is expected and consistent 
with the previous works, the same direction and similar statistical magnitude found for 
the P2 activities is unexpected and raises interesting empirical questions. More 
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specifically, according to the hypotheses proposed by Maxwell and Decker (2006) and 
Decker (2007), the voluntary adoption of P2 activities at mills should serve as a positive 
signal of environmental stewardship to the regulators, hence should be associated with 
reduced regulatory scrutiny and less frequent inspections and enforcements. Yet, this was 
not what I find. 
In order to understand the nature of P2 activities and the effectiveness of policy 
instruments aimed at voluntary environmental programs (VEP), such as P2 programs, I 
examine a number of models of adoption of new P2 activities, and factors influencing P2 
adoptions, in the Essay 3 in Chapter 4. More specifically, I study if: (1) P2 policy 
instruments – regulatory-, information-, and management-based – designed to encourage 
P2 adoption, (2) threat of regulatory action and political pressure, and (3) previous 
experience with P2 technologies and external firm-level P2 spillovers, have impact on all 
P2 adoptions and when grouped in two more general categories. I define the first P2 
category as consisting of operating practices, inventory control, spill and leak prevention, 
and raw-material modifications. Process modifications, cleaning and degreasing 
modifications, surface preparations and finishing modifications, and product 
modifications form the second P2 group. For the purposes of this analysis, I term the first 
group as management and logistical, and second as process and product modifications. 
The results of the third analysis confirm some of the findings in the previous 
research on the impact of policy instruments on voluntary participation in environmental 
programs. For instance, like Jaffe and Stavins (1995) and Harrington (2013), I find that 
assigning numerical goals as environmental policy tools can produce ambiguous results. 
Similarly, I confirm the previous findings that reporting requirement (Khanna et al. 1998, 
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Khanna and Damon 1999, Decker 2005, Delmas et al. 2010), regulatory and political 
threats (Arora and Cason 1995, Khanna et al. 1998, Khanna and Damon 1999, King and 
Lenox 2000, Maxwell et al. 2000, Decker 2005, Maxwell and Decker 2006, Decker 2007, 
Vidovic and Khanna 2007, Innes and Sam 2008, Brouhle at al. 2009, Sam et al. 2009, 
Brouhle and Harrington 2010, Delmas et al. 2010, Harrington 2012, 2013) as well as firm 
P2 spillover and prior P2 experience (Jaffe 1986, Griliches 1992, Jaffer 1998, Goulder 
and Mathai 2000, and Jaffe et al. 2002) are all strong predictors of the increases in P2 
adoptions at pulp and paper facilities. 
 
5.2.Implications 
In light of the EPA (2014) findings that compliance costs associated with the 
Cluster Rules were significantly over-estimated by the regulators as well as the industry, 
the results of weak or no impact of environmental stringency on investment patterns 
documented  in Essay 1 of this thesis are not surprising. The main lesson of these results 
is that, ceteris paribus, pollution abatement costs do not change the usual investment 
behavior of such capital intensive industries as the pulp and paper. And more specifically, 
the environmental costs do not have drastic impacts on the papermakers’ profit 
maximization. These findings are consistent regardless if the analyses are done for short-
term capacity fluctuations or longer term lumpy investments. The EPA (2014) report 
suggested that the over-estimated costs did not account for the substitution of mandatory 
abatement requirements by more flexible compliance procedures adopted by the 
regulators and mills, suggesting that these more flexible pollution abatement strategies 
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provide substantial cost-savings and are preferred by mills.124 On the other hand, the only 
costs that are found to significantly affect short-term investment decisions are energy 
prices, emphasizing the need of corporate strategists to analyze local energy markets. 
And when looking at longer-term investments pulp and paper managers take into account 
wages, land prices, and availability of recycled pulp. 
The analyses on whether mills adjust their pollution behavior in order to pre-empt 
regulatory stringency in Essay 2 suggest that voluntary P2 activities is a better measure of 
such behavior than the mill TRI, which are required to be reported to the EPA. The 
preliminary endogeneity tests further suggest that P2 is a robust measure of 
environmental management and is not a greenwash. In addition, the analyses showed that 
regulators are more driven by environmental targets than by their budgets. Also, 
environmental political activism has greater impact for water inspections, and state 
residents’ willingness to pay for better environmental quality increases the expected 
count of air inspections. Finally, larger facilities as well as firm market leaders are found 
to draw more regulatory attention on average. 
Finally, the findings in Essay 3 inform policy on the effectiveness of P2 
legislation and its individual policy tools – numeric goal, reporting requirement and 
mandatory planning. While the findings are ambiguous on whether the adoption of the 
legislation and numeric goal have any impact on P2 adoptions at pulp and paper mills, 
124 EPA (2014): “Among the reasons for EPA’s overestimates of these capital costs are 
the mills’ use of the clean condensate alternative (CCA), flexible compliance options, 
extended compliance schedules, site specific rules, use of equivalent-by-permit, and 
equipment/mill shutdowns and consolidations. However, the lack of detail in the 
available data means we can only speculate on which reason(s) is primarily responsible 
for EPA’s overestimate,” p. 52. 
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results for reporting requirement and mandatory planning policy instruments are more 
conclusive. The adoption of the reporting requirement appears to have a strong positive 
impact on the expected count of P2 adoptions at mill, on the one hand. Mandatory 
planning and P2 grants, however, produce quite surprising, if not perverse, results and, 
while I am able to offer a couple of plausible explanations for the unexpected effect of 
the mandatory planning policy instrument, I cannot uncover why P2 grants have a robust 
negative spillover effect on P2 modifications. To explain the effect of the P2 mandatory 
planning, I suggest that both nonbinding and private characteristics of P2 mandatory 
plans created an incentive for delaying more costly modifications. It would be wise, on 
the part of policy-makers, to consider potential ways to modify the policy in order to 
reverse this incentive. The explanation for the negative effect of state P2 grants do not 
appear as easily, however. After having done considerable research within the data as 
well as P2 grant program descriptions, I concluded that, even though pulp and paper mills 
get little attention from the federal and state government in comparison to other sectors, 
this should not justify the negative spillovers that I find in my sample. Consequently, 
policy-makers must look into the planning and all stages of implementation of the P2 
grant programs. 
Another interesting finding bearing import on policy is that the impact of most of 
the policy instruments and other factors varied for different groups of P2 modifications. I 
find that these distinctions result from the nature of the paper-making technology and P2 
modifications associated with different stages of production, which then affect their cost 
and feasibility of implementation. For P2 modifications that heavily rely on improved 
management tools (like improved maintenance, scheduling, or record-keeping), 
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information-sharing policies, such as reporting requirement, have strong positive impact. 
The result is opposite for P2 modifications related to process or product modifications. 
 
5.3.Future Research and Empirical Implications 
Putting the results from the three essays back together within a bigger picture of 
how changes in regulatory policies interact with and shape industry response and 
compliance, a few theoretical and empirical implications emerge. The current literature 
on environmental compliance is focused on how markets adjust to the evolving 
regulatory climates. To extend this work further, I propose to pursue the next three 
prominent lines of inquiry: (1) impact of different regulatory climates and policies on 
industry structure and interaction between corporate restructuring strategies and 
regulations, (2) role of strategic firm communications/interactions in preempting 
regulatory action under different policy climates/regimes, and (3) whether firms, in the 
effort to minimize costs, move pollution across different media. From the perspective of 
the literature focused on regulatory effectiveness, my findings suggest two directions for 
subsequent research: (1) examining monitoring and enforcement activities separately, and 
(2) analyzing the role of public scrutiny in the effectiveness of voluntary environmental 
programs. I next discuss each of these themes in greater detail and conclude with 
necessary empirical and data improvements. 
 
Market Adjustments to Regulatory Climate 
Compliance Costs and Industry Restructuring 
I start with the discussion of the current state of the literature and findings on the 
types of restructuring strategies used by industries in their efforts to adjust to 
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environmental compliance costs. While earlier research documented that 
compliance costs had significant impact on mill behavior, more evidence is 
emerging that these effects are not always big and/or unidirectional. Gray and 
Shadbegian (1998, 2002) found that compliance costs had significant impacts on 
the choice of pulping technology and shifting production shares across states in 
favor of less stringent regulatory climates. Similarly, Keller and Levinson (2002) 
find that compliance costs have moderate deterrent effects on foreign direct 
investment flows in the U.S.  
More recently, in their working paper Gray et al. (2011a) found that plants 
that underwent restructuring in the previous couple of years had better 
environmental compliance. Their econometric analyses looked at how three types 
of restructuring events – downsizing, re-engineering, and outsourcing – 
influenced air and water compliance and toxic releases at 454 pulp and paper 
mills during 1985-1996.125 Similarly, in another analysis, Gray et al. (2011b) 
examined if environmental compliance associated with the Cluster Rules caused 
decreases in total employment at 458 pulp and paper mills during 1993-2007. 
Contrary to the expectations, the authors find that having to comply with the 
Cluster Rules caused only small decreases in labor demand at the affected mills. 
125 While downsizing and outsourcing are self-explanatory, the notion of restructuring via 
re-engineering requires additional definition. According to Hammer and Champy (1993) 
cited in Gray et al. (2011a), re-engineering is “the fundamental rethinking and radical 
redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical, 
contemporary measures such as cost, quality, service, and speed.” The authors further 
expand by adding that “the strategy consists of such actions as eliminating functions, 
hierarchical levels, groups, divisions, or products; redesigning work tasks; and 
consolidating or merging units” (Gray et al. 2011a,p. 3). 
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Further, documenting the abatement and compliance costs associated with the Cluster 
Rule, the 2014 EPA report found that the actual compliance costs were much lower than 
predicted by both the regulators and the industry.126 
Finding that compliance costs may have more complex effects on manufacturing 
investments, I propose that it is important to examine next the impact of different policies 
and policy regimes within a broader, if not the full, set of restructuring strategies 
available to the industries. To do so, I propose to expand the list of restructuring 
strategies included in Gray et al. (2011a) to include: (a) vertical and horizontal mergers 
and acquisitions, and (b) greenfields, closures and/or bankruptcies. Earlier work on the 
corporate restructuring within the pulp and paper sector suggests that most of the 
restructuring occurs through mergers and acquisitions. Specifically, Pesendorfer (2003) 
documented that 40% of capacity expansions were achieved through horizontal 
acquisitions, with only 7.29% through building new plants. Both Ohanian (1994) and 
Melendez (2002) find that vertical integration of pulping and paper-making operations 
was consistent with the transactions costs model and was associated with larger mill size. 
Ohanian (1994) also found that major adjustments to industry trends occurred through 
entry and exit, not through changes in integrated status. Finally, Ho et al. (2013) 
examined market exits through bankruptcies and found very few firms in the industry 
went bankrupt, yet the choice of bankruptcy filing as an exit strategy decreased with firm 
size, and bankruptcy filing resulted in a negative market reaction. 
126 For review, see Chapter 1 of the thesis. For detailed discussion, see EPA, 2014, 
Retrospective Study of the Costs of EPA Regulations: A Report of Four Case Studies, in 
Environmental Protection Agency National Center for Environmental Economics, Office 
of the Administrator: http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-
0575.pdf/$file/EE-0575.pdf. 
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Strategic Interactions under Different Regulatory Climates 
In Chapter 1 I introduced the findings of Gray and Shimshack (2011) of 
decreasing amounts of money allotted to the regulatory oversight.127 Results in Chapter 3 
show that regulatory actions are motivated more by environmental targets than by 
budgetary constraints, while at average levels of both TRI and P2, state and local budgets 
have different effects on different media. This confirms the expectations that while 
monitoring and enforcement are effective at attaining pollution targets, decreases in 
budgets do not automatically signal reduced effectiveness of the oversight. These 
findings invite further empirical analyses of the effectiveness of target vs. budget 
motivations within the theoretical framework of responsive regulation. Building on 
Maxwell and Decker (2006), Decker (2007), and Heyes and Kapur (2009), Colson and 
Menapace (2012) theoretically demonstrate that even under a budget-driven mission 
regulators can use multiple measures of ambient pollution to create strategic interaction 
among firms, thereby generating positive compliance spillovers. Under such conditions, 
the authors argue, the budget-driven mission can be more effective than a target-driven 
mission. 
The use of multiple measures of ambient pollution appears to reflect the reality of 
the regulators relying not only on plant-level pollution releases, but on the general 
measures of ambient pollution collected directly by the environmental agencies at their 
regional collection stations. Further, emphasizing the strategic nature of mill compliance, 
127 For a more detailed discussion, see Chapter 1, Introduction, 7. Responsive Regulation, 
Essay 2, Budget-driven Regime: Role of Budgetary Constraints under and Figure 1.9 of 
the budget allotments for Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA). 
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Gray and Shadbegian (2009) found that inspections at one plant tended to increase 
compliance at both the inspected and nearby facilities. Finally, Christensen and Caves 
(1997) empirically tested and documented the importance of strategic interactions within 
the pulp and paper industry in their bids for future capacity projects. Incorporating such 
strategic communications among mills empirically is an important next step in 
understanding the dynamics of preemptive corporate environmentalism. 
 
Cross-Media Pollution: Complements or Substitutes? 
The final strategy which manufacturers may be using in order to adjust to 
abatement and compliance costs and which I suggest for further research is the strategy of 
moving pollution from one pollution media to another. I propose to test empirically 
whether and to what extent different media pollution releases are complements or 
substitutes. The literature on cross-media substitution is limited to Sigman (1996) and 
Alberini (2001). Sigman (1996) finds that increases in hazardous waste management 
costs raised air emissions, suggesting that facilities substitute between releases into 
different environmental media. Similarly, Alberini (2001) found that the enactment of 
regulations was associated with the change in the nature of the relationship between 
underground and aboveground pollutant disposals from one of complementarity to 
substitution. Anecdotally, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) noted 
that during 1995-1999 North American 25% decreases in air releases were offset by 25% 
increases in on-site land releases, 35% landfill releases, and 26% effluent releases.128 
128 More specifically, the CEC notes that “The North American manufacturing sector's 
25-percent (153,000 tonnes) reduction in releases to air was largely offset by a 25-percent 
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Further, when examining the residuals from the three environmental 
performance models of a given mill across air and water compliance, and toxic 
releases, Gray et al. (2011a) found weak positive correlations between (1) air and 
water, and (2) air and toxics, suggesting that a mill with good air pollution 
performance was likely to perform better on water and toxics. Finally, potentially 
similar to the theoretical model in Colson and Menapace (2011), the use of cross 
media monitoring and enforcement creates cross-media compliance spillovers. 
Given the availability of the data and in order to expand the limited literature, I 
propose in-depth analyses investigating the nature of the relationship between 
different pollution media at the mills. 
 
Regulatory Effectiveness 
Monitoring vs. Enforcement, Environmental Recidivism and Chronic Non-
compliance 
From the perspective of the literature focused on regulatory effectiveness, my 
findings suggest that monitoring and enforcement actions may be driven by different 
factors. This can be seen anecdotally in Chapter 1 in Figures 1.5 and 1.6, which depict 
dramatically different graphs for the number of inspections and enforcements at pulp and 
paper mills during 1973-2013. First, I suspect that monitoring inspections are regularly 
scheduled events and their primary role is to communicate the importance of consistent 
(33,000 tonnes) increase in on-site releases to land and a 35-percent (58,000 tonnes) 
increase in off-site releases (mostly to landfills). Releases to lakes, rivers and streams 
also increased during this period by 26 percent (24,000 tonnes)” 
(http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=122&ContentID=1945&SiteNodeID=361).  
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compliance during the current and future periods. Enforcement actions, such as levied 
fines and judicial actions, on the other hand, are targeted at ex-post and repeat offenders 
with the emphasis on past performance. To put in other words – while both compliant and 
non-compliant firms need to be inspected, only offenders need to be punished. 
Further, in their 2007 report, the EPA explicitly states that, while there is ample 
literature on the deterrence effect of monitoring and enforcement on non-compliance, the 
empirical literature on repeat offenders, or recidivists, is limited and “represents a 
promising area of future empirical research.”129 The report cites the single work of Miller 
(2005), which analyzed both civil and administrative penalties and found that both were 
associated with reduced repeat offenses. Also, the author found some evidence that 
criminal fines that increased with the number of offenses were especially effective for 
reducing recidivism and chronic non-compliance. Given the differences exhibited in the 
number of monitoring and enforcement actions and lack of literature differentiating the 
two types of activities and factors that drive them, this presents an interesting area for 
empirical investigation. 
 
Role of Public Scrutiny in Voluntary Environmental Programs 
I next move to the question of evaluating the effectiveness of the voluntary 
environmental programs. According to the taxonomy developed by Lyon and Maxwell 
(2001) and updated by Lyon (2013), policies geared towards firms’ self-regulation fall 
under Public Voluntary Schemes (PVS) and Public Voluntary Programs (PVP). 
129 EPA (2007), "Monitoring, Enforcement, & Environmental Compliance: 
Understanding Specific & General Deterrence, State-of-Science White Paper,” p. 13. 
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Reviewing the existing literature, the authors emphasize that the PVS’ and PVPs 
can be effective in complementing more traditional regulations and help raise 
public awareness of and stimulate public discourse over environmental initiatives. 
However, consistent with my findings, the authors indicate that some government 
reports criticize those PVS’ and PVPs that do not institute monitoring and 
reporting requirements. 130 This, to quote the authors, “damages the credibility of 
the voluntary agreements since it does not allow for accountability, and makes ex 
post evaluation of the effectiveness of the agreements difficult” (Lyon and 
Maxwell, 2001, p. 2). 
The assertion of the negative impact of damaged credibility of PVS’ and 
PVPs due to the lack of public exposure and scrutiny is consistent with the 
findings in Essay 3 in Chapter 4 of this thesis on the determinants of new P2 
activities at pulp and paper mills. Having found that the policy instrument 
associated with mandatory planning had a perverse effect on the expected number 
of new P2 counts, I suggest that both nonbinding and private characteristics of P2 
mandatory plans create an incentive for delaying more costly modifications. 
Therefore, it is important to examine the role of public scrutiny in the 
effectiveness of the PVS’ and PVPs, possibly extending the analysis to other 
voluntary programs that have a greater public exposure component. 
130 More specifically, the European Environmental Agency (1997) report entitled 
“Environmental 
Agreements: Environmental Effectiveness,” which can be found here: 
http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/92-9167-052-9/page002.html.  
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To relate PVP discussions back to the rest of the literature on regulatory 
effectiveness and environmental compliance, one of the interesting findings using the 
the case study methodology, Gray et al. (2011a) show that restructuring has little impact 
impact on compliance but affects voluntary activities. Specifically, their study showed 
showed that “as resources become scarce, companies might cut back on programs like 
like establishing voluntary standards, consulting with environmental groups, or 
promoting EHS (environmental, human, safety) ‘culture’” (Gray et al. 2011a, p. 12).131 
The authors suggest that EHS programs compete for scarce resources with other 
corporate functional departments and the impact of their programs is evaluated by the 
value-added or potential profits they would generate. From this perspective voluntary 
programs may not be viewed as ‘profit-generating’ and are likely to be cut from firms’ 
budgetary considerations. The survey results, as Gray et al. (2011a) state, showed that 
there was “little enthusiasm for ISO 14000 as a source of ‘additional value’ for the EHS 
departments in the Pulp and Paper industry” (Gray et al. 2011a, p. 12). This is consistent 
with the findings of Youtie et al. (2009), who found that only 3.3% of surveyed paper 
manufacturing firms in Georgia state indicated that they adopted ISO14000.132 Finally, 
the 1999 OECD report commented that regulators like VEPs potentially for two main 
reasons. On the one hand, the regulators may collude with the industry and speed up 
legislature in order to signal due diligence. On the other hand, the VEPs may serve as a 
131 EHS stands for environmental, human and safety, and refers to the literature on 
corporate EHS risk management. 
132 Youtie et al. (2009) enumerate the sustainability programs reported by the paper 
establishments in the GA manufacturing survey. The programs include: High Efficiency 
Lighting, Water Recycling, Energy Audits, Recycling Production Materials, ISO 14000, Life 
Cycle Costing, EPA Programs, Energy Star, and Sustainability Program for Environmental 
Stewardship. 
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mechanism to transfer at least part of the administrative cost of compliance to the 
industry. While undocumented, such claims would be consistent with the 
decreases in regulatory budgets found in Gray and Shimshack (2011) and more 
analyses need to be done to suggest any such relationships. 
 
Empirical Improvements 
Endogeneity of Preemptive/Strategic Behavior 
Last, but far from least, in order to properly validate my empirical tests, it 
is important to address the issue of endogeneity persistent in all the models of 
preemptive and strategic interactions between the industry and the regulators. 
Confirming my expectations and when examining the residuals from the three 
environmental performance models of a given mill across air and water 
compliance, and toxic releases, Gray et al. (2011a) found that that there were 
components of performance that were not explained by the models.133 The weak 
positive correlations between (1) air and water, and (2) air and toxics, suggested 
that mills with good air pollution performance were likely to perform better on 
water and toxics. And while I did not examine errors estimated in my models, the 
parameter coefficients suggested similar relationships between (1) air and water 
and (2) air and land models (see Tables 4.2 and 4.3 in Essay 2, Chapter 3). 
By my definition, the mill performance variables, namely the level of TRI 
and P2 count, are endogenous in the model of regulatory stringency. If the 
133 Such factors could include “better management ability or greater local pressure” as 
proposed by the authors (Gray et al. 2011a, p. 7). 
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unobserved component, for example, is the quality of mill management and good 
management is expected to decrease the number of regulatory actions, then the effect of 
effect of the omitted good management will generate lower than expected errors or will 
or will be associated with more regulatory stringency than expected from the included 
included independent variables. Good management will also be associated with better 
mill performance, leading to positive correlation between the estimated errors and TRI 
and P2 variables. 
On the other hand, bad management is expected to generated greater 
environmental stringency and, if true, will generate higher than expected errors for the 
included explanatory variables. Yet, similar to the case with good management, bad 
management is likely to be associated with worse mill performance, resulting in the 
positive correlation between environmental performance and errors. In both cases, the 
correlation between the estimated errors and TRI/P2 is greater than zero, which leads to 
endogeneity caused by the omitted quality of management. 
 
More Facility-level Data, Extension to Other Policies, Programs, and Sectors 
Finally, my current analyses cover mid-1980s to 2002. Data availability allows 
me to extend the model estimations up to 2013-2014, once a number of data sets are 
merged together. In terms of additional variables, I can include the EPA facility-level 
data on the history of compliance. Additional years may provide sufficient basis for 
testing determinants of adoptions of all eight P2 categories. In relation to other PVPs, the 
pulp and paper industry take part in two certification programs – Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC) and Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI) – both of which have not yet 
been empirically studied. Locational variables, such as per-capital income, can be merged 
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at a county level, which then can provide substantial basis for studying any spatial 
correlations and geographical spillovers in the data. Finally, extending the 
analyses to include other industries, regulatory policies and environmental 
programs will help broaden available research on the complex interrelationships 
between regulatory policy climates and industry responses. 
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Appendix A: Essay 1 
Table A.1. Previous Findings 






















Stringency  -* -*      
Environmental 








significant   
+  +*  
Wages - -  -/+* + -* -* -* 
Energy - 
+* in some 
specificatio
ns 
+ - -* +* -* - 
Land  
Land price: 
-; Area: +*     
Land price: +; 
land area: +*, 
takes away 
significance 
from polit var 
 
Virgin Pulp   
+* for 
kraft, sulf, 
mech; - for 
deink 
-* +* +  -* 
  
188 
Table A.1. Continued 
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Plant age   -*      
Dirty industry  -*     +  
Political party 
(Democratic)  +*     
+ mixed 
significance  
Note: '-/+' stand for negative and positive signs; '*' for statistical significance at, at least, 10% significance level; and HHI for 
Herfindahl Index measuring industry concentration. For space reasons did not include Carlton (1993), Bartik (1985), Herderson 
(1996), List (2001), List et al. (2004), and Condliffe and Morgan (2008). 
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Table A.2. Correlations for Variables in the First-differencing Models 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 Dep.Var.: Δ Investment 1       
2 Δ Environmental Stringency -0.03 1      
3 Δ Environmental Noncompliance 0.13 -0.07 1     
4 Δ Taxes 0.08 -0.01 -0.01 1    
5 Δ Wage 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.05 1   
6 Δ Energy Price -0.04 -0.05 0.04 -0.10 0.00 1  
7 Δ Recycled Pulp 0.04 -0.09 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 1 
8 Δ Land Price -0.04 0.06 -0.03 0.09 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 
 
Table A.3. Correlations for the LPM and Logit Models 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 Dep. Var.: Investment 1       
2 Environmental Stringency -0.13 1      
3 Environmental Noncompliance -0.09 0.11 1     
4 Tax Rates 0.25 -0.06 0.24 1    
5 Wage 0.06 -0.10 0.07 0.24 1   
6 Energy Price -0.02 0.21 0.04 0.22 -0.15 1  7 Recycled Pulp 0.27 -0.19 -0.04 0.54 0.22 -0.27 1 
8 Land Price 0.02 0.30 0.25 0.21 0.17 -0.13 0.05 
 
Table A.4. Mill-level First-differenced Models 
Dependent variable: ∆ Mill Capacity I 
Intercept 0.0618*** 
 (0.020) ∆ Environmental Stringency 0.0021 
 (0.002) ∆ Environmental Noncompliance -0.0073** 
 (0.003) ∆ Taxes -0.1735 
 (0.184) ∆ Wage -0.0085 
 (0.054) ∆ Energy Prices -0.0631 
 (0.290) ∆ Recycled Pulp 0.0149 
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Table A.4. Continued 
Dependent variable: ∆ Mill Capacity I 
 (0.027) ∆ Land Price -0.3697 
 (0.300) N 2,988 
R-Square 0.0008 
F Value 0.36 
Note: All variables are in the two-year lagged and log form. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors for the OLS estimates were obtained using White 
(1980) procedure and are reported in brackets. Significance levels are indicated as 
follows:* significant at the α = .10 level, ** significant at the α = .05 level, and 
*** significant at the α = .01 level. 
 
 
Table A.5. Mill-Level Logit Models with State and Year FE 






Environmental Stringency 0.0813** -0.0098 
 (0.033) (0.035) Environmental Noncompliance -0.0912 -0.1850 
 (0.114) (0.120) Taxes 0.1346 0.0034 
 (0.364) (0.370) Wage -0.5711 -0.6408 
 (0.394) (0.392) Energy Prices -0.0074 -0.3116 
 (0.690) (0.699) Recycled Pulp -0.1984 -0.1864 
 (0.149) (0.150) Land Price -1.6646*** -1.6812*** 
 (0.480) (0.486) N 3,190 3,190 
-2 Log L 1,997.0 1,475.2 
Pseudo R-squared 0.015 0.019 
Note: All variables are in the two-year lagged and log form. Significance levels are 
indicated as follows:* significant at the α = .10 level, ** significant at the α = .05 




Appendix B: Essay 2 
B1. Preliminary Endogeneity Checks 
To test for endogeneity due to the omitted quality of management, which is likely 
to be correlated with one or both measures of environmental performance – TRI and P2, I 
calculate ownership change and state paper manufacturing income. I expect the first 
variable to proxy improved management from the previous period in case there was a 
change in ownership, and the second variable to approximate industry profitability within 
a state. These are not be the best instrumental variables (IV) and further work, 
specifically examining IV validity using the overidentification test, will help identify 
better instruments for the quality of pulp and paper mill managers. 
Since there are no endogeneity tests available for panel negative binomial 
methodology, I treated the two dependent variables – count of inspections and count of 
enforcements – first, as continuous, then as binary. However, when running the 
endogeneity tests using the discrete regressions with 2-way fixed effects, the models fail 
to converge. This could be the result of one or more explanatory variables having high 
correlation with the dependent variables. The quick look at the correlation matrices 
aggregated across all mills (see Appendix Table B.1) does not point to any one variable 
in particular, hence more disaggregated analysis is needed to complete this step. I intend 
to review the data mill-by-mill for the next stage of the research for this paper. Finally, to 
test and control for endogeneity in panel data and within the framework of the 
exponential regressions as the next step of this work, I will follow Wooldridge (2010) 
and will use the Correlated Random Effects (CRE) Poisson methodology. 
For this thesis, to get a sense if there is an issue of endogeneity in the current 
analyses, I employ two-stage linear with 2-way FE using full information maximum 
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likelihood (FIML) estimation (PROC QLIM in SAS). The suspect endogenous variables 
are the mill-level TRI and number of P2 adoptions. The test of each of the variables 
independently as well as together for both inspections and enforcements, fails to reject 
the null of no endogeneity. The exception is TRI in the model of inspections with the p-
value of 0.09, which rejects the null of exogeneity at 10% significance level. This result 
argues for P2 being a good measure of the quality of environmental management (vs. 
being a greenwash). 
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Table B.1. Correlation Matrix for Essay 2 
# Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 All Inspections 1           
2 All Enforcements 0.16 1          
3 Air Inspections 0.8 0.06 1         
4 Air Enforcements 0.18 0.41 0.15 1        
5 Water Inspections 0.65 0.12 0.13 0.11 1       
6 Water Enforcements 0.05 0.86 0 0.02 0.08 1      
7 Land Inspections 0.33 0.21 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.02 1     
8 Land Enforcements 0.16 0.35 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.53 1    
9 ln(Air TRI, t-1) 0.25 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.08 0.15 0.11 1   
10 ln(Water TRI, t-1) 0.25 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.23 0.07 0.1 0.11 0.72 1  
11 ln(Land TRI, t-1) 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.1 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.51 0.55 1 
12 ln(Total TRI, t-1) 0.25 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.07 0.15 0.11 0.95 0.74 0.5 
13 ln(P2, t-1) 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0 0 0 0.01 0.15 0.17 0.07 
14 ln(Loc Gov Exp, t-1) 0 0.01 0 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 
15 ln(State Gov Exp, t-1) 0.01 0.04 -0.04 0 0.07 0.06 0 -0.02 -0.16 -0.13 -0.12 
16 ln(Sierra Membership, t-1) 0 -0.01 0 0.01 0 0 0.01 -0.02 -0.2 -0.2 -0.21 
17 Year P2 Adopted -0.11 0.01 -0.13 0 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.11 -0.06 -0.06 
18 ln(State Per Capita Inc, t-1) -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 0.05 0 -0.05 0.01 0.14 0.17 0.09 
19 ln(Annual Mill Capacity, t-1) 0.17 0.16 0.12 0.13 0.1 0.09 0.11 0.1 0.51 0.45 0.39 
20 ln(Firm Market Share, t-1) 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.11 0.08 0.33 0.31 0.24 
21 ln(#Paper Grades Mill Produces, t-1) 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.11 0.34 0.33 0.25 
22 Board Mill, Reference category 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.1 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.06 0.08 
23 Pulp Mill 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.09 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.2 0.2 0.26 
24 Paper Mill 0.07 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.09 -0.04 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.16 0.03 
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Table B.1. Continued 
  12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
12 ln(Total TRI, t-1) 1            
13 ln(P2, t-1) 0.15 1           
14 ln(Loc Gov Exp, t-1) -0.03 -0.07 1          
15 ln(State Gov Exp, t-1) -0.12 -0.05 0.78 1         
16 ln(Sierra Membership, t-1) -0.17 -0.07 0.81 0.8 1        
17 Year P2 Adopted -0.09 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.14 1       
18 ln(State Per Cap Inc, t-1) 0.11 0.05 -0.62 -0.6 -0.63 -0.05 1      
19 ln(Ann Mill Capacity, t-1) 0.5 0.05 0 -0.11 -0.16 -0.1 0.07 1     
20 ln(Firm Market Share, t-1) 0.31 0.05 -0.13 -0.16 -0.23 -0.03 0.14 0.04 1    
21 ln(Number of Paper Grades Mill Produces, t-1) 0.32 0.08 -0.06 -0.11 -0.14 -0.06 0.12 0.4 0.08 1   
22 Board Mill, Reference category 0.11 -0.11 0.01 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 0.39 0.1 0.11 1  
23 Pulp Mill 0.2 0.08 -0.01 -0.06 -0.12 -0.1 0.02 0.25 0.06 0.38 -0.09 1 
24 Paper Mill 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.1 0 -0.15 0.28 -0.63 0 
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Appendix C: Essay 3 
C1. Preliminary Endogeneity Checks 
Harrington (2012) suggested that the year of legislative adoption of P2 mandatory 
planning instrument may be endogenous in relation to state-level facility characteristics. 
She ran a state-level probit model with the year of adoption of P2 mandatory planning 
against a number of aggregated facility measures and did not find statistical significance 
among them. Following her suggestion, I test if the P2 legislation variables are 
endogenous individually as well as jointly. Given that there are no endogeneity tests 
available for panel negative binomial methodology, I ran linear and logit with two-way 
fixed effects treating the count of P2 adoptions as a continuous and binary variable. In the 
first case, the estimations ran smoothly, in the second (logit with 2-way FE) the models 
failed to converge. 
For the purposes of providing preliminary estimations of endogeneity, I ran the 
linear regressions using the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation 
(with PROC QLIM in SAS). The suspect endogenous variables are continuous and are: 
year of P2 adoption, year of adoption of numerical goal, year of adoption of reporting 
requirement, and year of adoption of mandatory planning. The tests of each variable 
independently fail to reject the null of no endogeneity. However, when testing for a joint 
null, the model fails to converge. This could be the result of one or more explanatory 
variables having high correlation with the dependent variables. 
The quick look at the correlations mill-by-mill and the history of P2 legislation 
adoption (Table 4.2 of Essay 3, Chapter 4) show that the years of adoption of P2 
reporting requirement and mandatory planning are correlated. This suggests that the two 
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variables should be combined into one. However, the main results presented in Table 4.4 
indicated that the two variables have different impact on all P2 adoptions and especially 
when P2 modifications are disaggregated into two groups – (i) input and process and (ii) 
process, equipment, and product modifications. This further complicates the analysis and 
more research is needed to properly run the econometric estimations. 
From Table 4.2 and the list of states in the current sample, there are two states 
which adopt one, but not the other policy instrument: LA and OH adopted the reporting 
requirement, but not mandatory planning. If including these two states from the sample 
does not change the overall results, then one would be able to say that the findings in 
relation to the negative sign on mandatory planning are robust. I ran Model I with 
additional LA and OH dummy variables, but it failed to converge. I then ran Model I on 
the sample without (1) LA and OH as well as (2) omitting the year of adoption of P2 
legislation and year of adoption of P2 numerical goal, and the results were qualitatively 
the same – the coefficient on the reporting requirement is positive and on the mandatory 
planning is negative and both are highly significant. 
To test for endogeneity due to omitted quality of state’s environmental 
stewardship, I chose state and local monitoring and enforcement budgets to proxy for the 
state’s ability to promote environmental programs. The budget variables are expected to 
be correlated with the years of adoption of state P2 policies and policy instruments, but 
uncorrelated with the error term in the unrestricted model. These may not be the best 
instrumental variables and further work will help identify better instruments for the 
quality of state environmental stewardship. Finally, to control for endogeneity in panel 
data and within the framework of the exponential regressions as the next step of this 
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work, I will follow Wooldridge (2010) and will use the Correlated Random Effects 
(CRE) Poisson methodology.” 
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Table C.1. Correlation Matrix for Essay 3 
# Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Number of New P2 Activities 1           
2 Group 1 P2: New Input and Procedural Modifications 0.9 1          
3 
Group 2 P2: New Process, 
Equipment, and Product 
Modifications 
0.72 0.35 1         
4 Year P2 Adopted, t-1 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 1        
5 Year Adopted, Numerical Goal, t-1 -0.02 0.01 -0.06 0.19 1       
6 Year Adopted, Reporting Requirement, t-1 -0.01 0 -0.03 0.47 0.13 1      
7 Year Adopted, Mandatory Planning, t-1 -0.02 0.01 -0.06 0.4 0.18 0.84 1     
8 P2 State Grant Budget, t-1 -0.13 -0.09 -0.14 0.19 0.14 0.08 0.12 1    
9 Mill TRI, t-1 0.2 0.17 0.16 -0.1 -0.1 -0.03 -0.08 -0.06 1   
10 Mill Inspections, t-1 0.1 0.08 0.1 -0.13 0.01 -0.08 -0.14 -0.04 0.28 1  
11 Mill Enforcements, t-1 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.02 -0.07 0.1 0.02 -0.04 0.17 0.18 1 
12 Sierra Membership, t-1 -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 0.12 -0.14 0.24 0.29 0.12 -0.21 -0.1 -0.03 
13 State Per Capita Income, t-1 0.12 0.12 0.08 -0.03 0.17 -0.1 -0.05 -0.21 0.14 0.07 0 
14 Firm Spillover P2, t-1 0.25 0.22 0.19 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.06 -0.16 0.32 0.14 0.05 
15 Mill Cumulative P2, t-1 0.32 0.32 0.18 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.17 0.3 0.11 0.02 
16 Mill Cumulative Group 1 P2, t-1 0.32 0.37 0.12 0.1 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.15 0.25 0.05 -0.01 
17 Mill Cumulative Group 2 P2, t-1 0.22 0.17 0.22 0.05 -0.02 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.24 0.1 0.06 
18 Annual Mill Capacity, t-1 0.03 0 0.06 -0.11 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.49 0.19 0.17 
19 Number of Mills per Firm, t-1 0.04 0.02 0.06 -0.08 -0.09 -0.04 -0.11 -0.07 0.34 0.09 0.14 
20 Board Mill, Reference Category -0.15 -0.15 -0.08 -0.1 -0.14 0.01 -0.06 -0.03 0.11 0.07 0.14 
21 Pulp Mill 0.08 0.07 0.06 -0.08 -0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.19 0.07 0.03 
22 Paper Mill 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.04 0.11 0 0.03 0.01 0.1 0.07 -0.06 
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Table C.1. Continued 
# Variable 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
12 Sierra Membership, t-1 1           
13 State Per Capita Income, t-1 -0.63 1          
14 Firm Spillover P2, t-1 -0.19 0.16 1         
15 Mill Cumulative P2, t-1 -0.01 0.03 0.3 1        
16 Mill Cumulative Group 1 P2, t-1 -0.03 0.03 0.25 0.92 1       
17 Mill Cumulative Group 2 P2, t-1 0.02 0.02 0.23 0.78 0.57 1      
18 Annual Mill Capacity, t-1 -0.21 0.1 0.14 0.08 0.04 0.09 1     
19 Number of Mills per Firm, t-1 -0.2 0.15 0.49 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.31 1    
20 Board Mill, Reference Category -0.13 -0.04 -0.07 -0.2 -0.18 -0.13 0.38 0.18 1   
21 Pulp Mill -0.13 0.02 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.24 0.09 -0.09 1  
22 Paper Mill 0.05 0.11 0.17 0.23 0.19 0.18 -0.03 0 -0.66 -0.01 1 
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